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Evolution of the Secondary Spectrum Market
Abstract
The secondary spectrum market where primaries (license holders) lease the secondaries (unlicensed users) in
lieu of the financial remuneration can eliminate the inefficiencies of the "static" spectrum allocation policy. We
redress some of the challenges that have inhibited the wide scale deployment of the secondary spectrum
market.
We first consider a secondary spectrum market where the primaries quote their prices for their available
channels at a single location. The transmission rates offered by the channels of primaries evolve randomly
because of the fading and noise. The secondaries decide to buy among the channels based on the transmission
rate and the prices. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with the primaries as players. Each
primary selects a price based on its own channel state only, as it is unaware of the channel states of the other
primaries. We show that under the unique NE strategy profile a primary prices its channel to render the
channel which provides high transmission rate more preferable; this negates the perception that prices ought
to be selected to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their transmission rates.
Next, we consider the setting where the secondary spectrum market operates over multiple locations. Each
primary needs to select an independent set in a conflict graph and the price at each location. We consider two
scenarios--i) the number of locations is small, and ii) the number of locations is large. We show that when the
number of locations is small, in a symmetric NE strategy, each primary sells its channel to an independent set
whose cardinality exceeds a certain threshold. The threshold also decreases as the transmission rate offered by
the channel decreases. The symmetric NE is unique in a widely seen conflict graph-the linear conflict graph. In
contrast, when the number of locations is large, a primary only sells its channel in the maximum independent
set and the symmetric NE in not unique in the linear conflict graph.
Subsequently, we consider the setting where a primary owns a channel at a single location and can acquire the
competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) by incurring a cost. Each primary now needs to decide
whether to acquire the C-CSI or not and a price based on the information it has. We formulate the problem as
a non cooperative game with two primaries as players and characterize the NE strategies. We first characterize
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the
payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for
imperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel
availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation
error. We also show that surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI
acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities.
Finally, we consider the setting where a primary allows multiple secondaries use the channel of a primary at a
location. The interference must be limited at each primary-user terminal (primary-UT) in order to maintain a
quality of service for each primary-UT. The secondary-base stations (secondary-BSs) are self-interested
entities and only maximize their own utilities which makes it difficult to obtain a simple interference
mitigation policy. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative coupled constrained concave game. We use
the concept of the normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) since it caters to the distributed setting. We develop a
distributed algorithm which converges to the unique NNE for a large class of utility functions. In the
distributed algorithm, the secondary-BSs do not need to exchange information among themselves, and the
minimal cooperation from the primary-UTs. When the NNE is not unique or difficult to compute, we
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1734
introduce the concept of WNNE which retains most of the properties of the NNE, but it can be computed
easily compared to the NNE.
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ABSTRACT
EVOLUTION OF THE SECONDARY SPECTRUM MARKET
Arnob Ghosh
Saswati Sarkar
The secondary spectrum market where primaries (license holders) lease the secondaries
(unlicensed users) in lieu of the financial remuneration can eliminate the inefficiencies
of the “static” spectrum allocation policy. We redress some of the challenges that have
inhibited the wide scale deployment of the secondary spectrum market.
We first consider a secondary spectrum market where the primaries quote their prices
for their available channels at a single location. The transmission rates offered by the
channels of primaries evolve randomly because of the fading and noise. The secondaries
decide to buy among the channels based on the transmission rate and the prices. We
formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with the primaries as players. Each
primary selects a price based on its own channel state only, as it is unaware of the
channel states of the other primaries. We show that under the unique NE strategy profile
a primary prices its channel to render the channel which provides high transmission rate
more preferable; this negates the perception that prices ought to be selected to render
channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their transmission rates.
Next, we consider the setting where the secondary spectrum market operates over
multiple locations. Each primary needs to select an independent set in a conflict graph
and the price at each location. We consider two scenarios–i) the number of locations is
vi
small, and ii) the number of locations is large. We show that when the number of locations
is small, in a symmetric NE strategy, each primary sells its channel to an independent
set whose cardinality exceeds a certain threshold. The threshold also decreases as the
transmission rate offered by the channel decreases. The symmetric NE is unique in a
widely seen conflict graph-the linear conflict graph. In contrast, when the number of
locations is large, a primary only sells its channel in the maximum independent set and
the symmetric NE in not unique in the linear conflict graph.
Subsequently, we consider the setting where a primary owns a channel at a single
location and can acquire the competitor’s channel state information (C-CSI) by incurring
a cost. Each primary now needs to decide whether to acquire the C-CSI or not and a price
based on the information it has. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative game
with two primaries as players and characterize the NE strategies. We first characterize the
Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect.
We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We
then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the two
primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show
interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also
show that surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI
acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities.
Finally, we consider the setting where a primary allows multiple secondaries use the
channel of a primary at a location. The interference must be limited at each primary-user
terminal (primary-UT) in order to maintain a quality of service for each primary-UT. The
secondary-base stations (secondary-BSs) are self-interested entities and only maximize
vii
their own utilities which makes it difficult to obtain a simple interference mitigation
policy. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative coupled constrained concave
game. We use the concept of the normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) since it caters to
the distributed setting. We develop a distributed algorithm which converges to the unique
NNE for a large class of utility functions. In the distributed algorithm, the secondary-
BSs do not need to exchange information among themselves, and the minimal cooperation
from the primary-UTs. When the NNE is not unique or difficult to compute, we introduce
the concept of WNNE which retains most of the properties of the NNE, but it can be
computed easily compared to the NNE.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The demand for mobile broadband is increasing due to the proliferation of wireless devices
(e.g. smartphones, tablets, kindles etc.). According to a recent study, almost 30 billion
devices will be connected via wireless by 2020. As a result, there is a widespread belief
that the wireless spectrum is becoming increasingly crowded. However, recent studies
suggest that the licensed spectrum is largely underutilized [1]. This is because, tradi-
tionally, a spectrum regulator (e.g. FCC in USA) allocates a fixed frequency band to a
service provider (primary1) for its “ exclusive use” (which is known as a ‘static’ spectrum
allocation policy), so, the frequency band can not be used by others even if it is not
utilized by the licensee 2.
To eliminate the above inefficient usage of the licensed spectrum, researchers propose
1We use the word primary service provider and primary interchangeably.
2This is also known as ”the tragedy of anticommons”[37]
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that the primary providers should allow unlicensed users (secondaries3) to access the
channel. Towards that end, both the technical and legal hurdles have already been re-
moved. The advent of the cognitive radio technology has enabled the users to intelligently
select the idle frequency bands and switch across the bands as per the necessity. FCC has
legalized the TV “white space usage” in 2004.
However, the secondary spectrum access will only proliferate if it is rendered profitable
to the primaries. Realizing the above, TV white space trading where primaries lease their
spectrum in lieu of financial remuneration has already been initiated. As of now4, company
such as ‘Spectrum Bridge’ acts as a spectrum broker and acquires the information of the
unused spectrum from the primaries and advertises them in its database. The secondaries
can buy them through an auction mechanism or direct negotiation with the primaries.
The spectrum brokers retain a portion of the price paid by the secondary and forward
the rest to the primary. The primaries lease their spectrum on the long term basis (e.g.
yearly, or monthly).
However, the spectrum trading is yet to be widely deployed. This is because [2]–
• Primary can use the channel only in a limited manner during the period of the
lease. Since the lease is on a long term basis, the primary is reluctant to lease the
spectrum as it may need it in near future.
3The word ’secondary’ may denote to either the local wireless service provider which does not have
license of the spectrum or the end-users which can buy the Cognitive Radio devices and can access the
spectrum of the primary.
4There are also some spectrum trading based on the one-to-one negotiation between the secondary and
the primary, however it has some serious drawbacks; such as the secondary can not choose among all the
TV white spaces, and compare the prices from other primaries.
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• It is difficult for a primary to decide a price on the long term basis as the valuation
of its spectrum may change in future depending on the availability of the other
spectrum.
• Primaries feel that the spectrum brokers (e.g. ‘Spectrum Bridge’, ‘M2M Spectrum
Networks’) may acquire most of the profit reducing the profits of the primaries.
• Spectrum Brokers have to maintain a database of unused spectrum over a large
number of locations which is a challenging task. A large amount of information has
to be exchanged between the primary and the spectrum broker, and the secondary
and the spectrum broker for a transaction.
• The transaction costs are high. There is also a delay in approval of such lease (FCC
generally takes 45-60 days to approve such lease).
Failure of the above markets have motivated the researchers to consider the alternatives
such as short term leasing of the spectrum. The short term leasing has some potential
advantages. For example, the primaries are no longer required to adapt their own usage in
order to honor the secondary usage on a long term basis. It will also enable the primary to
decide price efficiently as the primary only has to know the valuation of the spectrum for a
small time period. Spectrum brokers are also unnecessary, thus all the complications with
the spectrum brokers do not arise. Though the peak usage of the primary’s spectrum is
high, the usage of a primary’s spectrum fluctuates drastically over short time [8]. Thus, if
the secondary spectrum is operated on a short term, more spectrum can be made available
to the secondaries. The transaction cost in such a short term market will also be low.
The real time secondary spectrum market also has some additional benefits. Apart from
3
the local service providers (which mainly act as the secondaries in the long term lease)
the end-users can also act as secondaries and use the spectrum on the short term basis
by paying the primaries, thus, the demand will also increase. Apart from the traditional
primaries such as the wireless service providers, and the TV broadcasters, owners of
various WiFi Access points (e.g. hotel owners, Airport authorities, hotspot owners) can
also lease their channels to the secondaries on a short term basis.
Real time secondary spectrum market where the primaries lease their spectrum on
a short term basis has already been proposed in the wireless economy literature [65, 8].
Based on the above observations and from [8] the criteria for the success of the secondary
spectrum market are–i) the leases are made in the short term basis (e.g. hourly, or daily
basis), ii) the trading should be well understood by the participants and the exchange of
information should be limited, iii) primaries have to be compensated adequately– mul-
tiple primaries can directly quote their prices to the secondaries i.e. the market should
be devoid of spectrum brokers, iv) the trading should facilitate efficient allocation, and
v) primaries can lease the channels to the secondary without affecting the performance
degradation of the primary-UTs in order to avoid “the tragedy of commons”5.
However, there exist major challenges before the deploying of the secondary spectrum
market on the short term basis. There are two broad categories of challenges. First,
there are some policy issues which have to be circumvented through new regulations. For
example, FCC has to reduce the transaction costs, and the current delays in transactions.
FCC is already working in this direction [77]. Second, there are several technical issues
5FCC has also defined “interference temperature” as a specific way to constrain interference at the
primary-user terminals.
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which have so far inhibited the deployment of the secondary spectrum market. This
dissertation seeks to redress some of those challenges enabling the large scale proliferation
of the secondary spectrum market.
We consider a secondary spectrum market which is easy to operate in the real time.
In this market, a primary chooses a price for its available channel in a database without
coordinating with the other primaries. The secondaries then decide on the channels to buy
based on the qualities. The market is readily scalable. Note that it eliminates the need
of spectrum brokers. Yet, the primaries need a framework to decide their prices which we
focus on this dissertation. The selection of the prices will be different depending on various
associated factors such as– the variation of the channel states over time, the information
that the primaries have, the various stages of the deployment of the secondary spectrum
market, and the cost of obtaining an additional information. In the following, we discuss
the challenges involved in designing the frameworks for selecting the prices in each of
the above in detail. We also discuss the challenges involved in designing an interference
mitigation policy when multiple self-interested secondaries use the channel of a primary
at a location.
1.2 Quality Sensitive Price Competition in the Secondary
Spectrum Market: Single Location
The quality of the wireless spectrum evolves randomly over time because of the fading, the
noise and the usage statistics of the subscribers of the primaries. Such time dependent
factors do not arise in the long term leasing. At a certain time the transmission rate
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offered by the channel of a primary may be very low which may be of low value to a
secondary, but the same channel can offer a very high transmission rate at some other
time which may be of high value to a secondary. In general, the primary is aware of its
own channel state, however, it is not aware of the channel state of its competitors. This
is because–
• A primary has to estimate the channel state of its competitor by sensing and analyz-
ing the traffic pattern which may be costly. Thus, the primary may decide against
it.
• Even if the primary estimates the channel state of the competitor, the estimation
error may be large because of the fast fading, noise and measurement error. Thus,
acquiring the channel state information (CSI) of the competitor may not be bene-
ficial to a primary.
• Note that if a primary knows that the channel state of its competitor is poor, then
it can select a very high price as it will have a monopoly power. The regulator may
dictate against acquiring the CSI of the competitor in order to avoid a primary
having the monopoly power.
We expect that initially secondary market on the short term basis is likely to be
introduced in geographically dispersed locations which are unlikely to interfere with each
other. In Chapter 2 we consider a secondary spectrum market where each primary selects a
price based on its own channel state to the secondary at a location6. The secondaries select
channels depending on the prices and the transmission rates. However, since a primary is
6Since there is only one secondary, the primary can specify the interference limit to the secondary [65].
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unaware of transmission rates offered by channels of its competitors; this special feature
known as uncertainty in competition7 complicates the analysis. For example, if a primary
quotes a high price, it will earn a large profit if it sells its channel, but may not be able
to sell at all; on the other hand a low price will enhance the probability of a sale but may
also fetch lower profits in the event of a sale. Further, the impact of the transmission rate
on the pricing strategy of a primary is also not apriori clear. In Chapter 2 we characterize
the pricing strategies, analyze their properties and the payoffs of the primaries.
1.3 Multiple Locations: Spatial Reuse
The market must eventually operate on a region consisting of multiple locations. In
Chapter 3 we consider the setting where a primary owns a channel over multiple locations
and seeks to lease its channel to at most one secondary at each location. Radio spectrum
possess a special property known as spatial reuse: The same spectrum band can be utilized
simultaneously at geographically dispersed locations without interference; but the same
band can not be utilized simultaneously at interfering locations. This special feature
adds another dimension in the strategic interaction as now a primary has to cull a set
of non-interfering locations, which is denoted as an independent set in the conflict graph
representation of the region[80]; at which to offer its channel apart from selecting a price
at every node of that set. Intuitively, a primary would like to make its channel available
at an independent set of the maximum size (cardinality). However, a primary is not
7Note that a secondary only buys a channel which offers a transmission rate above a certain threshold.
Thus, if the transmission rate offered by the channel of a primary is very low, the primary can not sell its
channel. Thus, a primary is also not aware of the number of competitors with whom it is competing.
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aware of the channel states of its competitors. Thus, at a maximum independent set a
primary may face a stiff competition from the other primaries which have higher quality
channels at the maximum independent sets. Thus, the primary may achieve higher payoff
by setting high price at small independent sets (where the competition is not so intense).
It is also not apriori clear what are the independent sets that a primary will select based
on the transmission rate offered by the channel.
In Chapter 3, we consider two settings–i) the channel state is the same throughout
the region, ii) the channel state can vary across the locations. The first setting is likely
to arise in initial deployment of the secondary market where the market will consist of a
small number of locations. When the number of locations is large (which occurs in the
later stage of deployment of the secondary market) the second setting is likely to arise.
1.4 To acquire the CSI of the competitor or not?
In Chapter 4 we extend the setting discussed in section 1.2 to consider the scenario where
a primary can acquire the CSI of the other primaries. However, a primary incurs a cost
to acquire the CSI. For example, a primary needs to sense the channel of other primaries
and analyze their traffic patterns. The primary, then, needs to estimate the channel state
based on that information. All these processes require power which is costly to procure.
Each primary needs to decide i) whether to acquire the CSI of other primaries, and ii)
the price depending on whether it has acquired the CSI of the competitors or not. The
channel is available (unavailable, resp.) if the transmission rate offered is higher (lower,
resp.) compared to a threshold.
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We now illustrate the challenges involved in analyzing the setting. A primary needs
to select whether to acquire the CSI of its competitors and a price when its own channel
is available. However, while taking its own decision a primary does not know whether its
competitors decide to acquire the CSI or not. Knowledge of the CSI of the other primary
has potential advantage. For example, if the primary knows that the competitors’ channels
are not available, then, it can select the highest possible price and still can sell its channel
because of the lack of competition. Thus, conventional wisdom suggests that a primary
should acquire the CSI of the competitors and gain a higher payoff. However, conventional
wisdom is not definitive. For example, if the other primaries also acquire the CSI, then
they may select lower prices if the number of available channels are high which also may
reduce the expected payoff of the primary as the primary also needs to select a lower
price to sell its channel. Additionally, a primary incurs a cost to acquire the CSI of the
competitors. Thus, it is not apriori clear whether a primary acquires the CSI of the other
primaries.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitor’s decision also complicates the pricing
strategy of the primary. The pricing strategy not only depends on the information the
primary has, but also the information its competitors’ have. For example, suppose that
there are two primaries. If the primary (A) knows that the channel of the competitor (B)
is unavailable, then it will select a higher price, however, if the channel of the primary B
is available, then whether primary A will be able to sell its channel inherently depends on
the price selected by primary B. On the other hand, the price of primary B inherently
depends on whether it acquires the CSI of the primary A or not. Primary B may select
different prices depending on whether it acquires the CSI of primary A or not. This in
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turn complicates the decision of primary A as primary A is unaware of the decision of the
primary B.
If a primary acquires the CSI of its competitors’ it selects a price depending on how
many competitors’ channel states are known and how many channels are available. Note
that in Section 1.2 we consider the setting where the primaries do not know the channel
states of their competitors. Thus, a primary only needs to select a price depending on
only its own channel state in the setting considered in Section 1.2. As explained in
the previous paragraph, in this setting, the price of the primary also depends on the
information its competitors have. However, a primary (A, say) is also unaware whether
the other primaries have acquired the CSI of their competitors’ and how many channels
are available among the acquired CSIs (if it does so), while in the setting considered
in Section 1.2 the primary A knows that the CSIs of the competitors are also unknown
to other primaries. Thus, there is also additional uncertainty regarding the information
that the competitors of primary A have in this setting. The error in estimating the
channel state is also very common because of the noise in the environment, the lack of
co-ordination among the primaries, and the fast fading of the channel. Thus, even if a
primary estimates the CSI of the competitor, the actual channel state of the competitor
can be different from the estimated state. To simplify the analysis, we consider that there
are two primaries and the channel is either available or unavailable i.e. the available
channels are statistically identical. It also resembles the competition setting in practice
as in many countries the wireless market is mostly shared by only two primary service
providers. For example, in the USA, Verizon and AT&T have a combined market share
of almost 70%.
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We characterize the impact of the estimation errors, the cost of acquiring the CSI of
the competitors and the channel availability probabilities on the decision, and the payoffs
of the primaries in Chapter 4.
1.5 Co-existence of Multiple secondaries in the channel of
a Primary
When multiple secondaries use the spectrum of a primary at a location, the interference
mitigation policy is required to limit the interference at each primary-UT. However, the
secondaries are independent entities which only want to maximize their own utilities.
A secondary is also unaware of the channel parameters of the other users, thus, the
interference mitigation in such a setting is an uphill task [8].
In Chapter 5, we consider the setting where a primary allows multiple secondaries to
use the channel simultaneously at a given location along with the primary users8. Specif-
ically, we consider a setting where multiple pairs of secondary-Base stations (secondary-
BSs) and secondary-user terminals (secondary-UTs) co-exist with multiple primary-user
terminals (primary-UTs). A secondary-BS serves the secondary-UT. A secondary-BS
must select its transmission power using cognitive radio technology such that the total
interference from secondary-BSs at each primary-UT is below an acceptable threshold.
Since each secondary-BS is an independent entity and selects its transmission power
level in order to maximize only its own utility, a non cooperative game theoretic setting
8The above setting differs from the ‘‘spectrum commons model” since we consider that secondaries
must transmit with powers such that the interference must be limited at the primary-users.
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is a preferable model in this context. A distributed algorithm is also preferable to obtain
an equilibrium in order to keep the exchange of information among the secondary-BSs
limited. Despite the minimal exchange of information, the secondary-BSs must satisfy the
interference constraint at each primary-UT. Since the secondary-BSs are not operated by
the primary-BS owners and primary-UTs are oblivious of the number of active secondary-
BSs, the exchange of information between primary- and secondary-BSs should also be
limited. To summarize, our goal is to obtain an equilibrium power allocation strategy
profile using a distributed approach based on a non cooperative game theoretic setting
with secondary-BSs as players. Additionally, the primary-UTs should be oblivious of the
secondary-BSs and the interference constraint should be satisfied at each primary-UT. In
Chapter 5 we provide an equilibrium strategy profile among the secondaries which satisfy
the above characteristics.
1.6 Our Contributions and Related Literature
1.6.1 Uncertainty in Competition: Single Location Game
In Chapter 2 we consider the setting where the primary owns a channel only at a single
location. As discussed in Section 1.2 the primary is only aware of the channel state of
its own channel, however, it is not aware of the channel state of its competitors. We
formulate the price selection as a game in which each primary selects a price depending
on the transmission rate its channel provides. We consider that the preference of the
secondaries can be captured by a penalty function which associates a penalty value to
each channel that is available for sale depending on its transmission rate and the price
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quoted. Secondaries prefer the channels which induce lower penalty values. Since there
is an one-to-one relationship between price and penalty we consider penalty selection
strategies instead of price selection strategies. We characterize the Nash equilibrium
(NE) penalty selection strategies. We show that for a large class of penalty functions,
there exists a unique NE strategy profile, which we explicitly compute.
We show that the unique NE strategy profile is symmetric i.e. price selection strategy
of all primaries are statistically identical. We show that at channel state i, the primary
selects a penalty from the interval [Li, Ui] where Ui ≤ Lj if the channel quality is low
when the channel state is in state j compared to state i . Thus, our analysis reveals that
primaries select price in a manner such that the preference order of transmission rates
is retained. This negates the intuition that prices ought to be selected so as to render
all transmission rates equally preferable to a secondary. The analysis also reveals that
the unique NE strategy profile consists of “nice” cumulative distributions in that they
are continuous and strictly increasing; the former rules out pure strategy NEs and the
latter ensures that the support sets are contiguous. We also numerically show that as the
number of states goes to infinity each primary selects a pure pricing strategy at a given
channel state.
Subsequently, utilizing the explicit computation algorithm for the symmetric NE
strategies, we analytically investigate the reduction in expected profit suffered under the
unique symmetric NE pricing strategies as compared to the maximum possible value al-
lowing for collusion among primaries. Finally, we extend our one shot game at single
location, to a repeated game where primaries interact with each other multiple number
of times and compute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in which a primary
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attains a payoff which is arbitrarily close to the payoff that a primary would have ob-
tained if primaries select prices jointly; thus, price competition does not lower payoff in a
repeated game.
Related Literature
Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics as a non co-
operative Bertrand Game [59] and its modifications [64, 51]. The price competition among
wireless service providers have also been explored to a great extent ([41, 58, 57, 83, 62, 63,
91, 47, 76, 13, 89, 43, 87, 73, 49]). We divide this genre of works in two parts: i) Papers
which model price competition as Auction where a central auctioneer or spectrum broker
collect the bids and allocates the spectrum to the secodnaries ([73, 85]), and ii) Papers
which model the price competition as a non co-operative game ([41, 58, 57, 83, 62, 63, 47,
43, 87, 76, 89, 55, 13, 49]). We now distinguish our work with respect to these papers.
As compared to the genre of work in the first category our model has some advantages.
First, in our model, a central auctioneer or spectrum broker is not required. Second, since
the channel states of the primaries evolve randomly, the prices also fluctuate in the auction
framework considered in [73, 85]. For example, when the number of secondaries is higher
than the number of available channels, the price is set at the highest possible value which
reduce the utilities of the secondaries; on the other hand, when the number of high quality
channels are higher compared to the number of secondaries, the price is set at the lowest
possible value which reduce the payoffs of the primaries to 0. Thus, the primaries and
secondaries may not participate in such a market. However, in our setting since a primary
is not aware of the channel states of the other primaries, it neither selects too high price
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nor too low price. Thus, primaries and secondaries always achieve positive payoffs which
provide incentives to the primaries and secondaries to participate in the secondary market.
Third, it is not clear that players will bid truthfully in the auction framework. In [73, 85]
a VCG type auction has been proposed which is proved to be truthful, however, in the
VCG auction the payment made to the primaries is not straightforward, the payment to
a primary depends on the “ externality” added by a primary on the other competitors. A
computationally intensive algorithm is required to find the price to be paid to the primary.
On the contrary, in our setting the primaries quote their prices, and the secondary pays the
primary whatever it quotes if the secondary buys the channel. Hence, our setting is readily
scalable and implementable in practice. Fourth, despite the non cooperative setting, our
result shows that a socially efficient outcome9 is achieved in our setting. Specifically, we
show that the high quality channels are rendered more profitable compared to the low
quality channels.
Some papers in the second category [43, 87, 76, 89, 13, 49] considered the quality of
primaries as a factor while selecting the price. But all of these papers mentioned above,
ignore uncertainty in competition which distinguish secondary spectrum oligopoly from
standard oligopolies: a primary selects a price knowing only the transmission rate of its
own channel; it is unaware of transmission rates offered by channels of its competitors.
We have considered the uncertainty in competition.
Some recent works ([45],[42],[50], [46]) that consider uncertainty in competition assume
that the commodity on sale can be in one of two states: available or otherwise. This
9In Chapter, we also provide one more advantage of our approach compared to the auction mechanism.
Prices have more variability when it is set in an auction framework compared to our approach.
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assumption does not capture different transmission rates offered by available channels. A
primary may now need to employ different pricing strategies and different independent
set selection strategies for different transmission rates, while in the former case a single
pricing and independent set selection strategy will suffice as a price needs not be quoted
for an unavailable commodity. Our investigation in Chapter 2 seeks to contribute in this
space.
1.6.2 Spatial Reuse
Subsequently in Chapter 3, we consider the setting where a primary owns a channel over
multiple locations which we briefly introduced in Section 1.3. We devise the problem as a
game in which each primary’s strategy space consists of independent set selection strategy
and the pricing strategy at each node of the independent set when the channel is available
for sale. The channel is assumed to be in either one of the states 0, 1 . . . , n where lower
channel state represents lower transmission quality. When the channel is in state 0, the
transmission rate is very low and thus, we consider the channel is not available for sale.
Scenario 1
We consider two possible scenarios. First , we consider the setting when the region is small
consisting of few locations. Therefore, the usage statistics and the propagation condition
of a channel do not vary substantially over the region. Thus, we assume that the channel
state is identical at each location in this setting. In the initial stages of deployment of the
secondary market, it is expected that the secondary market will be introduced in small
regions consisting of a few locations. Hence, the price competition in this setting reduces
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to a price selection problem where the transmission quality of each primary remains the
same throughout the region.
We first show that there may exist multiple asymmetric NEs. Asymmetric NEs are
difficult to implement in the symmetric game that we consider. We, therefore, focus only
on finding symmetric NEs subsequently. We prove a separation theorem which entails that
the NE pricing strategy at each location can be uniquely computed if the independent
set selection strategy is known. By virtue of our work in Chapter 2 which characterizes
pricing strategies of primaries for different transmission rates when the region has only
one location (i.e. no spatial reuse), we then focus only on the independent set selection
strategy.
In this setting, we focus on a particular class of conflict graphs, introduced as mean
valid graph [46] since most of the small graphs observed in practice are mean valid graphs.
In a mean valid graph, nodes can be partitioned in d disjoint maximal independent sets
namely I1, . . . , Id [46]. But the total number of independent sets in such a graph may
be substantially large; generally, the number of independent sets grows exponentially
with the number of nodes. We show that there exists a symmetric NE strategy which
selects independent sets only amongst I1, . . . , Id which characterize the mean valid graph;
we explicitly compute the strategy. Such a strategy profile can be stored using a d
dimensional vector. Thus, the space required to store strategy profile scales with d rather
than increasing exponentially with nodes. Primaries also need to know only I1, . . . , Id
rather than the entire graph in order to compute a symmetric NE.
The characterization of the symmetric NE strategy profile reveals that a primary
only selects an independent set whose cardinality is greater than or equal to a certain
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threshold. This threshold turns out to be a non-decreasing function of channel quality.
Thus, when the channel quality is high, a primary restricts itself only to independent sets
of large cardinalities; when the channel quality is poor, the primary diversifies among
independent sets of different sizes. We show using an example that arises in practice that
primaries only offer their poor quality channels at independent sets of lower cardinalities.
Thus, a social planner may have to provide some incentives to primaries so as to ensure
that users of those locations can get access to higher quality channels.
Next, we examine the uniqueness among symmetric NE strategy profiles in mean valid
graphs. Nodes in such a graph can be partitioned into different collections of maximal
independent sets (Fig. 3.6). A primary in general would not know the partition other
primaries are selecting. Our result reveals that each such partition leads to a unique
symmetric NE; yet primaries need not co-ordinate with each other regarding the partition
one is selecting. Hence the symmetric NE strategy profile is easy to implement. We also
show that all these symmetric NEs lead to the same node selection probabilities. The NE
pricing strategy at a node depends only on the probability with which it is selected. Thus,
all these symmetric NEs are functionally unique. Finally, we focus on a special class of
mean valid graphs known as linear graphs (Fig. 3.1) which frequently arises in practice
such as in the modeling of communication nodes over a highway or a row of shops. We
prove that the symmetric NE strategy is unique (is not merely functionally unique) in
linear graphs.
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Scenario 2
Subsequently, we consider the scenario when the secondary spectrum market is operated
on a large region consisting of several locations. In this setting the transmission quality
of a channel may be different at different locations in the region. Thus, a primary needs
to specify a strategy for each possible channel state across the network. The number of
channel states and thus, the strategy space increases exponentially with number of nodes.
The conflict graph representation of the region depends on the channel state across each
location since a primary must select an independent set of nodes only among those nodes
where the channel is available for sale. A primary is not aware of the conflict graph from
which other primaries are selecting their independent sets let alone their channel states.
The characterization of a symmetric NE strategy profile in the above setting is thus, more
challenging. We simplify the model by assuming that the channel is either available or
not (i.e. n = 1), but the availability can differ across the nodes.
We focus on node symmetric or node transitive graphs [70] such as finite cyclic graph,
infinite lattice graphs (e.g. infinite linear graph (infinite in both directions), infinite square
graph, infinite grid graph, infinite triangular graphs)[79] which arise in practice when the
region becomes large. We allow some statistical correlations which arise naturally among
the channel states at different locations when the number of locations is large. We show
that there exists a symmetric NE strategy profile (SPsym ) for those graphs. In the
symmetric NE strategy profile, a primary randomizes uniformly among the maximum in-
dependent sets (the independent set of the highest cardinality). A primary thus only need
to enumerate the maximum independent sets in order to determine SPsym. In contrast to
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the setting where the channel state remains the same through the network, in SPsym the
channel is offered at every node with equal probability. We also show that SPsym may not
be an NE in a finite linear graph which is not a node symmetric graph. We show that the
symmetric NE may not be unique for a linear graph unlike the setting where the channel
state remains the same throughout the network.
In SPsym each primary needs to enumerate the maximum independent sets. The
number of independent sets grow exponentially with the nodes. However, at a given
channel state vector over the region, the conflict graph may consist of several components.
A primary can find maximum independent sets and SPsym in each component in parallel.
However, the number of maximum independent sets in a component grows exponentially
with the number of nodes in the component. We, thus, investigate the size of the expected
component size both analytically and empirically. Empirical result shows that the average
size of components is often moderate and the upper bound computed analytically is often
loose. However, empirical and analytical results show that the component size can be
substantially large when the channel availability probability is large. In order to control
the component size, we consider the setting where each primary decides to estimate the
channel state at a node with a certain probability (p). A primary then sells its channel at
nodes only amongst the nodes where it estimates the channel. We show that SPsym is a
NE strategy in this setting as well. However, if p is small, then a primary can only sell its
channel at few locations which will potentially reduce the payoff. A primary thus needs
to select p judiciously in order to attain a required trade-off between the computation
cost and the expected payoff.
Finally, we numerically compare the expected profit obtained by the primaries using
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our NE strategy profile in both of the settings to the maximum possible profit allowing
for collusion among primaries.
Related Literature
Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics which we have
analyzed in the previous section. However, most of the papers did not consider the spatial
reuse property of the secondary spectrum market. Only papers [31, 91, 46] considered
the spatial reuse property. [91, 31] considered an Auction framework where a central
auctioneer runs the auction to determine the winners. In our framework, we do not need
any auctioneer. The computational complexity is also higher to determine the winner with
the spatial reuse in an auction framework. We have provided computationally efficient
NE strategies. The different channel states across the network is also not considered in
the above framework.
We now distinguish our contributions compared to [46] which is the closest to our work.
First, [46] considered that the channel state remains the same throughout the region and
the state of the channel can be either 0 (not available for sale) or 1 (available); this
assumption does not capture the different transmission qualities offered by the available
channels. When we consider that the channel state remains the same throughout the
network we consider that the available channel can be in one of the n states depending on
the transmission qualities. Thus, in our setting a primary now needs to employ different
pricing strategies and different independent set selection strategies for different channel
states while in the former case a single pricing and independent set selection strategy
would suffice as the price need not be quoted for an unavailable commodity. Second, we
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also consider the setting where the channel state need not be the same unlike in [46]. In
our setting a primary does not know the conflict graph of other primaries from which they
will select their independent sets. Thus, the collection of independent sets from which
a primary selects an independent set may be different for different primaries at a given
time slot since the channel state vector may be different for different primaries. Whereas
in [46] the channel is either available at all locations or unavailable at any location. Thus
in [46], a primary knows the conflict graph from which other primaries will select their
independent sets when their channels are available. Thus, the characterization of an
NE becomes significantly challenging in our setting compared to [46]. The result we
obtain also significantly differs from [46]. For example, in [46] a primary can select an
independent set of lower cardinalities, however, in our setting, a primary only selects the
maximum independent set. Additionally, the symmetric NE is unique in a finite linear
graph in [46], whereas there are infinitely many symmetric NEs in our setting.
1.6.3 Provision of acquiring the CSI of the competitor
In Chapter 4 we consider the setting where a primary can acquire the CSI of its competitor
by incurring the cost which we briefly introduced in Section 1.4. Note from Section 1.4 we
only consider the setting where there are two primaries and the channel is either available
or unavailable. We model the setting as a non-cooperative game with two primaries as
players. When the channel of a primary is available, each primary decides i) whether to
acquire the competitor’s CSI or not, and ii) a price. Selection of the price depends on the
information the primary has. Specifically, if the primary acquires the competitor’s CSI it
may select different prices depending on whether its competitor’s channel is available or
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not. On the other hand, when the primary does not acquire the competitor’s CSI, it has
to select a price irrespective of the competitor’s channel state. We characterize the Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategies.
Basic Model: We first consider a basic model where each primary accurately estimates
the channel state of its competitor by acquiring its CSI. The channel availability proba-
bility and the cost of acquiring the competitor’s CSI (C-CSI) are the same for both the
primaries. We introduce a [T, p] class of strategy and show that there exists NE strategy
profile which is of the above form. In the [T, p] type strategy–i) a primary acquires the
C-CSI with probability (w.p.) p when the cost is below T and ii) does not acquire the
C-CSI when the cost is above T . We, additionally, show that p increases as the cost of
acquiring the C-CSI decreases. It is apparent that as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI
decreases, a primary should acquire the C-CSI with a higher probability. However, we
show that a primary never acquires the C-CSI with probability 1 irrespective of the cost.
Additionally, we also show that T depends on the availability probability of the com-
petitor and it increases as the uncertainty of the availability of the competitor’s channel
increases.
We find that the expected payoff of a primary is independent of the cost of acquiring
the C-CSI and is the same as in the setting where acquiring the C-CSI is not possible.
Thus, we have the following counter-intuitive result: the ability to acquire the competitor’s
CSI does not increase the expected payoff of the primary.
Intuitively, when a primary knows (does not know, resp.) the channel of its competitor
is available, a primary should select prices more conservatively (aggressively, resp.). Our
results validate the above intuition and go beyond. We show that when the primary knows
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that its competitor’s channel is available then it selects its price from an interval [L, p˜1],
on the other hand when the primary does not know the channel state of its competitor
then it selects its channel from the interval [p˜1, v] where v is the highest possible price.
We have fully characterized p˜1 and L. In the NE pricing strategy, both the primaries
select their prices from an interval using a continuous distribution.
Impact of the Estimation Error: We, subsequently, investigate the impact of the chan-
nel estimation error on the decision, payoff and the pricing strategy of the primary. Specif-
ically, we consider the setting where each primary accurately estimates the channel state
of its competitor with a probability qs. Conventional wisdom suggests that decrease in
the error in estimating the channel state should increase the payoff. However, conven-
tional wisdom is not definitive because of the following. A primary selects a higher price
even when it estimates that the channel of the competitor is available as the channel may
be unavailable with a positive probability if there is an error in estimation. The pricing
strategy also inherently depends on the estimation error. We characterize the impact of
the estimation error on the strategy and the payoff of a primary in Chapter 4.
We show that there exists a [T, p] type NE strategy where the threshold T decreases
as the error in estimation increases. Intuitively, increasing estimation error leads to more
uncertainty about the C-CSI, making acquiring the C-CSI less attractive for larger costs.
We show that the probability p with which a primary acquires the C-CSI increases as the
acquisition cost decreases. Interestingly, we show that the expected payoff of a primary
is higher when there is an error in estimating the C-CSI. Thus, it negates conventional
wisdom that the payoff of the primary should decrease as the error increases. In contrast
to the basic model, the expected payoff also increases as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI
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decreases.
We show that when the primary estimates that the competitor’s channel is available
(unavailable, resp.) then it randomizes among the prices in the interval [p˜1, LN ] ([L0, v],
resp.) where L0 > LN and v is the highest possible price. When the primary does
not estimate the C-CSI, then, it neither selects a too high price nor a too low price;
specifically, it selects its price from the interval [LN , L0]. Apparently, when a primary
knows that the channel of its competitor is available (unavailable, resp.) with a higher
probability, a primary selects a lower (higher, resp.) price. In the basic model, when the
primary accurately estimates that the channel of the competitor is unavailable, it selects
the highest possible price v w.p. 1. However, when there is an error in estimating the
channel state, the channel of the competitor may be available even when it estimates
that the channel is unavailable. Thus, a primary also selects a lower price. We also show
that the variance of the price selected by a primary increases as the estimation error (the
acquisition cost, resp.) decreases.
Impact of Unequal cost of acquiring the CSI: We, subsequently, investigate the setting
where different primaries may have different costs of acquiring the C-CSI. The impact of
different C-CSI acquisition costs on the frequency with which each primary acquires the
C-CSI is not apriori clear. For example, the primary (say, 1) who incurs a lower cost,
can acquire the CSI of the competitor (say 2) more often. However, primary 2 may also
acquire the C-CSI and select a lower price when the channel of primary 1 is available.
Thus, primary 1 has to select a lower price which reduces the possibility of acquiring the
C-CSI. The pricing strategy also inherently depends on the frequency with which each
primary acquires the CSI of its competitor. We characterize the NE strategies, and the
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payoffs of the primaries.
We show that the NE strategy is of the form [T, pi] for primary i. Though the thresh-
olds are the same pis are different for different primaries. We show that the primary 1
acquires the C-CSI with a higher probability compared to the primary 2. The expected
payoff of primary 2 is the same the payoff it obtained when it did not acquire the C-CSI,
thus, the provision of the acquiring the C-CSI does not impact the payoff of the primary
which has higher acquisition cost. However, in contrast to the basic model, the expected
payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to the expected payoff of the primary 2 when pri-
mary 1 acquires the C-CSI . Additionally, the expected payoff of the primary 1 decreases
as the difference between the costs of acquiring the CSI decreases.
We show that the primary i selects its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v], resp.)
when primary i acquires (does not acquire, resp.) the C-CSI and the channel of that
primary is available. However, we show that in contrast to the basic model, p˜1 > p˜2. We,
also, show that primary 2 selects its price from a distribution which has a discontinuity at
the highest possible price when it does not acquire the C-CSI. Thus, the primary which
has higher cost of acquiring the C-CSI, selects higher prices with higher probabilities when
it does not acquire the C-CSI.
Impact of Unequal availability probabilities: We, subsequently, investigate the impact
of primaries having different availability probabilities on the competition. The frequency
with which each primary acquires the C-CSI can not be readily concluded because of the
following. Acquiring the C-CSI depends on the availability probability of the competitor.
If the availability probability is high or low, a primary may not acquire the C-CSI. On
the other hand if the uncertainty is high regarding the availability of the competitor’s
26
channel, a primary will more likely to acquire the C-CSI. Since primaries have different
availability probabilities, thus, it is not apriori clear whether the primary which has higher
availability probability (say, 1) will acquire the C-CSI compared to the other primary (say,
2). Conventional wisdom suggests that the payoff of the primary should not decrease with
the decrease in the cost of acquiring the C-CSI. However, it is not definitive because of
the following. If primary 1 acquires the C-CSI with a higher probability, it selects a
lower price when the channel of primary 2 is available. Since the channel of primary 1
is available with a higher probability, the channel state of primary 2 will be known to
primary 1 with a higher probability. Thus, primary 2 selects a lower price in order to sell
its available channel which may reduce the payoff of primary 2. The pricing strategy of
each primary also inherently depends on the frequencies with which each primary acquires
the CSI of its competitor. We resolve all these quandaries.
We show a NE strategy which is of the form [Ti, pi] for primary i. We show that
T1 > T2 and p1 > p2. Thus, interestingly, irrespective of the availability probabilities
primary 1 acquires the C-CSI more frequently compared to the primary 2 when the cost
is below T1. The expected payoff of primary 1 is also higher compared to primary 2.
Moreover, the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI
of its competitor decreases which negates conventional wisdom that the payoff of a primary
should not decrease as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI decreases.
We show that primary i selects its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v] ,resp.) when
it acquires (does not acquire, resp.) the C-CSI and the channel of the competitor is
available. We, show that p˜1 > p˜2, thus, even when primary 1 acquires the C-CSI it selects
a higher price compared to primary 2 when the channel of the competitor is available. We
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also show that in contrast to the basic model, primary 1 selects its price from a function
which has a discontinuity at the highest possible price when it does not acquire the C-CSI.
Apparently, since primary 1 has a higher availability probability, it selects higher prices
with higher probabilities when it does not acquire the C-CSI.
Related Literature
Some recent papers [45, 42] imposed the constraint where the players can not know the
channel states of their competitors. However, in our setting a primary (A, say) is also
unaware whether the other primary has an acquired the CSI of A, while in [45, 42] the
primary A knows that its CSI is unknown to other primary. Thus, a primary now needs to
judiciously decide whether to acquire the CSI of its competitor or not and selects a price
based on the acquired CSI. None of the other papers discussed in Section 1.6.1 considered
the impact of the CSI on the decision of the player which we consider. Naturally, the
impact of the cost of acquiring the CSI, error in estimating the channel state and different
channel availability probabilities on the decision of the primaries have not been considered
in the above papers. We contribute in this space.
1.6.4 Co-existence of Multiple secondaries
In Chapter 5 we consider the setting where a primary allows multiple secondaries to share
the spectrum at a location. Specifically, we consider a setting with multiple secondary-
BSs and multiple primary-UTs. Each secondary-BS serves only one secondary-UT. We
formulate the power allocation problem among secondary-BSs as a coupled constrained
concave game [67] with secondary-BSs as players. Each secondary-BS selects its transmis-
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sion power to maximize its own utility subject to the constraint that the total interference
at each primary-UT must be below a threshold. Hence, the strategy of a player as well
as its utility also depends on the strategy of other players. There are multiple Nash equi-
libria in the coupled constrained concave game in general. In order to design distributed
algorithms converging to a well defined and unique equilibrium we resort to the concept
of normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) introduced by Rosen in [67].
We consider two scenarios, in the first one the interference at a secondary-UT from
other secondary-BSs, i.e., the inter-secondary-network interference is negligible. This
scenario is likely to arise when the secondary-BSs have small coverage area and the number
of secondary networks is small. In the second scenario, the inter secondary network
interference is non negligible and the utilities of secondary-BSs directly depend on the
policies selected by the other secondary-BSs. This situation is likely to arise when the
coverage of secondary-BS is large and/or the number of secondary networks is large. The
analysis of the former scenario is ancillary to the analysis of the latter one and motivates
the introduction of the concept of WNNE to extend the appealing properties of the NNE
in the former scenario to systems with inter-secondary network interference.
We show that the computation of an NNE reduces to solving a convex optimization
problem when the game admits a concave potential function [61]. We propose a distributed
algorithm which converges to the NNE when the game admits a strictly concave potential
function. In the algorithm (Algorithm DIST) the secondary-BSs do not need to exchange
information among them and the primary-UTs only need to track the total interference.
Primary-UTs select prices for the total interference caused by the secondary-BSs. Thus,
this mechanism also provides an incentive to primary-UTs to participate in the secondary
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access. We show that in the setting with negligible interference among secondary-UTs,
the NNE is always unique and the game admits a strictly concave potential function.
Thus, the algorithm DIST can be used in this setting to obtain the unique NNE.
In the setting with inter-secondary-network interference, the NNE may not be unique
and the game does not necessarily admit a potential function. Nevertheless, we identify a
class of utility functions which admits unique NNEs and strictly concave potential func-
tions even in presence of co-channel interference among secondary-BSs. Thus, algorithm
DIST can be used to obtain the unique NNE. We introduce the concept of Weakly Nor-
malized Nash equilibrium (WNNE) as an equilibrium selection concept when it is difficult
to compute an NNE in presence of inter-secondary-network interference.
We illustrate the significance of the WNNE by analyzing a specific game with a func-
tion that provides an achievable rate, commonly referred to as the Shannon function,
as a utility function and inter-secondary network interference. We show that this game
admits a unique NNE only under certain conditions depending on the parameters of the
channels and does not admit a potential function. The standard algorithm to compute
standard NNE increases exponentially with the number of secondary-BSs. We provide
an algorithm whose complexity only scales linearly with the number of secondary-BSs.
The implementation of this algorithm requires that a secondary-BS knows all the channel
coefficients from each secondary-BS to all secondary-UTs and the primary-UTs. On the
contrary, the WNNE can be obtained with lower complexity using the distributed algo-
rithm DIST. When algorithm DIST is applied, each secondary-BS only needs to know the
coefficients of the local channels from the BS itself and the primary-UTs. A secondary-
BS does not need to know the coefficients of the channels involving other secondary-BSs
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and/or secondary-UTs. Moreover, WNNEs can be obtained for all possible realizations
of the channel parameters.
Finally, we numerically evaluate various properties of NNE and WNNE solution for
some well known utility functions.
Related Literature
Game theoretic approaches have been widely applied to wireless communication problems
(see e.g. [35]). However, only those works which are related to resource allocation in
heterogeneous or cognitive radio network are of particular interest to us. Algorithms for
power allocation at the secondary-UTs relying on the cooperation of primary-UTs have
been studied in [5, 38, 88, 48]. Power allocation in cognitive radio using Stackelberg game
is studied [4, 66] with primary-UTs as leaders and secondary-BSs as followers. Power
allocation for heterogeneous networks (HetNets) using Stackelberg game is studied in
[34, 75]. The setting of HetNet is analogous to the setting considered in this chapter with
macro- and femto-cells playing the role of primary and secondary networks, respectively.
In contrast to the above mentioned works, in the game theoretical framework proposed in
this chapter, primary-UTs are oblivious of the number of secondary-BSs. Primary-UTs
are almost passive entities that only select prices depending on the total interference:
no knowledge of each secondary-BS’s utility or the channel state information is required.
Thus, our model is readily scalable compared to previous models. In [40], the authors
obtained an equilibrium power allocation strategy using a non cooperative game theoretic
distributed algorithm. However, no interference constraints are enforced at the primary-
UTs, i.e., the total interference at each primary-UT is not constrained to be below a
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certain threshold.
Optimal power allocation in HetNet with interference mitigation techniques has also
been studied using evolutionary game theoretic approaches[72, 6]. Both these papers as-
sume an identical discrete finite strategy space for each player whereas the strategy space
of each player in our setting is continuous, uncountably infinite and the strategy of a
player inherently depends on the strategy of other players since we consider a coupled
constrained game. Additionally, in [72] and [6] a player must know the average utility of
the players in order to obtain a stable equilibrium and thus, it requires either communi-
cations among players [6] or a central controller [72]. In contrast, in our setting a player,
i.e., a secondary-BS, does not need to know the utility functions of other secondary-BSs
in the distributed algorithm DIST to attain an NNE (or, WNNE). In [84], the authors
also studied resource allocation among secondary-UTs using a stochastic learning method.
Unlike the DIST algorithm, the method proposed in [84] needs a central controller and
coordination among players. Thus, our approach is more practically viable and readily
implementable compared to the above mentioned works.
Distributed power allocation in cognitive radio network in a non cooperative game
theoretic setting has also been studied in [82, 53, 78]. Our approach differs from those
works in the following aspects. Previous works focused on the characteristics of the
equilibriums for very specific utility functions. In contrast, we characterize the uniqueness
of the NNE for a wide class of utility functions. Moreover, for the cases when it is difficult
to compute the NNE, we introduce the WNNE as an equilibrium selection approach
since it retains most of the favorable properties of NNE. Thus, our equilibrium selection
methods can be applied to more generalized and challenging settings. Additionally, in
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the above mentioned works, secondary-BSs need to exchange information among them
for the distributed algorithm to converge. In the present work, algorithm DIST, which
provides NNE or WNNE, does not require exchange of information among secondary-
BSs. Finally, only in [82] the Shannon capacity function is adopted as a utility function.
The algorithm proposed in [82] to compute an NE scales exponentially with the number
of secondary-BSs. In contrast, for the Shannon capacity function in presence of inter-
secondary-network interference, we identify the conditions under which an NNE is unique
and we propose an algorithm to obtain the unique NNE which scales only linearly with
the number of secondary-BSs.
The closest work to ours is [17] where the NNE is adopted as equilibrium concept
for optimal power allocation among femto-BSs in a HetNet. In [17], a single macro-UT
with interference free femto-cells is considered. The setting studied there corresponds
to a setting with a single primary-UT and negligible inter-secondary-network interfer-
ence. We relax both these assumptions in this chapter. We contribute in this space.
The presence of multiple primary-UTs in the system raises a problem of computational
complexity in determining the unique NNE: the NNE computation does not boil down
to an ordinary water-filling problem as in [17]. By applying standard techniques it turns
out that the problem has exponential complexity in the number of primary-UTs and
secondary-BSs and we are not aware of the techniques that solve the problem with lower
complexity. Along with increasing complexity, the consideration of co-channel interference
at secondary-UTs in our setting has the effect of destroying the property of uniqueness of
NNE always satisfied in the setting considered in [17].
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1.7 Publications
• Chapter 2 is based on [26]. The shorter version has been published in [21].
• Chapter 3 is based on [24] (Archived version[28]). The shorter versions have been
published in [22, 25].
• Chapter 4 is based on [27] (Archived version [29]). The shorter version will be
published in [30].
• Chapter 5 is based on [19]. The shorter versions are published in [20, 18].
• Other published papers are [23], [81].
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty in Competition:
Single Location Game
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell its channel to
a secondary at a location. Transmission rate of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary
needs to select a price depending on the transmission rate of its channel. However,
the primary is unaware of the channel states of the other primaries while taking its
decision. Each secondary selects a channel depending on the price and the transmission
rate of the channel. We formulate the above problem as a non-cooperative game with
primaries as the players. We show that there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE)
and explicitly compute it. Under the NE strategy profile a primary prices its channel to
render the channel which provides higher transmission rate more preferable; this negates
the perception that prices ought to be selected to render channels equally preferable to
the secondary regardless of their transmission rates. We show that the non cooperation
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of the primaries may lead to a loss in the revenue in the asymptotic limit. In the repeated
version of the game, we characterize a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a
payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would obtain when primaries cooperate.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1 we describe the system model
and the strategies of the players. In Section 2.2 we characterize the structure of an
NE, and show the existence and uniqueness. We also provide an algorithm to explicitly
compute the NE. In Section 2.3 we compute the ratio of the payoffs of the primaries in
the competitive setting and the collusive setting in an asymptotic limit. In Section 2.4
we consider the setting where the primaries interact with each other multiple times. In
Section 2.5 we briefly characterize the results when some of the assumptions made in this
chapter are relaxed. We finally conclude and discuss some future works in Section 2.6.
We prove the results in Section 2.7.
2.1 System Model
We consider a spectrum market with l(l ≥ 2) primaries. Each primary owns a channel at
a single location. Different channels leased by primaries to secondaries constitute disjoint
frequency bands. A primary only allows at most one secondary to use it. There are m
secondaries. We initially consider the case when primaries know m, later generalize our
results for random, apriori unknown m (Section 2.2.3).
2.1.1 Transmission Rate
The channel of a primary provides a certain transmission rate to a secondary who is
granted access. Transmission rate (i.e. Shanon Capacity) depends on 1) the number of
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subscribers of a primary that are using the channel1 and 2) the propagation condition of
the radio signal. The transmission rate evolves randomly over time owing to the random
fluctuations of the usage of subscribers of primaries and the propagation condition2. We
assume that at every time slot, the channel of a primary belongs to one of the states3
0, 1, . . . , n. State i provides a lower transmission rate to a secondary than state j if i < j
and state 0 arises when the channel is not available for sale i.e. secondaries can not use
the channel when it is in state4 0. A channel is in state i ≥ 1 w.p. qi > 0 and in state
1Shanon Capacity [12] for user i at a channel is equal to log
(
1 +
pihi∑
j 6=i pjhj + σ
2
)
where pk is the
power with which user k is transmitting, σ2 is the power of white noise, hk is the channel gain between
transmitter and receiver which depends on the propagation condition. If a secondary is using the channel
then pi, hi of the numerator are the attributes associated with the secondary while pj , hjj 6= i are those
of the subscribers of the primaries. In general, the power pj for subscriber of primaries is constant for
subscriber j of primary, but the number of subscribers vary randomly over time. The power pi with which
a secondary will transmit may be a constant or may decrease with the number of subscribers of primaries
in order to limit the interference caused to each subscriber. The above factors contributes to the random
fluctuation in the capacity of a channel offered to a secondary. In our setting pi, his are assumed to be the
same across the secondaries for a channel which we justify later. However, these values can be different
for different channels.
2Referring to footnote 2, hk and σ
2 evolve randomly owing to the random scattering of the particles
in the ionosphere and troposphere; this phenomenon is also known as fading.
3We discretize the available transmission rates into a fixed number of states n. This is a standard
approximation to discretize the continuous function[16, 56]. The corresponding inaccuracy becomes neg-
ligible with increase in n.
4Generally a minimum transmission rate is required to send data. State 0 indicates that the trans-
mission rate is below that threshold due to either the excessive usage of subscribers of primaries or the
transmission condition.
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0 w.p. 1 − q where q = ∑ni=1 qi, independent of the channel states of other primaries 5.
Thus, the state of the channel of each primary is independent and identically distributed.
We do not make any assumption on the relationship between qi and l or qi and
6 m. We
assume
q < 1. (2.1)
We assume that the transmission rate offered by the channel of a primary is the same
to all secondaries. We justify the above assumption in the following. We consider the
setting where the secondaries are one of the following types: i) Service provider who does
not lease spectrum from the FCC and serves the end-users through secondary access, ii)
end-users who directly buy a channel from primaries. In initial stages of deployment of
the secondary market, secondaries will be of the first type. When the secondaries are
of the first type, then a primary would not know the transmission rate to the end-users
who are subscribers of the service provider. A primary measures the channel qualities
across different positions in the locality (e.g. a cell) and considers the average as the
channel quality that an end-user subscribed to a secondary service provider will get at the
location (e.g. a cell). This average will be identical across different end-users subscribed
to different secondary service providers and hence, the channel quality is identical across
5We have shown that at a given slot, the channel state differs across the primaries mainly because
of the differences of i) the number of subscribers that are using the channel and ii) the propagation
conditions. Since different primaries have different subscriber bases, thus, their usage behaviors are
largely uncorrelated. Also, channels of different primaries operate on different frequency bands and have
different noise levels, thus, the propagation conditions are also uncorrelated across the channels.
6 Since each primary sells its channel to only one secondary, thus, referring to footnotes 2 and 3
transmission rate (or qi) at a channel does not depend on m (secondary demand) in practice.
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the secondaries.
If the secondaries are of the second type, then the primary may know the transmission
rate that an end-user will attain which may be different at different positions. However, if
a primary needs to select a price for each position of the location, then it needs to compute
the transmission rate at each possible position at that location (e.g. a cell). Thus, the
computation and storage requirement for the primary would be large. Such position
based pricing scheme will also not be attractive to the end-users since they may perceive
it discriminatory as the price changes when its position changes within a location (e.g. a
cell). Thus, such a position based pricing scheme may not be practically implementable.
Hence, a primary estimates the channel quality and decides the price for the estimated
channel quality by considering that the channel quality will not significantly vary across
the location. This is because end-users who are interested to buy the channel from a
primary at a location most likely have similar propagation paths: for example, secondary
users who buy the channels are most often present in buildings (e.g. shopping complex,
an office or residential area). The distance from the base station of the primary to the
end-users is also similar because the end-users are close to each other in a location. Thus,
the path loss component will also similar. Hence, the channel quality is considered to be
identical across the secondaries.
Though the quality of a channel is identical for secondaries, the quality can vary
across the channels. A primary can get an estimate of the transmission rate by sending a
pilot test signal at different positions with the location and then, applying some standard
estimation techniques[7].
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2.1.2 Penalty functions of Secondaries and Strategy of Primaries
Each primary selects a price for its channel if it is available for sale. We formulate the
decision problem of primaries as a non-cooperative game. A primary selects a price with
the knowledge of the state of its channel, but without knowing the states of the other
channels; a primary however knows l,m, n, q1, . . . , qn.
Secondaries are passive entities. They select channels depending on the price and the
transmission rate a channel offers. We assume that the preference of secondaries can be
represented by a penalty function. If a primary selects a price p at channel state i, then
the channel incurs a penalty gi(p) for all secondaries. As the name suggests, a secondary
prefers a channel with a lower penalty. Since lower prices should induce lower penalty,
thus, we assume that each gi(·) is strictly increasing; therefore, gi(·) is invertible. A
primary selects a price for its available channel, but, since there is an one-to-one relation
between the price and penalty at each state, we can equivalently consider that primaries
select penalties instead. For a given price, a channel of higher transmission rate must
induce lower penalty, thus, gi(p) < gj(p) if i > j. We can also consider that desirability of
a channel for a secondary is the negative of penalty. A secondary will not buy any channel
whose desirability falls below a certain threshold, equivalently, whose penalty exceeds a
certain threshold. We consider that such threshold is the same for each secondary and we
denote it as v i.e. no secondary will buy any channel whose penalty exceeds v. Secondaries
have the same penalty function and the same upper bound for penalty value (v), thus,
secondaries are statistically identical.
Primary i chooses its penalty using an arbitrary probability distribution function (d.f.)
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ψi,j(·) 7 when its channel is in state j ≥ 1. If j = 0 (i.e., the channel is unavailable),
primary i chooses a penalty of v+ 1: this is equivalent to considering that such a channel
is not offered for sale as no secondary buys a channel whose penalty exceeds v.
Definition 2.1. A strategy of a primary i for state j ≥ 1, ψi,j(·) provides the penalty
distribution it uses at each node, when the channel state is j ≥ 1. Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,n) de-
notes the strategy of primary i, and (S1, ..., Sl) denotes the strategy profile of all primaries
(players). S−i denotes the strategy profile of primaries other than i.
2.1.3 Payoff of Primaries
We denote fi(·) as the inverse of gi(·). Thus, fi(x) denotes the price when the penalty is x
at channel state i. We assume that gi(·) is continuous, thus fi(·) is continuous and strictly
increasing. Also, fi(x) < fj(x) for each x and i < j. Each primary incurs a transaction
cost c > 0 when the primary leases its channel to a secondary, and therefore never selects
a price lower than c.
If primary i selects a penalty x when its channel state is j, then its payoff is

fj(x)− c if the primary sells its channel
0 otherwise.
Note that if Y is the number of channels offered for sale, for which the penalties are upper
bounded by v, then those with min(Y,m) lowest penalties are sold since secondaries select
7Probability distribution refers cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). C.d.f. of a random variable
X is the function G(x), G(x) = P (X ≤ x) ∀x ∈ < [14].
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channels in the increasing order of penalties. The ties among channels with identical
penalties are broken randomly and symmetrically among the primaries.
Definition 2.2. ui,j(ψi,j , S−i) is the expected payoff when primary i’s channel is at state
j and selects strategy ψi,j(·) and other primaries use strategy S−i.
2.1.4 Nash Equilibrium
We use Nash Equilibrium (NE) as a solution concept which we define below
Definition 2.3. [59] A Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . , Sn) is a strategy profile such that no
primary can improve its expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. So,
with Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,n), (S1, . . . , Sn), is an NE if for each primary i and channel state j
ui,j(ψi,j , S−i) ≥ ui,j(ψ˜i,j , S−i) ∀ ψ˜i,j . (2.2)
An NE (S1, . . . , Sn) is a symmetric NE if Si = Sj for all i, j.
An NE is asymmetric if Si 6= Sj for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Note that if m ≥ l, then primaries select the highest penalty v with probability 1. This
is because, when m ≥ l, then, the channel of a primary will always be sold. Henceforth,
we will consider that m < l.
2.1.5 A Class of Penalty Functions
Since gi(·) is strictly increasing in p and gi(p) > gj(p) for i < j, we focus on penalty
functions of the form gi(p) = h1(p) − h2(i), where h1(·) and h2(·) are strictly increasing
in their respective arguments. Note that −gi(p) may be considered as a utility that a
secondary would get at channel state i when the price is set at p. Such utility functions
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are commonly assumed to be concave [74]; which is possible only if gi(·) is convex in p i.e.
h1(·) is convex. It is easy to show that when gi(p) = h1(p) − h2(i) and h1(·) is convex,
satisfies the following property:
Assumption 1
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c <
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c for all x > y > gi(c), i < j. (2.3)
Moreover, when gi(p) = h1(p)/h2(i), then, the inequality in (2.3) is satisfied for some
certain convex functions h1(·) like h1(p) = pr(r ≥ 1), exp(p). In addition, there is also a
large set of functions that satisfy (2.3), such as: gi(p) = ζ (p− h2(i)) , gi(p) = ζ (p/h2(i))
where ζ(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, gi(·) are such that the inverses
are of the form fi(x) = h(x) + h2(i), fi(x) = h(x) ∗ h2(i), where h(·) is any strictly
increasing function, satisfy Assumption 1. Henceforth, we only consider penalty functions
which satisfy (2.3).
We mostly consider gi(·)s which do not depend on l,m, n, q1, . . . , qn (e.g. Fig. 2.1, 2.2,
2.3). But in some case we also consider that gi(·) is a function of n (e.g. Fig. 2.4).
2.2 Structure, Computation, Uniqueness and Existence of
NE
First, we identify key structural properties of a NE (should it exist). Next we show that
the above properties lead to a unique strategy profile which we explicitly compute - thus
the symmetric NE is unique should it exist. We finally prove that the strategy profile
resulting from the structural properties above is indeed a NE thereby establishing the
existence.
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2.2.1 Structure of an NE
We provide some important properties that any NE (S1, . . . , Sl) (Si = {ψi,1, . . . , ψi,n})
must satisfy. First, we show that each primary must use the same strategy profile (The-
orem 2.1). In the next chapter, we show that this is no longer the case when there are
multiple locations. In fact we show that there may be multiple asymmetric NEs when
there are multiple locations. We show that under the NE strategy profile a primary se-
lects lower values of the penalties when the channel quality is high (Theorem 2.3). In
Remark 2.1 we also show that the result attained in our setting is equivalent to the socially
optimum solution where the sum of the utilities of the secondaries and the payoffs of the
primaries are maximized. We have also shown that ψi,j(·) are continuous and contiguous
(Theorem 2.2 and 2.4).
Theorem 2.1. Each primary must use the same strategy i.e. ψi,j(·) = ψk,j(·) ∀i, k ∈
{1, . . . , l} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Theorem 2.1 implies that an NE strategy profile can not be asymmetric. Since channel
statistics are identical and payoff functions are identical to each primary, thus this game is
symmetric. Given that the game is symmetric, apparently there should only be symmetric
NE strategies. Although there are symmetric games where asymmetric NEs do exist [15],
we are able to rule that out in our setting using the assumptions that naturally arise in
practice namely those which are stated in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and Assumption 1 which
is satisfied by a large class of functions that are likely to arise in practice (Section 2.1.5).
Thus, a significance of Theorem 2.1 is that Theorem 1 holds for a large class of penalty
functions which are likely to arise in practice. However, we show that there may exist
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asymmetric NE in absence of Assumption 1 (Section 2.5.2).
Now, we point out another significance of the above theorem. In a symmetric game
it is difficult to implement an asymmetric NE. For example, for two players if (S1, S2)
is an NE with S1 6= S2, then (S2, S1) is also an NE due to the symmetry of the game.
The realization of such an NE is only possible when one player knows whether the other
is using S1 or S2. But, coordination among players is infeasible apriori as the game is
non co-operative. Thus, Theorem 2.1 entails that we can avoid such complications in
this game. We show that this game has a unique symmetric NE through Lemma 2.2 and
Theorem 2.5. Thus, Theorem 2.1, Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.5 together entail that there
exists a unique NE strategy profile.
Since every primary uses the same strategy, thus, we drop the indices corre-
sponding to primaries and represent the strategy of any primary as S =
(ψ1(·), ψ2(·), ....., ψn(·)), where ψi(·) denotes the strategy at channel state i. Thus,
we can represent a strategy profile in terms of only one primary.
Definition 2.4. φj(x) is the expected profit of a primary whose channel is in state j and
selects a penalty x 8.
Theorem 2.2. ψi(.), i ∈ {1, .., n} is a continuous probability distribution. Function φj(·)
is continuous.
The above theorem implies that ψi(·) does not have any jump at any penalty value.
i.e. no penalty value is chosen with positive probability. We now intuitively justify the
8Note that φj(x) depend on strategies of other primaries , to keep notational simplicity, we do not
make it explicit
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property. There are uncountably infinite number of penalty values and thus, clearly ψi(·)
can only have jump at some of those values. Intuitively, there is no inherent asymmetry
amongst the penalty values within the interval (gi(c), v) i.e. at the penalty values except
the end points of the interval [gi(c), v]. Thus, a primary does not prioritize any of those
penalty values. Now, we intuitively explain why ψi(·) does not have jump at the end
points. First, at penalty gi(c), a primary gets a payoff of 0 when the channel state is
i; but the payoff at any penalty value greater that gi(c) is positive, thus ψi(·) does not
prioritize the penalty value gi(c). On the other hand, intuitively if a primary selects
penalty v with positive probability, then the rest would select slightly lower penalty in
order to enhance their sales and thus, the probability that the primary would sell its
channel decreases. Thus, ψi(·) also does not have a jump at v.
Note that in a deterministic N.E. strategy at channel state i, then ψi(·) must have a
jump from 0 to 1 at the above penalty value. Such ψi(·) is not continuous. Thus, the
above theorem rules out any deterministic N.E. strategy. The fact that φj(·) is continuous
has an important technical consequence; this guarantees the existence of the best response
penalty in Definition 2.6 stated in Section 2.2.2.
Definition 2.5. We denote the lower and upper endpoints of the support set9 of ψi(.) as
Li and Ui respectively i.e.
Li = inf{x : ψi(x) > 0}.
Ui = inf{x : ψi(x) = 1}.
9The support set of a probability distribution is the smallest closed set such that the probability of its
complement is 0.[14]
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We next show that primaries select higher penalty when the transmission rate is low.
More specifically, we show that upper endpoint of the support set of ψi(·) is upper bounded
by the lower endpoint of ψi−1(·).
Theorem 2.3. Ui ≤ Li−1, if j < i.
Theorem 2.3 is apparently counter intuitive. We prove it using the assumptions stated
in Section 2.1. In particular, we rely on Assumption 1 which is satisfied by a large class of
penalty functions (Section 2.1.5). Thus, the significance of Theorem 2.3 is that the counter
intuitive structure holds for a large class of penalty functions. However, in Section 2.5.3
we show that Theorem 2.3 needs not to hold in absence of Assumption 1.
Remark 2.1. Theorem 2.3 shows in our setting socially desirable outcome can be achieved
i.e. there can not be any unsold high quality channel if the low quality channel is sold10.
To illustrate the fact consider the penalty function gi(x) = x−h(i) where h(·) is a strictly
increasing function. The above penalty function satisfies the Assumption 1. Now, suppose
a social planner wants to allocate the available channels to the secondaries in order to
maximize the social welfare i.e. it wants to maximize the sum of the utilities of the
secondaries and the payoffs of the primaries. The utility of the secondary is −gi(x) and
the payoff of the primary is x − c, thus, if the channel which in state i is alloted to a
secondary at price x then the sum of the utility of the secondary and the payoff of the
primary is h(i). Since h(·) is strictly increasing, thus, the socially efficient outcome is to
sort the channels in the descending order of the channel states and then allocate channels
to the secondaries until all the demand is met or the number of available channels are
10Note that if the high quality channels are larger than the number of secondaries, then there can be
unsold high quality channels.
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Figure 2.1: Figure in the left hand side shows the d.f. ψi(·), i = 1, . . . , 3 as a function of
penalty for an example setting: v = 100, c = 1, l = 21,m = 10, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2 and
gi(x) = x− i3. Note that support sets of ψi(·)s are disjoint with L3 = 17.2766, U3 = 17.345 = L2,
U2 = 22.864 = L1, and U1 = 100 = v. Figures in the center and the right hand side show d.f.
ψ2(·) and ψ3(·) respectively, using different scales compared to the left hand figure.
exhausted. Thus, we show that though the primaries are selfish entities they select prices
such that a socially desirable outcome is achieved.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates Lis and Uis in an example scenario (The distribution ψi(·) in Fig. 2.1
is plotted using (2.9)).
In general, a continuous NE penalty selection distribution may not be contiguous i.e.
support set may be a union of multiple number of disjoint closed intervals. Thus, the
support set of ψi(·) may be of the following form [a1, b1]∪ . . .∪ [ad, bd] with bk < ak+1, k ∈
{1, . . . , d − 1}, a1 = Li and bd = Ui. In this case, ψi(·) is strictly increasing in each of
[ak, bk]k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, but it is constant in the “gap” between the intervals i.e. ψi(·) is
constant in the interval [ak−1, bk] k ∈ {2, . . . , d}. We rule out the above possibility in the
following theorem i.e. the support set of ψi(·) consists of only one closed interval [Li, Ui]
which also establishes that ψi(·) is strictly increasing from Li to Ui. In the following
theorem we also rule out any “gap” between support sets for different ψi(·), i = 1, . . . , n.
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Theorem 2.4. The support set of ψi(·), i = 1, .., n is [Li, Ui] and Ui = Li−1 for i = 2, .., n,
U1 = v.
Theorem 2.3 states that Li−1 ≥ Ui. Theorem 2.4 further confirms that Li−1 = Ui
i.e. there is no “gap” between the support sets. Theorem 2.4 also implies that there is
no “gap” within a support set. We now explain the intuition that leads to the reason.
If there are a and b which are in the support sets such that the primaries do not select
any penalty in the interval (a, b), then, a primary can get strictly a higher payoff at any
penalty in the interval (a, b) compared to penalty at a or just below a. Thus, a primary
would select penalties at or just below a with probability 0 which implies that a can not
be in the support set of an NE strategy profile. We prove Theorem 2.4 using the above
insights and Theorem 2.3.
Figure 2.1 illustrates d.f. ψi(·) for an example scenario.
2.2.2 Computation, Uniqueness and Existence
We now show that the structural properties of an NE identified in Theorems 2.1-2.4 are
satisfied by a unique strategy profile, which we explicitly compute (Lemma 2.2). This
proves the uniqueness of a NE subject to the existence. We show that the strategy profile
is indeed an NE in Theorem 2.5. We start with the following definitions.
Definition 2.6. A best response penalty for a channel in state j ≥ 1 is x if and only if
φj(x) = sup
y∈<
φj(y). (2.4)
Let uj,max = φj(x) for a best response x
11 for state j, j ≥ 1 i.e., uj,max is the maximum
expected profit that a primary earns when its channel is in state j, j ≥ 1.
11Since φj(·) is continuous by Theorem 2.2 and penalty must be selected within the interval [gj(c), v],
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Remark 2.2. In an NE strategy profile a primary only selects a best response penalty
with a positive probability. Thus, a primary selects x with positive probability at channel
state i, then expected payoff to the primary must be ui,max at x.
Definition 2.7. Let w(x) (wi, respectively) be the probability of at least m successes out
of l − 1 independent Bernoulli trials, each of which occurs with probability x (∑nk=i qk,
respectively). Thus,
w(x) =
l−1∑
i=m
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−i−1. (2.5)
wi = w
 n∑
j=i
qj
 for i = 1, ..., n &wn+1 = 0. (2.6)
The following lemma provides the explicit expression for the maximum expected payoff
that a primary can get under an NE strategy profile.
Lemma 2.1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
ui,max = pi − c.
where, pi = c+ (fi(Li−1)− c)(1− wi). (2.7)
and Li = gi(
pi − c
1− wi+1 + c), L0 = v. (2.8)
Remark 2.3. Expected payoff obtained by a primary under an NE strategy profile at
channel state i is given by pi − c.
Remark 2.4. Starting from L0 = v, we obtain p1 (from (2.7)) and using p1 we obtain L1
by (2.8) which we use to obtain p2 from (2.7). Thus, recursively we obtain pi and Li for
i = 1, . . . , n.
thus the maximum exists in (2.4). This maximum is equal to uj,max and φj(x) is equal to uj,max for some
x.
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We now obtain expressions for ψi(·) using expression of Li and pi. We use the fact
that w(·) is strictly increasing and continuous in [0, 1].
Lemma 2.2. An NE strategy profile (if it exists) (ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)) must comprise of:
ψi(x) =0, if x < Li
1
qi
(w−1(
fi(x)− pi
fi(x)− c )−
n∑
j=i+1
qj), if Li−1 ≥ x ≥ Li
1, if x > Li−1. (2.9)
where pi, Li, i = 0, .., n are defined in (2.7).
Remark 2.5. Using (2.9) we can easily compute the strategy profile (ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)).
Fig. 2.1 illustrates d.f. ψi(·) for an example scenario.
The following lemma ensures that ψi(·) as defined in Lemma 2.2 is indeed a strategy
profile.
Lemma 2.3. ψi(·) as defined in Lemma 2.2 is a strictly increasing and continuous prob-
ability distribution function.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates continuous and strictly increasing ψi(·) for i = 1, . . . , 3 for an
example setting.
Explicit computation in Lemma 2.2 shows that the NE strategy profile is unique, if it
exists. There is a plethora of symmetric games [59] where NE strategy profile does not
exist. However, we establish that any strategy profile of the form (2.9) is an NE.
Theorem 2.5. Strategy profile as defined in Lemma 2.2 is an NE.
Hence, we have shown that
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Theorem 2.6. The strategy profile, in which each primary randomizes over the penalties
in the range [Li, Li−1] using the continuous probability distribution function ψi(·) (defined
in Lemma 2.2) when the channel state is i, is the unique NE strategy profile.
2.2.3 Random Demand
Note that all our results readily generalize to allow for random number of secondaries (M)
with probability mass functions (p.m.f.) Pr(M = m) = γm. A primary does not have the
exact realization of number of secondaries, but it knows the p.m.f. . We only have to
redefine w(x) as-
max(M)∑
k=0
γk
l−1∑
i=k
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−1−i
and wn+1 = γ0.
2.3 Performance Evaluations of NE Strategy Profile in Asymp-
totic Limit
In this section, we analyze the reduction in payoff under NE strategy profile due to the
competition. First, we study the expected payoff that a primary obtains under the unique
NE strategy profile in the asymptotic limit (Lemma 2.4). Subsequently, we compare the
expected payoff of primaries under the NE strategy profile with the payoff that primaries
get when they collude (Lemma 2.5). Subsequently, we investigate the asymptotic variation
of strategy profiles of primaries with n in an example setting (Fig. 2.4).
Recall from Remark 2.3 that expected payoff obtained by a primary under the unique
NE strategy profile at channel state i is given by pi − c. Next,
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Definition 2.8. Let RNE denote the ex-ante expected profit of a primary at the Nash
equilibrium. Then,
RNE =
n∑
i=1
(qi.(pi − c)). (2.10)
Note that l ·RNE denotes the total ex-ante expected payoff obtained by primaries at
the NE strategy profile. We obtain
Lemma 2.4. Let cj = gj(c), j = 1, .., n. When l→∞, then
pi − c→

fi(v)− c if (l − 1)
∑n
j=1 qj < m
fi(ck)− c if (l − 1)
∑n
j=k+1 qj < m
< (l − 1)∑nj=k qj 1 ≤ k < i
0 if m < (l − 1)∑nj=i qj .
We illustrate Lemma 2.4 using an example in Figure 2.2. Intuitively, competition
increases with the decrease in m. Primaries choose prices progressively closer to the lower
limit c. Thus, the expected payoff pi− c, i = 1 . . . , n decreases as m decreases. The above
lemma reveals that, as m becomes smaller only those primaries whose channels provide
higher transmission rate can have strictly positive payoff i.e. pi − c is positive (Fig. 2.2).
From Lemma 2.4 and (2.10) we readily obtain
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Figure 2.2: This figure illustrates the variation
of pi − c, i = 1, . . . , n with m in an example
setting: l = 51, n = 3, v = 100, c = 1, q1 =
q2 = q3 = 0.2 and gi(x) = x
2 − i3. For m ≤ 5,
pi − c ≈ 0 for all i. For 5 ≤ 5 ≤ 15, pi − c ≈ 0
for i = 1, 2.. For 15 ≤ m ≤ 20, p1 − c ≈ 0.
When m exceeds 40, pi − c, i = 1, 2, 3 closely
match the highest possible expected value as
Lemma 2.4 indicates.
Figure 2.3: Variation of efficiency (η) with m
in an example setting: gi(x) = x
2 − i3, l =
51, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2, v = 100 and
c = 1. When m ≤ 5, η ≈ 0. When m ≥ 35,
η ≈ 1.
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Corollary 2.1. When l→∞, then,
RNE →

∑n
j=1 qj .(fj(v)− c) If (l − 1)
∑n
j=1 qj < m
∑n
j=i+1 qj .(fj(ci)− c) If (l − 1)
∑n
j=i+1 qj < m
< (l − 1)∑nj=i qj , i ∈ {1, .., n− 1}
0 If m < (l − 1)qn.
Thus, asymptotically RNE decreases as m decreases (Fig. 2.2).
Definition 2.9. Let ROPT be the maximum expected profit earned through collusive
selection of prices by the primaries. Efficiency η is defined as
l ·RNE
ROPT
.
Efficiency is a measure of the reduction in the expected profit owing to competition.
The asymptotic behavior of η is characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5. When l→∞, then
η →

1 If (l − 1)∑nj=1 qj < m
0 If m < (l − 1)qn.
We illustrate the variation of efficiency with m using an example in Figure 2.3. In-
tuitively, the competition decreases with increase in m; thus primaries set their penalties
close to the highest possible value for all states. This leads to high efficiency. On the
other hand, competition becomes intense when m decreases, thus, RNE becomes very
small as Corollary 2.1 reveals. But, if primaries collude, primaries can maximize the ag-
gregate payoff by offering only the channels of highest possible states by selecting highest
penalties. Thus, efficiency becomes very small when m is very small (Fig. 2.3).
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Figure 2.4: Figure shows the plot of L1 and Ln with n. We consider v = 10, c = 0, l = 21,m =
10, q1 = . . . = qn = 0.5/n and the following penalty function: gi(x) = x − (rmax − rmin) ∗ i/n,
where rmax denotes the maximum possible transmission rate which a secondary user can transmit
and rmin denotes the minimum transmission rate required to transmit the signal. Note that the
penalty function is of the form gi(x) = h1(x) − h2(i), where, h1(x) = x is strictly increasing
concave function in x, and h2(i) = (rmax − rmin) ∗ i/n is strictly decreasing in i. Thus, gi(·)
satisfies Assumption 1. We have equally divided the available rate region into the number of
states n. We consider that h2(·) is the representative rate at state i. We consider rmax = 3.5 and
rmin = 0.5.
The transmission rates of an available channel constitute a continuum in practice. We
have discretized the transmission rates of an available channel in multiple states for the
ease of analysis. However, the theory allows us to investigate numerically how the penalty
distribution strategies behave in the asymptotic limit (Fig. 2.4).
Fig. 2.4 reveals that Ln increases with n and eventually converges to a point which is
strictly less than v. On the other hand, L1 converges to v as n becomes large (Fig. 2.4).
Thus, the lower endpoints (and thus, the upper endpoints (since Uj = Lj−1)) of penalty
selection strategies converge at different points when n becomes large.
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2.4 Repeated Game
We have so far considered the setting where primaries and secondaries interact only once.
In practice, however, primaries and secondaries interact repeatedly. To analyze repeated
interactions we consider a scenario where the one shot game is repeated an infinite number
of times. We characterize the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium where the expected
payoff of primaries can be made arbitrarily close to the payoff that primaries would obtain
if they would collude.
The one shot game is played at time slots t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,. Let, φi,t denote the expected
payoff at stage t, when the channel state is i. Hence, the payoff of a primary, when its
channel state is i, is given by
φi = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtφi,t (2.11)
where, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Since NE constitutes a weak notion in repeated game [59], we will focus on Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
Definition 2.10. [59] Strategy profile (S1, . . . , Sn) constitutes a SPNE if the strategy
profile prescribes an NE at every subgame.
The one shot unique NE that we have characterized, is also a SPNE in repeated
game. Total expected payoff that a primary can get, is RNE (Definition 2.8) under one-
shot game. We have already shown that this payoff is not always efficient (Lemma 2.5) i.e.
η 9 1. Here, we present an efficient SPNE (Theorem 2.7), provided that δ is sufficiently
high.
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Fix a sequence of {i}n1 such that
0 = 1 < 2 < . . . < n. (2.12)
i ≤ v − Li−1, i ≤ v − gi((fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + c). (2.13)
We provide a Nash Reversion Strategy such that a primary will get a payoff arbitrarily
close to the payoff that it would obtain when all primaries collude.
Strategy Profile (SPR): Each primary selects penalty v− i, (where i satisfies (2.12)
and (2.13)), when state of the channel is i, at t = 0 and also at time slot τ = 1, 2, . . . as
long as all other primaries have chosen v− j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, when their channel state is
j at all time slots 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1. Otherwise, play the unique one shot game NE strategy
ψi(·) (Lemma 2.2).
Remark 2.6. Note that if everyone sticks to the strategy, then each primary selects a
penalty of v − i at every time slot, when the channel state is i. Under the collusive
setting, each primary selects penalty v. Thus, for every γ > 0, we can choose sufficiently
small i, i = 1, . . . , n and sufficiently high δ such that the efficiency (definition 2.9) is at
least 1− γ.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.7. Suppose {i}ni=1 are such that they satisfy (2.12) and (2.13). Then, there
exists δmin ∈ (0, 1) such that for any discount factor δ ≥ δmin the strategy profile SPR is
a SPNE.
Remark 2.7. Thus, there exists a SPNE strategy profile (for sufficiently high δ) where each
primary obtains an expected payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would have obtained
if all primaries collude.
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2.5 Pending Question: What happens when Assumption 1
is relaxed?
We show that if penalty functions do not satisfy Assumption 1, then the system may have
multiple NEs (section 2.5.1), asymmetric NE (section 2.5.2) and the strategy profile that
we have characterized in (2.9) may not be an NE (section 2.5.3).
2.5.1 Multiple NEs
We first give a set of penalty functions which do not satisfy Assumption 1 and then we
state a strategy profile which is an NE for this set of penalties along with the strategy
profile that we have characterized in (2.9).
Let fi(·) be such that
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c =
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c (x > y > gi(c), i < j) (2.14)
Examples of such kind of functions are gi(x) = (x− c)p/i.
It can be easily verified that strategy profile, described as in (2.9), is still an NE
strategy profile under the above setting. We will provide another NE strategy profile.
First, we will introduce some notations which will be used throughout this section.
p¯i = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1) + c (2.15)
L¯ = g1(p¯1) (2.16)
Now, we show that there exists a symmetric NE strategy profile where a primary
selects the same strategy for its each state of the channel. This establishes that the the
system has multiple NEs.
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Let’s consider the following symmetric strategy profile where at channel state i a
primary’s strategy profile is ψ¯i(·) = ψ¯(·) for i = 1, . . . , n, where
ψ¯(x) =0 (if x < L¯)
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c) (if v ≥ x ≥ L¯)
1 (if x > v) (2.17)
First, we show that ψ¯(·) is a probability d.f.
Lemma 2.6. ψ¯(·) as defined in (2.17) is a probability distribution function.
Note that in this strategy profile each primary selects the same strategy irrespective
of the channel state. Next, we show that strategy profile as described in (2.17) is an NE
strategy profile.
Theorem 2.8. Consider the strategy profile where ψ¯i(·) = ψ¯(·), for i = 1, . . . , n. This
strategy profile constitute an NE.
2.5.2 Asymmetric NE
If Assumption 1 is not satisfied, then there may exist asymmetric NEs. Note that when
Assumption 1 is satisfied the unique NE is symmetric. We again consider the penalty
functions are of the type given in (2.14). We consider n = 2, l = 2,m = 1 and q1 = q2.
Here, we denote ψi,j(·) as the strategy profile for primary i, i = 1, 2 at channel state j,
j = 1, 2. Let
Lˆ = g2((f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)/(1− q2) + c) (2.18)
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Note from (2.18) that
(f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) = (f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
(f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) = (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2) (from (2.14))
(f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1) = (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2) (since q1 = q2) (2.19)
Next
Lˆlow = g1((f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2) + c) (2.20)
Again using (2.14) and the fact that q1 = q2 we also obtain
f2(Lˆlow)− c = (f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1) (2.21)
Consider the following strategy profile
ψ1,1(x) = 1, (x ≥ v),
=
1
q1
(1− q2 − (f2(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
f2(x)− c ) (v > x > Lˆ)
= 0, x ≤ Lˆ
ψ1,2(x) = 1, (x ≥ Lˆ),
=
1
q2
(1− (f1(Lˆ)− c)(1− q2)
f1(x)− c ) (Lˆ > x > Lˆlow)
= 0, x ≤ Lˆlow (2.22)
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and
ψ2,1(x) = 1, (x ≥ Lˆ),
=
1
q1
(1− (f2(Lˆ)− c)(1− q1)
f2(x)− c ) Lˆlow < x < Lˆ
= 0. x ≤ Lˆlow
ψ2,2(x) = 1, x ≥ v
=
1
q2
(1− q1 − (f1(v)− c)(1− q1 − q2)
f1(x)− c ) Lˆ > x > v
= 0, x ≤ Lˆ (2.23)
It is easy to discern that the above strategy profile is a continuous distribution function.
Also note that ψ1,1 6= ψ2,1 and ψ1,2 6= ψ2,2. Hence, the strategy profile is asymmetric.
The following theorem confirms that the strategy profile that we have just described is
indeed an NE.
Theorem 2.9. The strategy profile ψ1 = {ψ1,1(·), ψ1,2(·)} and ψ2 = {ψ2,1(·), ψ2,2(·)} as
described in (2.22) and (2.23) respectively is an NE.
The above theorem confirms that there may exist an asymmetric NE when the penalty
functions are of the form (2.14).
2.5.3 Strategy Profile Described in (2.9) may not be an NE
We first describe a set of penalty functions that do not satisfy (2.3) and then we show
that the strategy profile that we have characterized in (2.9) is not an NE. 12
12Note that in theorem 2.5 we have shown that the strategy profile described in (2.9) is an NE when
(2.3) is satisfied
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Consider that n = 2, c = 0; penalty functions are as follow:
g1(x) = x, f1(x) = x (2.24)
g2(x) = log(x), f2(x) = e
x (2.25)
Now, as c = 0, hence
f1(x)− c
f2(x)− c =
x
ex
= F (x)
dF (x)
dx
= e−x − xe−x (2.26)
From (2.26), it is clear that for x > 1, F (x) is strictly decreasing. Hence we have for
1 < x < y
f2(y)− c
f1(y)− c >
f2(x)− c
f1(x)− c (2.27)
which contradicts (2.3).
Now, let v = 5 and l = 20,m = 10, q1 = 0.2, q2 = 0.4. Under this setting, we obtain
Theorem 2.10. The strategy profile as defined in (2.9) is not an NE strategy profile.
Remark 2.8. Thus, the condition in (2.3) is also necessary for a NE strategy profile to be
in the form (2.9).
In the example constructed above, however, an NE strategy profile may still exist.
Now, we show that in certain cases we can have a symmetric NE where L1 < L2. Thus,
when channel state is 1 and 2, a primary chooses penalty from the interval [L1, L2] and
[L2, v] respectively. (Note the difference; in the strategy profile described in lemma 2.2,
we have L1 > L2). Consider the following symmetric strategy profile where each primary
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selects strategy ψ˜i at channel state i, i ∈ {1, 2}-
ψ˜i(x) =0, if x < L˜i
1
qi
(w−1(
fi(x)− p˜i
fi(x)− c )−
i−1∑
j=1
qj), if L˜i+1 ≥ x ≥ L˜i
1, if x > L˜i+1 (2.28)
with L˜3 = v, L˜1 > 1.
and
p˜2 = (f2(v)− c)(1− w(q1 + q2))
L˜2 = g2(
p˜2
1− w(q1))
L˜1 = g1(f1(L˜2)(1− w(q1))
p˜1 =
f1(L˜2)
f2(L˜2)
∗ p˜2 (2.29)
When v = 5, l = 20,m = 10, q1 = 0.2, q2 = 0.4; we obtain p˜2 = 27.6185, L˜2 = 3.3201, p˜1 =
3.3148, L˜1 = 3.3148 .
It is easy to show that ψ˜i(·) as defined in (2.28) is distribution function with ψ˜i(L˜i) = 0
and ψ˜i(L˜i+1) = 1. Note that under ψ˜i(·), a primary selects penalty from the interval
[L˜1, L˜2] and [L˜2, v] when the channel states are 1 and 2 respectively. So, it remains to
show that it is an NE strategy profile. The following theorem shows that it is indeed an
NE strategy profile.
Theorem 2.11. Strategy profile ψ˜i(·), i = 1, . . . , n as described in (2.28) is an NE .
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2.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have analyzed a spectrum oligopoly market with primaries and secondaries where
secondaries select a channel depending on the price quoted by a primary and the trans-
mission rate a channel offers. We have shown that in the one-shot game there exists a
unique NE strategy profile which we have explicitly computed. We have analyzed the ex-
pected payoff under the NE strategy profile in the asymptotic limit and compared it with
the payoff that primaries would obtain when they collude. We have shown that under a
repeated version of the game there exists a subgame perfect NE strategy profile where
each primary obtains a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff that it would have obtained
if all primaries collude.
The characterization of an NE strategy profile under the setting i) when secondaries
have different penalty functions, and ii) when demand of secondaries vary depending on
the pricing strategy remains an open problem. The analytical tools and results that we
have provided may provide the basis for developing a framework to solve those problems.
2.7 Proofs
2.7.1 Proof of the results of Section 2.2.1
We first state Lemma 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 in order to prove Theorem 2.1. Theorem 2.2
readily follows from Lemma 2.7. After that we show Corollary 2.3 which we use to prove
theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Now, we introduce some notations which we use throughout this section.
Definition 2.11. Let ri(x) denote the probability of winning of primary i when it selects
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penalty x.
Let ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) denote the probability of at least m success out of l − 1
(except i) independent Bernouli event with event k has success probability of xk.
Note that ri(x) does not depend on the state of the channel since secondaries select
the channels based only on the penalties. Since secondaries prefer channels which induce
lower penalty thus ri(·) is non-increasing function. Note that ti(·) is strictly increasing in
each component. Note also that
ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) = w(x) (if x1 = . . . = xl = x). (2.30)
If primary i selects penalty x at channel state j, then its expected payoff is
(fj(x)− c)ri(x). (2.31)
Definition 2.12. A Best response penalty for primary i at channel state j ≥ 1 is
x = argmax
y∈<
(fj(y)− c)ri(y)
Let ui,j,max denote the maximum expected payoff under NE strategy profile for primary
i at channel state j i.e. ui,j,max is equal to the payoff at x at channel state j if x is a best
response for primary i at channel state j.
A primary only selects penalty x with positive probability at channel state j, if x is a
best penalty response at j. We state an observation that we will use throughout:
Observation 2.1. Any penalty y ≤ gj(c) can not be a best response (definition 2.6) for
channel state j.
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Proof. Note that the profit of a primary is non-positive if the selected penalty is upper
bounded by gj(c). On the other hand when a primary selects penalty x where gj(c) <
x ≤ v, it can sell its channel at least in the event when the total number of available
channels are less than m. Since 0 <
∑n
i=1 qi < 1 by (2.1), thus the event occurs with
non-zero probability, hence the profit is strictly positive when gj(c) < x ≤ v. Hence, the
result follows.
We denote f(x−) = limy↑x f(y) throughout this section for a function f(·). Now we
are ready to show Lemma 2.7.
Lemma 2.7. ψi,j(·) is continuous at all points, except possibly at v. Also, at most one
primary can have a jump at v.
Proof. Let ψi,j(·) has a jump at x < v where i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, x
is a best response for primary i at channel state j. Next, we show that no player other
than player i will select penalty in the interval [x, x+] with positive probability for small
enough  > 0.
Fix a player k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , l} and channel state k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
First, note that if fk1(x) ≤ c, then a player can not select penalty in the interval
[x, x+ 0] with positive probability where fk1(x+ 0)− c < (fk1(v)− c)(1− w(
∑n
j=1 qj))
since a primary gets a payoff of at least (fk1(v)− c)(1− w(
∑n
j=1 qi)) at penalty v. Note
that
∑n
j=1 qi < 1, thus 0 > 0. We need to consider states k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
fk1(x) > c.
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The payoff that player k will get at a channel state k1 at a y ∈ [x, x+ 1] is
(fk1(y)− c)rk(y) ≤ (fk1(y)− c)rk(x)
(since rk(y) ≤ rk(x)). (2.32)
For any δ > 0, expected payoff for player k at x − δ at channel state k1 is lower
bounded by
(fk1(x− δ)− c)rk(x−)(since rk(x−) ≤ rk(x− δ)). (2.33)
Since ψi,j(·) has a jump at x, thus rk(x−) > rk(x). Hence, by continuity of fk1(·) there
exists a δ > 0 and small enough 1 > 0 such that for every y ∈ [x, x+ 1] we have
(fk1(x− δ)− c)rk(x−) > (fk1(y)− c)rk(x)
≥ (fk1(y)− c)rk(x) (from (2.32)).
Thus, player k has strictly higher payoff at x− δ compared to at penalty y ∈ [x, x+ 1].
Hence, no player apart from i selects penalty in the interval [x, x + ] with positive
probability where  = min(0, 1).
Since no player apart from player i select penalty in the interval [x, x+ ], thus player
i will have a strictly higher payoff at x+  instead of x which contradicts the fact that x
is a best penalty response for player i.
If player i selects v with positive probability, then player j, j 6= i will have strictly
higher payoff by selecting a penalty just below v. Hence, player j will select v with 0
probability. Hence, the result follows.
We introduce some notations which we use throughout this section:
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Definition 2.13. Let Xm,i be the mth lowest penalty selected by primaries except i.
Note that if primary i selects penalty x, then it will not be able to sell its channel
if Xm,i < x. Now we show some results which directly follow from Lemma 2.7. We use
these results to prove Theorem 2.1.
Observation 2.2. If ψk,j(·), k 6= i, j = 1, . . . , n does not have jump at x apart from i (i
may or may not have jump at x), then
ri(x) = 1− ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl)
(where xk =
n∑
j=1
qjψk,j(x)). (2.34)
Proof. Note that
ri(x) = P (A|Xm,i = x)P (Xm,i = x) + P (Xm,i > x) (2.35)
where P (A|Xm,i = x) is the probability that primary i will be selected by secondaries
when Xm,i = x. If ψk,j(·), k 6= i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} does not have any jump at x, then,
P (Xm,i = x) = 0. (2.36)
On the other hand note that the probability of the event that primary k selects penalty
less than or equal to x is given by
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x), hence, P (Xm,i > x) is given by
1− ti(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) (2.37)
where xk =
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x). Thus, if ψk,j(·) does not have jump at x for all k and j, then
(2.34) follows from (2.35), (2.36) and (2.37).
By Lemma 2.7 no primary has a jump at x < v. Thus, ri(x) is exactly given by (2.34)
when x < v. By Lemma 2.7, only one player can have a jump at v. Thus, if player k have
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a jump at v, then by Observation 2.2, rk(v) = rk(v−). Hence, the following corollary is
a direct consequence of (2.34).
Corollary 2.2. ri(x) = rk(x) iff
∑n
j=1 qjψi,j(x) =
∑n
j=1 qjψk,j(x) and ri(x) > rk(x) iff∑n
j=1 qjψi,j(x) > qj
∑n
j=1 ψi,j(x) for x < v and for x = v if no primary has a jump at v.
If primary k has a jump at v, then rk(v) = rk(v−).
Definition 2.14. Let
Li,j = inf{x : ψi,j(x) > 0}. (2.38)
Ui,j = inf{x : ψi,j = 1}. (2.39)
Li,j , Ui,j are respectively the lowest and upper endpoint of support set of ψi,j(·).
Lemma 2.8. i ) Li,j is a best response for primary i at channel state j.
ii) Ui,j is a best response for primary i at channel state j, if one of the followings is true:
a) Ui,j < v.
b) Ui,j = v and no primary has a jump at Ui,j.
c) Ui,j = v and only primary i has a jump at v.
Proof. We prove part (i). The proof of part (ii) is similar and hence we omit.
We prove part (i) by considering the following two scenarios:
Case i : Li,j = v: Note that ψi,j(v) = 1. Thus, by (2.38), ψi,j(·) has a jump at Li,j ; thus,
Li,j is a best response to primary i at channel state j.
Case ii : Li,j < v: By Lemma 2.7, no primary has a jump at Li,j and thus ri(·) is
continuous at Li,j . Thus, by (2.38), primary i selects a penalty just above Li,j with positive
probability when the channel state is j i.e. for every  > 0 there exists y ∈ (Li,j , Li,j + )
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such that y is a best response to primary i at channel state j. Then, we must have a
sequence zk, k = 1, 2, . . . such that each zk is a best response for primary i at channel
state j and lim
k→∞
zk = Li,j . But profit to primary i at channel state j is (fj(zk)− c)ri(zk).
Now from continuity of fj(·) and ri(·) at Li,j we obtain
lim
k→∞
(fj(zk)− c)ri(zk) = (fj(Li,j)− c)ri(Li,j). (2.40)
Since each zk, k = 1 . . . ,∞ is a best response, thus, Li,j is also a best response.
Lemma 2.9. Ui,a ≤ Li,j if a > j
Proof. Fix a primary i. We first show that for any x, y such that x < y ≤ v, if x is a
best response when the state of the channel is j, then y can not be a best response when
the state of the channel is a where a > j. If not, consider y > x such that x, y are the
best responses when channel states are respectively j, a(a > j). Since x is a best response
at channel state j, thus fj(x) > c by Observation 2.1. On the other hand, since y is a
best response at channel state a, thus, fa(y) > c by Observation 2.1. Since y > x, thus
fj(y) > c. Also,
ui,a,max = (fa(y)− c)ri(y). (2.41)
Expected payoff to primary i at channel state j at y is (fj(y)− c)ri(y). Thus, from (2.41)
ui,j,max ≥ (fj(y)− c)ri(y) = ui,a,max. fj(y)− c
fa(y)− c . (2.42)
Since x is a best response to primary i at channel state j, thus
ui,j,max = (fj(x)− c)ri(x).
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Expected payoff of primary i at channel state a at penalty x is
(fa(x)− c)ri(x) = ui,j,max.fa(x)− c
fj(x)− c (2.43)
Using (2.42) and (2.43), we obtain-
(fa(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ ui,a,max.(fj(y)− c)(fa(x)− c)
(fa(y)− c)(fj(x)− c)
> ui,a,max(from (2.3)since y > x, a > j, fj(x) > c) (2.44)
which contradicts Definition 2.12.
We also obtain from the argument in the above paragraph, if Ui,a is a best response
then Ui,a < Li,j .
If Ui,a is not a best response then by Lemma 2.8, Ui,a = v and there exists a primary
other than i which has a jump at v. Thus, by Lemma 2.7, primary i does not have a
jump at v. Thus, ψi,a(·) is continuous and thus, by the definition of Ui,a (2.39) for every
 > 0, there exists y ∈ [v − , v) such that y is a best response for primary i at channel
state a. Hence, if Ui,a > Li,j , then there exists a y1 > Li,j such that y1 is a best response
for primary i for state a. But, we have already shown that it is not possible. Hence, the
result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Suppose the statement is not true. Thus, we must have i, k ∈
{1, . . . , l} which do not have identical strategy. Let, j be the largest index in {1, . . . , n}
such that ψi,j(·) and ψk,j(·) differs. Thus, we must have
x = inf{y ≤ v : ψi,j(y) 6= ψk,j(y)}.
If x = v, then ψi,j(·) = ψk,j(·) since ψi,j(x′) = 1 for any x′ ≥ v. Hence, we must have
x < v.
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Note that by definition of j, ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) ∀a > j. Since x < v, thus ψi,j(x) and
ψk,j(·) are continuous at x by Lemma 2.7, thus, ψi,j(x) = ψk,j(x). Hence, ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x)
for all a ≥ j. By definition of x, ψi,j(·) and ψk,j(·) can not differ at a penalty less than x
and thus ψi,j(x) = ψk,j(x) 6= 1. Thus x < Ui,j and x < Uk,j , hence ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) = 0
∀a < j by Lemma 2.9. Since ψi,a(x) = ψk,a(x) for all a and qa, a = 1, . . . , n are exactly
the same for each primary, thus, by Corollary 2.2
ri(x) = rk(x). (2.45)
By definition of x, for every  > 0, there is a y such that y ∈ (x, x+) and ψi,j(y) 6= ψk,j(y).
Without loss of generality, we assume that ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y) for every y in (x, x + ) for
some  > 0. Thus, ψi,j(x + ) > ψi,j(x) for every  > 0. We consider the following two
possible scenarios:
Case i : ψk,j(x+ ) > ψk,j(x) for every  > 0.
Hence, there is a γ > 0, such that x + γ ≤ Uk,j , y ∈ (x, x + γ) is a best response
for primary k at channel state j and ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y). Since ψk,j(x + ) > ψk,j(x) and
ψi,j(x + ) > ψi,j(x) for every  > 0; and no primary has a jump at x, thus, x is also a
best response for primary k and primary i at channel state j. But, expected payoff to
primary k at x at channel state j is
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) = (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (2.45)). (2.46)
Since x is a best response for primary i at channel state j, thus,
(fj(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ (fj(y)− c)ri(y). (2.47)
Since ψi,j(y) > ψk,j(y) and ψk,a(y) = ψk,a(x) (since Lk,j < y < Uk,j) by Lemma 2.9 for
all a 6= j, thus, ∑na=1 qaψi,a(y) >∑na=1 qaψk,a(y). Thus, from Corollary 2.2 rk(y) < ri(y).
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Thus, expected payoff at y is
(fj(y)− c)rk(y) < (fj(y)− c)ri(y)
≤ (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (2.47))
= (fj(x)− c)rk(x) (from (2.46)). (2.48)
Since y and x are best response to primary k at channel state j, thus expected payoff to
primary k at channel state j at x and y must be equal. But, this leads to a contradiction
from (2.48) and (2.46).
Case ii : ψk,j(x) = ψk,j(y) for some y > x:
Let x1 = inf{y > x : ψk,j(y) = ψk,j(x)}. Note that ψi,j(x1) > ψk,j(x1). We consider
two possible scenarios:
Case ii a: x1 < v:
Since no primary has a jump at x1 by Lemma 2.7, thus, by definition of x1, it is a best
response for primary k at channel state j. But expected payoff to primary k at channel
state j at x1 is given by
(fj(x1)− c)rk(x1). (2.49)
Since ψk,j(x1) = ψk,j(x) < 1, thus, x1 < Uk,j , thus, ψk,a(x) = ψk,a(x1) ∀a < j by Lemma
2.9. Since ψi,j(x+ ) > ψi,j(x) for every  > 0, thus, x ≥ Li,j , hence ψi,a(x) = 1 ∀a > j.
Since x1 > x, thus, ψi,a(x1) = ψi,a(x) = 1 for all a > j. If ψk,a(x) < ψk,a(x1) ≤ 1 for some
a > j, then ψi,a(·) differs from ψk,a(·) (since 1 = ψi,a(x) = ψi,a(x1) for all a > j) at least at
x, but this is against the definition of j. Hence, ψk,a(x) = ψk,a(x1) ∀a. Since ψi,j(x1) >
ψk,j(x1) and ψi,a(x1) ≥ ψi,a(x) for all a < j,thus,
∑n
a=1 qaψi,a(x) >
∑n
a=1 qaψk,a(x1).
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Thus, by Corollary 2.2, ri(x1) > rk(x1). Since x is a best response for player i at channel
state j, thus
(fj(x)− c)ri(x) ≥ (fj(x1)− c)ri(x1)(since x1 > x). (2.50)
Hence,
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) = (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (2.45))
≥ (fj(x1)− c)ri(x1) (from (2.50))
> (fj(x1)− c)rk(x1).
which contradicts the fact that x1 is a best response for player k when the channel state
is j.
case ii b: x1 = v:
Since ψk,j(v) must be 1 and ψk,j(v−) = ψk,j(x) < 1. Hence, ψk,j(·) must have a jump
at v and thus v is a best response to primary k when the channel state is j. Thus, by
Corollary 2.2, rk(v) = rk(v−). Thus, by the continuity of fj(·), penalties close to v is also
a best response for primary k at channel state j i.e.
(fj(v)− c)rk(v) = (fj(v−)− c)rk(v−). (2.51)
Since ψk,j(v−) = ψk,j(x) by the definition of x1, thus, similar to argument in case ii a,
we obtain rk(y) < ri(y) for x < y < v, i.e. there exists an  > 0, ri(v − ) > rk(v − ) but
(fj(v) − c)rk(v) = (fj(v − ) − c)rk(v − ) (by (2.51)). Thus, there exists an  > 0, such
that
(fj(v − )− c)rk(v) = (fj(v − )− c)rk(v − )
< (fj(v − )− c)ri(v − ). (2.52)
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Note that the right hand side is the expression for the expected payoff of primary i at
channel state j at penalty v − . Since x is a best response to primary i at channel state
j, thus,
(fj(x)− c)rk(x) < (fj(x)− c)ri(x) (from (2.45))
≥ (fj(v − )− c)ri(v − )
> (fj(v)− c)rk(v) (from (2.52))
which contradicts that v is a best response for primary k at channel state j. Hence,
x1 6= v. Hence, this case does not arise.
Thus from case i, case ii.a, and case ii.b we obtain the desired result.
Henceforth, we denote ψi,j and ri(·) as ψj(·) and r(·) respectively by dropping the
index corresponding to primary i. Note from Definition 2.4 that
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)r(x). (2.53)
Also note that Li,j = Lj and Ui,j = Uj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Since strategy profiles of
primaries are identical, thus, we can consider strategy profile in terms of only one primary
(say, primary 1).
Proof of Theorem 2.2: By Lemma 2.7 ψi(·) does not have a jump at x < v. If a
primary has a jump at v, then by symmetric property other primaries also have a jump
at v, which is not possible by Lemma 2.7 since l ≥ 2. Thus, ψi(·) does not have a jump
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Now, we show that φj(·) is continuous. Now, we provide a closed form expression for
φj(x) using (2.53). Since ψi,j = ψj(x), thus, from Observation 2.2, (2.30) and Theorem 2.2
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the expected payoff for primary i at x at channel state j is given by
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qjψk(x))).
The continuity follows from the equation due to the continuity of w(·) (Definition 2.7)
and ψk, k = 1, . . . , n.
We obtain
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qjψk(x))). (2.54)
Now, we show a corollary which is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2. We use this
result to prove Theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Corollary 2.3. Every element in the support set of ψi(·) is a best response13; thus, so
are Li, Ui.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a point z in the support set of ψi(·), which is not a best
response. Therefore, primary 1 plays at z with probability 0 when the channel state is i.
Now, one of the following two cases must arise.
Case I : ∃ a neighborhood [69] of radius δ > 0 around z, such that no point in this neigh-
borhood is a best response. Neighborhood of radius δ > 0 of z is an open set (Theorem
13Note that in general every element of a support set need not be a best response. To illustrate the fact
consider a 3 player non co-operative game and the following NE strategy profile: players 1 and 2 have
identical strategy profile which is a uniform distribution from [L, v] and player 3 selects v with probability
1. Since the support set is closed, thus v is in the support set for players 1 and 2. But, players 1 and 2
will attain strictly higher payoff at just below v compared to at v. Thus, v is not a best penalty response
for players 1 and2. We show that this is not the case here because of the continuity of strategy profile.
Specifically, a primary attains the highest possible expected payoff at every penalty in the support set in
our setting.
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2.19 of [69]). Hence, we can eliminate that neighborhood and can attain a smaller closed
set, such that its complement has probability zero under ψi(·), which contradicts the fact
that z is in the support set of ψi(·).
Case II : For every  > 0, ∃y ∈ (z−, z+), such that y is a best response. Then, we must
have a sequence zk, k = 1, 2, . . . such that each zk is a best response, and lim
k→∞
zk = z [69].
But profit to primary 1 for channel state i at each of zk is (fi(zk)−c)(1−w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(zk)))
by (2.54). Thus, we can show that z is also a best response from the continuity of w(·) ad
fj(·). We can conclude the result by noting that Ui, Li (Definition 2.5) are in the support
set of ψi(·).
Remark 2.9. By corollary 2.3, at any channel state i, a primary attains the same expected
payoff (ui,max) at every point in the support set.
Now we are ready to prove theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.3: Theorem 2.3 is the direct consequence of Lemma 2.9 since
Li,j = Lj and Ui,j = Uj ∀i.
Proof Of Theorem 2.4: Suppose the statement is not true. But, it follows that there
exists an interval (x, y) ⊆ [Ln, v], such that no primary offers penalty in the interval (x, y)
with positive probability. So, we must have a˜ such that
a˜ = inf{b ≤ x : ψj(b) = ψj(x),∀j}.
By definition of a˜, a˜ is a best response for at least one state i. But, as no primary
offers penalty in the range (a˜, y), so from (2.54), φi(z) > φi(a˜) for each z ∈ (a˜, y). This
is because w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(z)) = w(
∑n
j=1 qjψj(a˜)) and fi(a˜) < fi(z). Thus, a˜ can not be a
best response for state i.
78
2.7.2 Proof of Results of Section 2.2.2
We prove Lemma 2.1, 2.2, 2.3. Then, we state and prove Observation 2.3 which we use
to prove Theorem 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: We first outline a recursive computation strategy that leads to
the expressions in (2.7) and (2.8).
Using Theorem 2.4, we have U1 = v and thus v is a best response at channel state
1 (Corollary 2.3). If a primary chooses penalty v then it sells only when Xm > v, this
allows us to compute u1,max. By Theorem 2.4, primaries with channel states 2, 3, . . . , n
choose penalty below L1 and primaries with channel state 1 select penalty greater than
L1 with probability 1. This allows us to calculate the payoff at L1 which must be equal
to u1,max. The above equality allows us to compute the expression for L1.
Since L1 = U2 (Theorem 2.4) and U2 is a best response at channel state 2, which
enables us to obtain the expression for u2,max. By Theorem 2.4 primaries with channel
states 3, . . . , n choose penalty below L2 and primaries with channel state 1 and 2 select
penalty greater than L2 with probability 1. This allows us to calculate the payoff at L2
which must be equal to u2,max. The above equality allows us to compute the expression
for L2. Using recursion, we can get the values of ui,max, Li, i = 1, . . . , n. The detailed
argument follows:
We first prove (2.7) using induction, (2.8) follows from (2.7).
From theorem 2.4, ψi(·)’s support set is [Li, Li−1] for i = 2, ..., n and [L1, v] for i = 1.
Thus, v is a best response for channel state 1 (by Corollary 2.3), hence
u1,max = (f1(v)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=1
qi)) = p1 − c.
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Thus, (2.7) holds for i = 1 with L0 = v. Let, (2.7) be true for i = t < n. We have to show
that (2.7) is satisfied for i = t + 1 assuming that it is true for i = t. Thus,by induction
hypothesis,
ut,max = pt − c = (ft(Lt−1)− c)(1− wt). (2.55)
Now, Lt is a best response for state t, and thus,
φt(Lt) = (ft(Lt)− c)(1− wt+1) = pt − c.
Now, as Lt is also a best response for state t+ 1 by Corollary 2.3, thus
φt+1(Lt) = (ft+1(Lt)− c)(1− wt+1) = ut+1,max.
Thus, ut+1,max = pt+1 − c and it satisfies (2.7). Thus, (2.7) follows from mathematical
induction.
(2.8) follows since (fi(Li)− c)(1− wi+1) = pi − c and gi(·) is the inverse of fi(·).
Proof of Lemma 2.2: By Theorem 2.4, Li, Li−1 are respectively the lower end-point
and the upper end-point of the support set of ψi(·). We should have for x < Li, ψi(x) = 0
and for x > Li−1,ψi(x) = 1. From Corollary 2.3, every point x ∈ [Li, Li−1] is a best
response for state i, and hence,
(fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
j=i+1
qj + qi.ψi(x))) = ui,max = pi − c.
Thus, the expression for ψi(·) follows. We conclude the proof by noting that the domain
and range of w(.) is [0, 1], and
pi − c
fi(x)− c < 1 for x ∈ [Li, Li−1]: so w
−1(.) is defined at
1− pi − c
fi(x)− c .
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Proof of Lemma 2.3: Note that
ψi(Li) =
1
qi
(w−1(1− pi − c
fi(Li)− c)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
(w−1(wi+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj) from(2.8)
= 0 (by(2.6)).
From (2.9) and (2.7), we obtain
ψi(Li−1) =
1
qi
(w−1(1− pi − c
fi(Li−1)− c)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
(w−1(wi)−
n∑
j=i+1
qj)
=
1
qi
.qi = 1 (aswi = w(
n∑
j=i
qj)).
w(.) is continuous, strictly increasing on compact set [0,
∑n
j=1 qj ], so w
−1 is also continuous
(theorem 4.17 in [69]). Also,
pi − c
fi(x)− c is continuous for x ≥ Li as fi(x) > c, so ψi(.) is
continuous as it is a composition of two continuous functions. Again, w−1(.) is strictly
increasing (as w(·) is strictly increasing), 1 − pi − c
fi(x)− c is strictly increasing (as fi(·) is
strictly increasing), so ψi(.) is strictly increasing on [Li, Li−1] ( as it is a composition of
two strictly increasing functions (Theorem 4.7 in [69])) .
Now, we state and prove a result (Observation 2.3). Subsequently we prove Theo-
rem 2.5.
First, note that as 1 − wi > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, thus, pi − c > 0. Hence, from (2.8) it
is evident that
fk(Lk) > c. (2.56)
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Observation 2.3. For t > s, t, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pt − c = (ps − c)
t−1∏
i=s
fi+1(Li)− c
fi(Li)− c . (2.57)
Proof. Since f−1i (·) = gi, thus from (2.8) we obtain for i− 1
pi−1 − c = (fi−1(Li−1)− c)(1− wi). (2.58)
Hence, from (2.7), (2.56), and (2.58)
pi − c = (pi−1 − c) fi(Li−1)− c
fi−1(Li−1)− c . (2.59)
We obtain the result using recursion.
Proof of Theorem 2.5: Fix a state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. First, we show that if a primary
follows its strategy profile then it would attain a payoff of pj − c at channel state j. Next,
we will show that if a primary unilaterally deviates from its strategy profile, then it would
obtain a payoff of at most of pj − c (Case i and Case ii) when the channel state is j.
If the state of the channel of primary 1 is i ≥ 1 and it selects penalty x, then its
expected profit is-
φi(x) = (fi(x)− c)r(x)
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=1
qk.ψk(x))). (2.60)
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First, suppose x ∈ [Lj , Lj−1]. From (2.60) and (2.9), we obtain
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=1
qiψi(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=j+1
qk + qjψj(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− pj − c
fj(x)− c))) (from (2.9))
= pj − c. (2.61)
Since ψi(Ln) = 0 ∀i, we have
φj(Ln) = (fj(Ln)− c)(1− w(0)) = fj(Ln)− c. (2.62)
From (2.62) expected payoff to a primary at state j at Ln is fj(Ln) − c. At any y < Ln
expected payoff to a primary at state j will be strictly less than fj(Ln) − c. Hence, it
suffices to show that for x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1], k 6= j, k ∈ {1, .., n}, profit to primary 1 is at most
pj − c, when the channel state is j.
Now, let x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1]. From (2.60) and (2.9), expected payoff at x
φj(x) = (fj(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=k+1
qi + qkψk(x)))
= (fj(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− pk − c
fk(x)− c)))(from (2.9))
=
(pk − c)(fj(x)− c)
fk(x)− c . (2.63)
We will show that φj(x) − (pj − c) is non-positive. As, k 6= j, so only the following two
cases are possible.
Case i : k < j: From (2.3), (2.56) and for i < j, we have-
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c >
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c (as Li < Li−1). (2.64)
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From Observation 2.3 we obtain-
pj − c = (pk − c)(fj(Lj−1)− c)
fk(Lk)− c
j−1∏
i=k+1
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c .
Using (2.64) the above expression becomes
pj − c ≥ (pk − c)(fj(Lj−1)− c)
fk(Lk)− c
j−1∏
i=k+1
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c
=
(pk − c)(fj(Lk)− c)
fk(Lk)− c . (2.65)
Hence, from (2.63) and (2.65), we obtain-
φj(x)− (pj − c)
≤ (pk − c)(fj(x)− c
fk(x)− c −
fj(Lk)− c
fk(Lk)− c). (2.66)
Since x ∈ [Lk, Lk−1], j > k and fk(Lk) > c (by (2.56)); hence, from (2.66) and Assumption
1, we have-
φj(x) ≤ pj − c. (2.67)
Case ii : j < k: If fj(x) ≤ c then a primary gets a non-positive payoff at channel state j,
which is strictly below pj−c. Hence we consider the case when fj(x) > c. Since x ≤ Lk−1
thus fj(Lk−1) > c. Now, if i > j and fj(Li) > c, we have from (2.3) and (2.56)-
fi(Li−1)− c
fj(Li−1)− c <
fi(Li)− c
fj(Li)− c (as Li < Li−1) (2.68)
Since fj(Lk−1) > c, thus
fj(Li) > c (for j ≤ i < k, as Li ≥ Lk−1). (2.69)
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Now, from Observation 2.3 we obtain-
pk − c = (pj − c)
k−1∏
i=j
fi+1(Li)− c
fi(Li)− c
= (pj − c).fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lj)− c
k−1∏
i=j+1
fi(Li−1)− c
fi(Li)− c
≤ (pj − c).fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lj)− c
k−1∏
i=j+1
fj(Li−1)− c
fj(Li)− c
(from (2.68),&(2.69))
= (pj − c).fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lk−1)− c . (2.70)
Thus, from (2.63) and (2.70), we obtain-
φj(x)− (pj − c)
≤ (pj − c)(fk(Lk−1)− c
fj(Lk−1)− c .
fj(x)− c
fk(x)− c − 1)
≤ 0(as x ≤ Lk−1, j < k and from Assumption 1). (2.71)
Hence, from (2.71), (2.67), and (2.61), every x ∈ [Lj , Lj−1] is a best response to primary
1 when channel state is j. Since j is arbitrary, it is true for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and thus
(2.9) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium strategy profile.
2.7.3 Proof of results of Section 2.3
We first establish Lemma 2.4. Subsequently, we prove Lemma 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.4: We divide the proof in three parts:
• First, we prove that when m ≥ (l − 1)(∑nj=1 qj + ) for some  > 0, then pi − c →
fi(v)− c as l→∞ (Part I).
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• Next we show that if (l − 1)∑nj=k(qj + ) ≥ m ≥ (l − 1)∑nj=k+1(qj − ) for some
 > 0, then pi − c→ fi(ck)− c if i > k and pi − c→ 0 if i ≤ k (Part II).
• Finally, we show if m ≤ (l− 1)(qn + ) for some  > 0, then pi− c→ 0 as l→∞ for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (Part III).
Part I : Suppose m ≥ (l − 1)(∑nj=1 qj + ) for some  > 0.
Since Li−1 ≤ v, thus, from (2.7)-
pi − c ≤ (fi(v)− c) i = 1, . . . , n. (2.72)
When primary 1 selects penalty v at channel state i ≥ 1, then its expected profit is
φi(v) = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1). Now, from Theorem 2.6 under the NE strategy profile,
pi − c ≥ φi(v) = (fi(v)− c)(1− w1). (2.73)
Let Zi, i = 1, .., l − 1 be Bernoulli trials with success probabilities
∑n
j=1 qi and Z =∑l−1
i=1 Zi; so P (Z ≥ m) is equal to w1 by (2.6). Since m ≥ (l − 1)(
∑n
i=1 qi + ) for some
 > 0 and E(Z) = (l − 1)∑ni=1 qi, by weak law of large numbers [68], w1 → 0 as l →∞.
Hence, pi − c→ fi(v)− c as l→∞ by (2.72) and (2.73).Thus, the result follows. .
Part II : We show the result by evaluating the expressions for pj − c, j = 1, . . . , n in
the asymptotic limit. Towards this end, we first evaluate the expressions for wj and Lj
in the asymptotic limit. We obtain the expression for pj − c when we combine those two
values.
Suppose (l − 1)∑nj=k(qj + ) ≥ m ≥ (l − 1)∑nj=k+1(qj − ) for some  > 0. Since wk+1
is the probability of at least m successes out of l − 1 independent Bernoulli trials, each
of which occurs with probability
∑n
j=k+1 qj (by (2.6)). Hence from the weak law of large
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numbers [68]
1− wk+1 → 1 as l→∞. (2.74)
Since wj < wi, for any j > i (from (2.6)), we have from (2.74) for j ≥ k + 1
1− wj → 1 as l→∞. (2.75)
Again, as m ≤ (l− 1)(∑nj=k qj − ), so, from weak law of large numbers[68], for every
 > 0, ∃L, such that 1− wk < , whenever l ≥ L. Hence,
1− wk →
l→∞
0
1− wj →
l→∞
0 (for j ≤ k,wj ≥ wk). (2.76)
Thus, it is evident from (2.7) and (2.76) that if i ≤ k, then
pi − c →
l→∞
0. (2.77)
Thus, from (2.8), (2.75), and (2.77)
Lk →
l→∞
gk(c) = ck. (2.78)
We obtain for j > k from (2.7) and (2.75)
pj →
l→∞
fj(Lj−1). (from (2.75)). (2.79)
Again, using (2.8) and (2.75), we obtain for j > k
pj →
l→∞
fj(Lj) (from (2.75)). (2.80)
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fj(·) is strictly increasing, thus from (2.79) and (2.80), Lj → Lj−1 (for j > k). Hence, for
j > k,
Lj →
l→∞
Lk
Lj →
l→∞
ck (from(2.78)). (2.81)
Thus, from (2.81), and (2.80), we obtain for any i > k
pi − c →
l→∞
(fi(ck)− c). (2.82)
Thus, from (2.77) pi− c→ 0 as l→∞ if i ≤ k. From (2.82) we obtain pi− c→ fi(ck)− c
as l→∞ if i > k. Hence, the result follows.
Part III : Suppose that m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0. Let, Zi, i = 1, ..., l − 1
be the Bernoulli trials with success probabilities qn and Z =
∑l−1
i=1 Zi, E(Z) = (l − 1)qn.
Hence,
1− wn ≤ P (Z ≤ m)
≤ P (Z ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ))
≤ P (|Z − (l − 1)qn| ≥ (l − 1))
≤ 2 exp(−2(l − 1)
22
l − 1 )
(from Hoeffding’s Inequality [39])
= 2 exp(−2(l − 1)2). (2.83)
Note that 1 − wi < 1 − wj (if j > i), fk(Lk−1) > fk−1(Lk−1). Hence, it can be readily
seen from (2.7) that
pi − c ≤ (fi(Li−1)− c)(1− wn). (2.84)
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Thus, the result follows from (2.83) and (2.84).
When m ≤ (l− 1)(qn − ) for some  > 0, then the upper bound for RNE (see (2.10))
from (2.84)is
RNE ≤ (1− wn)(
n∑
j=1
qj .(fj(Lj−1)− c)). (2.85)
Thus, for m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ),  > 0, from (2.83) and (2.85), we obtain.
RNE ≤ γ · exp(−22.(l − 1)) (2.86)
where γ = 2(1−wn)(
∑n
j=1 qj .(fj(Lj−1)−c)). We will use this bound in proving Lemma 2.5.
From, the definition of η, it should be clear that
η ≤ 1. (2.87)
Now, we show Lemma 2.5
Proof of Lemma 2.5: We divide the proof in the following two parts
• First, we show that if m ≥ (l−1)(∑ni=1 qi+ ) for some  > 0, then η → 1 as l→∞
(Part I).
• Next, we show that if m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0, then η → 0 as l → ∞
(Part II).
Part I : First suppose that m ≥ (l − 1)(∑ni=1 qi + ) for some  > 0.
From, definition of ROPT , it is obvious that
ROPT ≤ l · (
n∑
i=1
(qi.(fi(v)− c))). (2.88)
Hence the result follows from Corollary 2.1, (2.88) and (2.87).
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Part II : Now, suppose that m ≤ (l− 1)(qn − ), for some  > 0. We prove that η → 0
as l→ 0.
We prove the result by showing that RNE decreases at fast rate to 0 compared to
ROPT when l→∞.
Let, Z be the number of primaries, whose channel is in state n. Hence,
ROPT ≥ E(min(Z,m))(fn(v)− c)
ROPT
fn(v)− c ≥ E(min(Z,m)). (2.89)
Note that E(Z) = l · qn, V ar(Z) = l · qn(1− qn).
We introduce a new random variable Y as follows-
Y =

m, ifZ ≥ m
0, otherwise.
So,
E(min(Z,m)) ≥ E(Y )
= m.P (Z ≥ m)
≥ m.(1− P (Z ≤ (l − 1)(qn − )))
≥ m.(1− P (|Z − l.qn| ≥ (l − 1))
≥ m.(1− l.qn.(1− qn)
(l − 1)2.2 )
(From Chebyshev’s Inequality). (2.90)
Hence, from (2.86), (2.89) and (2.90), we obtain-
η ≤ l.γ. exp(−2(l − 1)
2)
m.(1− l.qn.(1− qn)
(l − 1)2.2 ).(fn(v)− c)
.
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Thus, η tends to zero for m ≤ (l − 1)(qn − ),as l tends to infinity (as m 6= 0).
2.7.4 Proof of Results of Section 2.4
Here, we prove Theorem 2.7. Towards this end, we state and prove Observation 2.4.
First, we evaluate the total expected payoff that a primary will get under the strategy
profile (SPR). Note that the strategy SPR is symmetric, thus, the expected payoff of
primaries would be identical and thus, we only evaluate the expected payoff of primary 1.
Now we introduce some notations which we use throughout this section:
Definition 2.15. Let Xm be the mth smallest offered penalty offered by primaries i =
2, . . . , l.
Let, Ai denote the event that at a time slot, primary 1’s channel will be bought, when
its channel state is i and selects penalty v− i and primary 2, . . . , l selects penalty v− j ,
when its channel state is j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let’s recall the definition of Xm (definition
2.15). From the law of total probability,
Pr(Ai) = Pr(Ai|Xm > v − i) Pr(Xm > v − i)
+ Pr(Ai|Xm = v − i) Pr(Xm = v − i)
+ Pr(Ai|Xm < v − i) Pr(Xm < v − i) (2.91)
Now, note that Pr(Ai|Xm) = 1 if Xm > v − i and Pr(Ai|Xm) = 0 if Xm < v − i.
Note from (2.12) that
Pr(Xm > v − i) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
l − 1
j
)
(
n∑
k=i
qk)
j(1−
n∑
k=i
qk)
l−1−j
= 1− wi (2.92)
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Thus, the first term of right hand side (r.h.s.) of(2.91) is 1 − wi. We will denote the
second term of the r.h.s. of (2.91) as βi. Since the third term of the r.h.s. of (2.91) is
zero, hence,
Pr(Ai) = 1− wi + βi (2.93)
Thus, if primary follows the strategy profile as described, then its total expected payoff
at any stage of the game will be
RSNE =
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j))(1− wj + βj) (2.94)
Next observation will be used in proving Theorem 2.7.
Observation 2.4. If a primary selects a penalty which is strictly greater than v − i, then
the probability of winning is ≤ 1− wi.
Proof. Consider that a primary selects penalty x > v − i. Note that only if Xm ≥ x,
then the channel of the primary may be bought14. Hence,
Pr(the channel of the primary is bought) ≤ Pr(Xm ≥ x) (2.95)
Since, x > v − i, thus
Pr(Xm > v − i) = Pr(Xm ≥ x) + Pr(x > Xm > v − i)
=> Pr(Xm > v − i) ≥ Pr(Xm ≥ x) (2.96)
Hence, using (2.96) in (2.95), we obtain
Pr(the channel of the primary is bought) ≤ Pr(Xm > v − i) (2.97)
But from (2.92), 1− wi = Pr(Xm > v − i), hence the result follows from (2.97).
14when Xm = x then there is a nonzero probability that the channel may not be bought
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Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 2.7.
proof of Theorem 2.7: Fix any state i. We prove the theorem in two part. In Part 1,
we show that when the game is at a stage where other primaries select penalty v− j , j =
1, . . . , n at channel state j, then primary 1 does not have any unilateral deviation by
selecting penalty different from v − i for sufficiently high δ. In part 2, we show that if
the game is in a stage where all the other primaries play the unique NE strategy profile,
then primary 1 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. This will ensure
that SPR is a subgame perfect NE.
Proof of Part 1 : First, we show that, deviating to lower penalty compared to v − i is
not profitable (case 1) and then we show that deviating to a higher penalty compared to
v−i, is also not profitable (case 2) when other primaries select penalty v−j , j = 1, . . . , n
at channel state j.
Case 1 : First, suppose that primary 1 offers penalty, which is strictly less than v− i.
A primary can attain at most a payoff of fi(v− i) at this stage. After this deviation,
all the primaries play the unique N.E. strategy. The payoff is given by RNE . Now,
RNE =
n∑
j=1
qj(pj − c)
=
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(Lj−1)− c)(1− wj) (from (2.7))
≤
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) (from(2.13)) (2.98)
If a primary deviates at stage T , then its expected payoff starting from stage T would be
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at most
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] (2.99)
If a primary would not have deviated, then its expected payoff would have been
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRSNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (2.100)
Hence, from (2.99) and (2.100), the following condition must be satisfied for sub game
perfect equilibrium
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] ≤
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (2.101)
From (2.94) and (2.98), it is enough to satisfy the following inequality in order to satisfy
inequality (2.101)
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) ≤
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (2.102)
By simple algebraic manipulation in (2.102), we obtain
δ ≥ (fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi)
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi) +
∑n
j=1 qj(fj(v − j)− c)βj
(2.103)
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The proof is complete by observing that the right hand side of (2.103) is strictly less than
1. Hence, if δ is greater than the following expression
max
i∈1,...,n
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi)
(fi(v − i)− c)(wi − βi) +
∑n
j=1 qj(fj(v − j)− c)βj
then, a primary will not have any profitable one shot deviation.
Case 2 : Now, suppose that primary 1 offers penalty which is strictly greater than
v − i.
Since primary 1 offers penalty strictly greater than v − i and v − i ≤ v, thus, from
observation 2.4, primary 1 can at most attain a payoff of (fi(v)− c)(1− wi) by offering
penalty higher than v − i. After the deviation, all the primaries play the one-shot NE
strategy profile. If a primary deviates at stage T , then its expected payoff starting from
stage T would be
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v)− c)(1− wi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δRNE ] (2.104)
If a primary would not have deviated, then its expected payoff would be
(1− δ)[δT (fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) +
∞∑
t=T+1
δtRSNE ]
= δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (2.105)
Hence, from (2.104) and (2.105), the following condition must be satisfied for sub game
perfect equilibrium
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + δRNE ] ≤
δT [(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi) + δRSNE ] (2.106)
95
Hence, from (2.94) satisfying the following condition will be enough for the strategy profile
to be a SPNE.
(1− δ)(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) + δRNE
≤ (1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (2.107)
But, from (2.13)
(fi(v)− c)(1− wi) ≤ (fi(v − i)− c)
Hence, it is enough to satisfy the following inequality in order to satisfy inequality (2.107)
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c) + δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj) ≤
(1− δ)(fi(v − i)− c)(1− wi + βi)
+ δ
n∑
j=1
qj(fj(v − j)− c)(1− wj + βj) (2.108)
which is exactly similar to (2.102). Hence, the rest of the proof will be similar to case 1.
proof of part 2 : If other primaries play the unique one-shot NE strategy, selecting the
unique one-shot NE strategy is a best response for a primary. Hence, no primary has any
profitable unilateral deviation.
2.7.5 Proof of Results of Section 2.5
First, we prove Lemma 2.6. Subsequently, we state and prove Observation 2.5 which we
use to show Theorem 2.8. The proof of Theorem 2.9 is similar and hence we omit it.
Finally, we show Theorems 2.10 and 2.11.
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Proof of Lemma 2.6: First , it is evident from (2.15) and (2.16)
0 ≤ p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c (ifx ≥ L¯)
Hence, w−1(·) is defined at x ≥ L¯. Note that
ψ¯(L¯) =
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(g1(p¯1))− c) (from(2.16))
= 0
Note that
ψ¯(v) =
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(v)− c)
=
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(1− (f1(v)− c)(1− w1)
f1(v)− c )
=
1∑n
j=1 qj
w−1(w1)
= 1
We already know that w−1(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Since 1 − p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c
is strictly increasing and continuous for x ≥ L¯. Hence, ψ¯(·) is continuous and strictly
increasing on [L¯, v]. .
Observation 2.5.
fi(L¯) = p¯i (i = 1, . . . , n) (2.109)
Proof. The result is trivially true for i = 1 by definition (2.16) as g1(·) = f−11 (·). We will
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show the statement for i ≥ 2. Since fi(L¯) > f1(L¯) > c, we have from (2.14)
f1(L¯)− c
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c
p¯1 − c
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c
(f1(v)− c)(1− w1)
fi(L¯)− c =
f1(v)− c
fi(v)− c (from(2.15))
fi(L¯)− c = p¯i − c (from(2.15))
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.8: We show that for any x ∈ [L¯, v], a primary attains a payoff of
p¯i − c at channel state i. Then, we will show that if a primary selects a penalty outside
the interval a primary’s payoff is strictly less than p¯i − c at channel state i.
Suppose, x ∈ [L¯, v]. Now, fix any channel state i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If primary 1 selects
penalty x at channels state i, then its expected payoff is
φi(x) = (fi(x)− c)(1− w(
n∑
j=1
qjψ¯j(x)))
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(ψ¯(x)
n∑
j=1
qj))
= (fi(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(1− p¯1 − c
f1(x)− c)))
=
(p¯1 − c)(fi(x)− c)
f1(x)− c
=
(f1(v)− c)(fi(x)− c)(1− w1)
f1(x)− c
(Using(2.15), f1(L¯) > c)
= (fi(v)− c)(1− w1) (using(2.14))
= p¯i − c (from(2.15)) (2.110)
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Now, at any x < L¯, expected payoff will be strictly less than fi(L¯) − c. But, from
Observation 2.5, fi(L¯)− c = p¯i − c.
Thus, from (2.110), when channel state is i ≥ 1, every point in the interval [L¯, v] is a
best response to primary 1. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.10: By simple calculation, we obtain the following values
p1 = 0.9305, L1 = 1.1432, L2 = 0.9372
Now, consider the following unilateral deviation for primary 1: primary 1 will choose a
penalty x ∈ (0.9305, 0.9372) with probability 1, when the channel state is 1. Since, no
primary selects penalty lower than 0.9372 under the strategy profile (2.9), thus expected
payoff that primary 1 will obtain is f1(x)− c = x− c, which is strictly larger than p1 − c
(since x > 0.9305 = p1), the expected payoff that primary 1 gets by Theorem 2.6 when
it selects strategy according to (2.9). Thus, the strategy profile as defined in (2.9) is not
an NE.
Proof of Theorem 2.11: We show that when the channel state is i = 2 a primary does
not have any profitable unilateral deviation from the strategy profile. The proof for i = 1
is similar and thus we omit it.
First, we show that under the strategy profile a primary attains a payoff of p˜2 − c at
channel state i = 2. Next, we show that if a primary deviates at channel state 2, then its
expected payoff is upper bounded by p˜2 − c.
Note that when channel state is 2 and primary chooses penalty x ∈ [L˜2, v], expected
payoff to primary 1 is-
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(f2(x)− c)(1− w(
2∑
i=1
qi ∗ ψ˜i(x)))
= (f2(x)− c)(1− w((w−1(f2(x)− p˜2
f2(x)− c ) + q1 − q1)))
= p˜2 − c (2.111)
Now, suppose x ∈ [L˜1, L˜2]. From (2.111), expected payoff to a primary when it selects
penalty x at channel state 2, is-
(f2(x)− c)(1− w(q1 ∗ ψ˜1(x)))
= (f2(x)− c)(1− w(w−1(f1(x)− p˜1
f1(x)− c )))
= (f2(x)− c) p˜1 − c
f1(x)− c
=
(f2(x)− c)(f1(L˜2)− c)
(f1(x)− c)(f2(L˜2)− c)
∗ (p˜2 − c)
(from (2.29) and c = 0)
< p˜2 − c (from (2.27) asL˜2 ≥ x ≥ L˜1 > 1) (2.112)
Note that at L˜1, ψ˜i(x) = 0, i = 1, 2. Hence, the expected payoff to a primary when it
selects penalty L˜1 at channel state 2 is given by f2(L˜1) − c. From (2.112) we obtain
p˜2 > f2(L˜1), hence any penalty x < L˜1 will induce payoff of strictly lower than p˜2 when
channel state is 2. Hence, the result follows.
100
Chapter 3
Multiple Locations
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary
access to its channel at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve
randomly. Each primary needs to select a price and a set of non-interfering locations
(which is the independent set in the conflict graph of the region) at which to offer its
channel without knowing the transmission qualities of the channels of its competitors. At
each location each secondary selects a channel depending on the price and the quality of
the channels. We formulate the above problem as a non-cooperative game with primaries
as players. We consider two scenarios-i) when the region is small, ii) when the region is
large. In the first setting, we focus on a class of conflict graphs, known as mean valid
graphs which commonly arise when the region is small. We explicitly characterize a com-
putationally efficient symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE). The NE is threshold type in that
primaries only choose independent set whose cardinality is greater than a certain thresh-
old. The threshold on the cardinality increases with increase in quality of the channel.
We show the functional uniqueness of the above NE. We show that the symmetric NE
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strategy profile is unique (not merely functionally unique) in a special class of conflict
graphs (linear graph) which commonly arises in practice. When the region is large, we
consider node symmetric conflict graphs as such conflict graphs commonly arise when the
number of locations is large. We explicitly compute a symmetric NE that randomizes
equally among the maximum independent sets at a given channel state vector. We show
that the two symmetric NEs computed in two settings exhibit important structural dif-
ferences. For example, when the number of locations is large, a primary only selects a
maximum independent set, however when the number of locations is small, the primary
also selects an independent set which may not be a maximum. The symmetric NE is also
not unique in a linear conflict graph when the number of locations is large.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1 we describe the system model
and the strategies of the primaries. In Section 3.2 we show that there can be multiple
asymmetric NEs unlike in the single location game. Asymmetric NEs are difficult to im-
plement in the symmetric game which we consider. We, thus, focus on symmetric NE.
In Lemma 3.1 we show that the pricing strategy can be computed once the independent
set selection strategy is known (using the single location pricing strategy which has been
characterized in the previous chapter). We, thus, focus on finding the independent set
selection strategy. In Section 3.3 we characterize the structure of a computationally effi-
cient symmetric NE strategy, show the existence and also compute the same in the setting
where the channel state remains the same. In Section 3.4 we consider the setting where
the channel state may be different at different locations. We characterize a symmetric NE
and explicitly compute it. In Section 3.6 we numerically analyze the ratio of the payoffs
of the primaries in non cooperative setting compared to the setting where the primaries
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collude with each other.
3.1 System Model
Unless otherwise stated, we consider that there are l number of primaries and m number of
secondaries at each location throughout this chapter. We, however, generalize our result
for random apriori unknown m in Section 3.5. Different channels constitute disjoint
frequency bands. Each primary only allows at most secondary to transmit at a given
location.
3.1.1 Transmission Rate and Channel State
Similar to the Chapter 2 the transmission rate offered by the channel at a location depends
on the state. The channel can be in one of the states ranging from 0, 1, . . . , n at each
location (Table 3.1).
Let J denote the channel state vector which indicates the channel state at each node.
For example, when the number of nodes are 3, then J = (1, 1, 0) is a channel state vector
which indicates that the channel is in state 1, 1, and 0 at nodes 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
We assume that the channels are statistically identical, specifically the probability that
the channel state vector of a primary is J is qJ . We also assume that the probability of
the event where the channel state is 0 at every location is non-zero i.e.
qJ > 0 when J = {0, 0, . . . , 0} (3.1)
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Notation Connotation Significance & Assumption
0, 1 . . . , n States of each channel. Transmission rate at state i is higher
compared to state j if i > j. The
channel is said to be in state 0 if it
is not available for sale.
gi(·) Penalty function for all secondaries
at channel state i. It is a function of
price and transmission rate at chan-
nel state i.
gi(·) is strictly increasing in price
and gi(x) < gj(x) if i > j.
fi(·) Inverse of gi(·) fi(·) is strictly increasing in penalty
and fi(x) > fj(x) if i > j.
v Upper bound for penalty for all sec-
ondaries
Secondaries do not buy a channel
whose penalty exceeds v.
c Transaction cost incurred by pri-
mary at each location
c > 0
Table 3.1: Symbols defined in Chapter 2
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3.1.2 Penalty functions and Assumptions
Notations l,m, n, c, v, gi(·), fi(·), i = 1, . . . , n have the same connotation as in the Chap-
ter 2. For completeness, we summarize all these in Table 3.1.
As justified in Chapter 2, we assume that the inverse of penalty functions satisfy the
following assumption:
Assumption 3.1.
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c <
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c for all x > y > gi(c), i < j. (3.2)
In the special class, when n = 1 i.e. the channel is either available or not, then the
available channels offer the same transmission rates. Hence, we do not need the penalty
functions to capture the preference order of secondaries for available channels having
different transmission rates. Thus, the penalty functions are redundant when n = 1. But
to be consistent with the notations, we still use the penalty function g1(·) and the inverse
penalty function f1(·) when n = 1. We do not need Assumption 1 when n = 1 and we
only assume that penalty function g1(·) is strictly increasing.
3.1.3 Conflict Graph
Each primary owns a channel over a broad region consisting of several locations. Typically,
secondary users can not transmit simultaneously using the same channel at adjacent
locations due to interference. In order to sell its channel a primary needs to find a
set of locations which do not interfere with each other. Wireless networks have been
traditionally modeled as conflict graphs (Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) in most of the existing
literature including in several seminal papers [33, 44, 32]. Let G = (V,E) be the overall
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conflict graph of the region where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges; an edge
exists between two nodes iff transmission at the corresponding locations interfere. In a
conflict graph, the set of nodes in which no edge exists between any pair of nodes is called
an independent set (Fig. 3.1, 3.3). Thus, secondaries at all nodes in an independent set,
can transmit simultaneously using the same channel without any interference.
Note that when the channel of a primary is at state 0 at a node, then the primary can
not sell its channel at that node. Thus, a primary ought to offer its channel at a set of
non interfering locations among the locations where the channel is available for sale (i.e.
the state of the channel is not 0). Let GJ = (VJ , EJ) be the conflict graph representation
of the channel state vector J : VJ is the set of nodes (locations) where the channel is
available for sale at channel state vector J of a primary and EJ is the set of edges in G
between the nodes of VJ . GJ is obtained by removing nodes and the edges corresponding
to those nodes from G where the channel is not available i.e. the channel is at state 0.
Thus, GJ is a subgraph of G. Figure 3.4 represents a conflict graph G of a region and
the conflict graph GJ when the channel state vector is J . A primary needs to select an
independent set from GJ when the channel state vector is J .
3.1.4 Strategy and Payoff of Each Primary
Let P denote the set of all possible channel state vectors except when the channel state
is 0 across all the locations. Note that |P| = (n+ 1)|V | − 1.
For each channel state vector J ∈ P a primary selects1: a) an independent set of
the conflict graph GJ where it will sell its channel; b) a price at every node of that
1A primary does not need to select a strategy when the channel state is 0 at all locations.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Figure in (a) shows a wireless network with M number of locations. There are m = 2
secondaries at each location. Signals at locations 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 interfere with each other,
but signals at locations 1 and 3 do not interfere. Linear Graph in figure (b) models the conflict
graph of the network in (a). Note that there is an edge between nodes 1 and 2, but not between
nodes 1 and 3. I1 = {1, 3, 5, . . . ,Mo} and I2 = {2, 4, . . . ,Me} constitute independent sets, where
Mo (Me, respectively) is the greatest odd (even, respectively) less than or equal to M . There are
other independent sets too e.g. {1,4,6}. Also {1,2,4} is not an independent set since there is an
edge between nodes 1 and 2.
Figure 3.2: The rectangle represents a shop in a shopping complex or a department in a university
campus. Circles 1, 2, 3, 4 are the ranges of Wireless access points. Each circle corresponds to a
node in the conflict graph. Since ranges of Wireless access points intersect with each other, thus
there exists an edge between every pair of nodes.
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Figure 3.3: The above graph is the conflict graph representation of a larger region consisting
of several networks depicted in Fig. 3.2. It is a grid conflict graph with k rows and columns
(here k = 5). Nodes correspond to the Wireless access points. {V1,1, V1,3} is an independent set
and users at these two nodes can transmit simultaneously. But {V1,1, V1,2} or {V1,1, V2,1} are not
independent sets.
Figure 3.4: The conflict graph for the overall region is G which corresponds to the situation
where the channel is available at all nodes in the region, GJ is the conflict graph when the channel
state vector is J = (j1, j2, j3, 0, 0, 0) where ji ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, 3. Since the channel states are 0 at
nodes 4, 5, and 6, thus, GJ is obtained by removing those nodes and the edges corresponding to
those nodes.
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independent set. A primary arrives at its decision with the knowledge of its own channel
state vector qJ but without knowing the channel state vector of other primaries. A
primary however knows l,m, n,G, g1, . . . , gn, f1, . . . , fn, and qJ , J ∈ P. As discussed in
Section 2.1.2 secondaries strictly prefer a channel which induces lower penalty compared
to the higher penalty one. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the price
and the penalty at a given channel state, similar to Chapter 2 we consider that primaries
select penalties instead of prices. The ties among channels with identical penalties are
broken randomly and symmetrically among the primaries. We formulate the decision
problem of primaries as a non-cooperative game with primaries as players.
Definition 3.1. A strategy of a primary i ψi,J provides the probability mass function
(p.m.f) for selection among the independent sets (I.S.s) and the penalty distribution it
uses at each node, when its channel state vector is J . Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,|P|) denotes the
strategy of primary i, and (S1, ..., Sl) denotes the strategy profile of all primaries (players).
S−i denotes the strategy profile of primaries other than i.
Note from Table 3.1 that each primary incurs a transaction cost c at each location
where it is able to sell its channel. If primary i selects a penalty x at node s when the
channel state is j, then its payoff at node s is2
2Note that if Ys is the number of channels offered for sale at a node s, for which the penalties are upper
bounded by v, then those with min(Ys,m) lowest penalties are sold since secondaries select channels in
the increasing order of penalties.
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
fj(x)− c if the primary sells its channel
0 otherwise.
The payoff of a primary over an independent set is the sum of payoff that it gets at each
node of that independent set. Thus, if a primary is unable to sell at any node of an
independent set, then its payoff is 0 over that independent set.
Definition 3.2. ui,J(ψi,J , S−i) is the expected payoff when primary i’s channel state
vector is J and selects strategy ψi,J(·) and other primaries use strategy S−i.
3.1.5 Solution Concept
We seek to obtain a Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy profile which we define below using
ui,J (Definition 3.2), ψi,J and S−i (Definition 3.1):
Definition 3.3. [59] A Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . , Sl) is a strategy profile such that no
primary can improve its expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. So,
with Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,|P|), (S1, . . . , Sl), is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for each primary i
and channel state vector J
ui,J(ψi,J , S−i) ≥ ui,J(ψ˜i,J , S−i) ∀ ψ˜i,J . (3.3)
An NE (S1, . . . , Sl) is a symmetric NE if Si = Sj for all i, j.
If Si 6= Sk for some i, k ∈ {1, . . . , l} in an NE strategy profile, then the strategy profile
is an asymmetric NE.
In a symmetric game, as the one we consider, it is difficult to implement an asymmetric
NE. For example, if there are two players and (S1, S2) is an asymmetric NE i.e. S1 6= S2,
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then (S2, S1) is also an NE due to the symmetry of the game. The realization of such
an NE is only possible when one player knows whether the other is using S1 or S2. But,
apriori coordination among players is infeasible as the game is non co-operative.
Note that if m ≥ l, then primaries select the highest penalty v at each node and
will select one of the maximum independent sets of GJ at channel state vector J with
probability 1. This is because, when m ≥ l, then, the channel of a primary will always
be sold at a location. Hence, a primary will be always be able to sell its channel at the
highest possible penalty. Henceforth, we will consider that m < l.
3.1.6 Two Different Settings
We consider two different settings: i) First, we consider that the region is small and
consists of a few (but, multiple) locations (Section 3.3). Initially, it is expected that the
secondary market will be introduced in a small region consisting of few locations. In a
small region, the usage statistic and the propagation condition of a channel will be similar
at each location, thus, in an analytical abstraction we consider that the transmission rate
offered by a channel is the same at each location. In this setting, the interference relations
amongst the locations may not be symmetric in general which we accommodate in our
model. Since we only consider that the channel state is the same across the nodes, thus,
qJ = 0 for all those channel state vectors where the channel state is not identical at each
location.
ii) Second, we consider the region consists of large number of locations (Section 3.4).
This is likely to happen in later stages of deployment of the secondary market. Since
the geographical region is large, the transmission rate offered by a channel at different
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locations may be different. Thus, we consider that the channel state of a primary can be
different at different locations. Given the large region, there will be an inherent symmetry
in the interference relations among the locations which we characterize and exploit.
3.2 Multiple NEs, and A Separation Result
3.2.1 Multiple Asymmetric NEs
We first show that there can be multiple NEs in this game unlike in the single location
game (Chapter 2). Consider the linear conflict graph (Fig. 3.1) with 2 nodes, 2 primaries
and 1 secondary.
We show multiple asymmetric NEs for two different settings which we have discussed
in Section 3.1.6. First, we consider the setting where the channel state is the same across
the network. Thus, a primary needs to select a strategy when the channel state is not 0
across the network. Note that if primaries selects different nodes, then each primary can
attain a maximum profit of (fi(v)−c) at the channel state i which corresponds to selecting
penalty v. Thus, both the following strategy profiles are asymmetric NE: 1) primary 1 (2,
respectively) selects V1 (V2, respectively) w.p. 1 and selects penalty v irrespective of the
channel state; 2) primary 1 (2, respectively) selects V2 (V1, respectively) w.p. 1 and selects
penalty v w.p. 1 irrespective of the channel state across the network. The realization of
one of the above NEs is possible only when a primary knows other’s strategy apriori; this
is ruled out due to non-cooperation. Thus, asymmetric NE can not be realized in this
game.
Now, we will provide multiple asymmetric NE strategies for the above linear conflict
112
graph when the channel state can be different at different locations using the NE penalty
strategy for single location as presented in Chapter 2. We need to specify strategy at
each possible channel state vector. We consider n = 1 i.e. at any given node the channel
is either available (state 1) or not (state 0). We also consider that the channel state of a
primary is 1 at a given location w.p. q1 independent of the channel state at other location.
The following strategy profiles are NE strategy profiles: i) When the channel state vector
is (0, 1) ((1, 0) respv.) then a primary selects node 2 (1 respv.) w.p. 1 and selects the
single location penalty strategy stated in Theorem 2.6 with q1q0 in place of q1
3. When
the channel state vector is (1, 1) then primary 1 (primary 2 respv.) selects node 1 (node
2 respv.) w.p. 1 and selects penalty v w.p. 1.
ii) When the channel state vector is either (0, 1) or (1, 0) then the strategy profile is
the same as before. When channel state vector is (1, 1) then primary 1 (primary 2 respv.)
selects node 2 (node 1 respv.) w.p. 1 and selects penalty v w.p. 1.
Note that NE strategy profiles cited above are asymmetric. The game is a symmetric
one since primaries have the same action sets, payoff functions and their channels are
statistically identical. In a symmetric game, we have already discussed in Section 3.1.4
that implementing an asymmetric NE is difficult. We therefore focus on finding a sym-
metric NE and investigate whether it is unique. Clearly, for any symmetric NE, we can
represent the strategy of any primary as S = (ψ1(.), ψ2(.), ....., ψ|P|(.)) where we drop the
index corresponding to the primary.
3q1q0 is the probability that the channel state vector is either (0, 1) or (1, 0).
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3.2.2 A Separation Result
We now observe that the NE penalty selection at a node in an independent set can be
uniquely computed using the single location NE penalty selection strategy characterized
in Chapter 2. First, we introduce some notations– Let IJ be the set of independent sets
of the graph GJ . Let Pa,j be the set of channel state vectors where the channel state is j
at node a.
Definition 3.4. Let βJ(I) be the probability with which the independent set I ∈ IJ is
selected by a primary, under a symmetric NE strategy when the channel state vector is
J .
Note that though βJ(I) depends on the symmetric NE strategy, we do not make it
explicit in the notation in order to keep the notational simplicity. Thus,
αa,j =
∑
I∈IJ :a∈I
∑
J :J∈Pa,j
qJβJ(I) (3.4)
Let for node s and channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Ls,0 = Us,1 = v,
ps,j − c = (fj(Us,j)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=j
αs,k)) (3.5)
and Ls,j = gj(
pj − c
1− w(∑nk=j+1 αs,k) + c), Us,j = Ls,j−1 (3.6)
where w(·) is given in (2.5). Since Us,1 = v, thus we obtain ps,j , Ls,j (which in turn gives
Uj+1) recursively starting from j = 1 using (3.5) and (3.6). Let for node s and channel
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state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
φs,j(x) =0, if x < Ls,j
1
qj
(w−1(
fj(x)− ps,j
fj(x)− c )−
n∑
k=j+1
αs,k), if Ls,j−1 ≥ x ≥ La,j
1, if x > Ls,j−1. (3.7)
Note that φs,i(·) is the same as ψi(·) (introduced in Lemma 2.2) with αs,jqj in place of qj .
Thus from Theorem 2.6
Lemma 3.1. Suppose, under a symmetric NE, each primary offers its channel which is
at state j at node s for sale at node s w.p. αs,j. Then, the unique NE penalty distribution
of each primary is the d.f. φs,j(·) as described in (3.7). The payoff of the primary at
channel state j is ps,j − c and it is attained at every penalty in the interval [Ls,j , Ls,j−1].
Since the penalty selection strategy of a primary is unique given the independent set
selection strategy {βJ(I)} (by Lemma 3.1), henceforth, we only focus on independent set
selection probability which provides the node selection probability as defined in (3.4).
3.3 Same Channel State Across the region
We first consider the setting where the channel state is the same across the network. Recall
from Section 3.1.6 that this setting occurs when the region is of moderate size. We first
introduce some notations specific to this setting (Section 3.3.1). We focus on symmetric
NEs on a specific class of conflict graphs known as mean valid graph since conflict graphs
of most of the commonly observed wireless networks of moderate sizes belong to this
category (Section 3.3.2). We subsequently focus on a policy which provides a storage
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and computation efficient NE strategy (if it exists) (Section 3.3.3). We identify certain
key properties that any NE strategy profile of the above policy (should it exist) must
satisfy (Section 3.3.4). Then, we show that the identified structure is a unique and there
exists a strategy profile which satisfies the identified structure (Theorem 3.2). We show
that the strategy profile which satisfies the identified structure is an NE (Theorem 3.3).
Finally, we investigate the uniqueness and implementation issues of the symmetric NE
profile (Section 3.3.7).
3.3.1 Modifications of Notations
Since the channel state is the same across the region, we denote the channel state vector
J as the scalar j in this setting when the channel state is j at each location. For example,
if the channel state is 3 everywhere, we denote the channel state at the network as 3.
qJ = 0 for all J where the channel state is not identical at each location and we denote
the probability that the channel state is j over the region as qj with slight abuse of
notation. Note that in this setting, when the channel state is j ≥ 1, then the channel
is available at each node, hence, a primary always selects an independent set from the
conflict graph G when the channel is available.
We replace βJ(I) in Definition 3.4 with βj(I) which denotes the probability with which
a primary selects independent set I under a symmetric NE strategy. Note that Pa,j is
now simply j. αa,j is thus,
αa,j =
∑
I:a∈I
qjβj(I) (3.8)
Also note from (3.1) that the channel state is 0 over the network with some non zero
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probability i.e.
n∑
j=1
qj < 1 (3.9)
The cardinality of the strategy space P in this setting is n. The NE strategy profile is thus
represented as (ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)) in this setting. Note that though the state of a channel
is the same across the nodes, the propagation condition and the usage level of different
channels can be different, thus, a primary is still not aware of the states of the channel of
other primaries.
3.3.2 Mean Valid Graphs
In practice most of the finite size wireless networks are of the following types:
• Wireless network of roadside shops.
• Wireless network of buildings.
• Cellular networks with hexagonal or square cells.
Conflict graphs of all the above wireless networks belong to a category, introduced as
mean valid graphs[46].
Definition 3.5. [46] A graph G = (V,E) is said to be a mean valid graph if and only if
1. Its vertex set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal4 I.S. for some integer
d ≥ 2 : V = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ . . .∪ Id5 where Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, is a maximal independent set
4 An independent set I is said to be maximal if for each a /∈ I, a ∈ V , I ∪ {a} is not an independent
set [80].
5For example, linear conflict graph (Fig. 3.1) is mean valid graph with d = 2, with I1 being the set
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and Is ∩ Ir = ∅, s 6= r. Let, |Is| = Ms,
M1 ≥M2 ≥ . . . ≥Md. (3.10)
and Is = {as,k : k = 1, . . . ,Ms}.
2. Suppose I ∈ Icontains ms(I) nodes from Is, s = 1, . . . , d, then ,
d∑
s=1
ms(I)
Ms
≤ 1 ∀I ∈ I. (3.11)
I1, . . . , Id are said to characterize the mean valid graph. The following graphs are
mean valid graphs[46].
• Linear Graph constitutes a conflict graph for locations along a highway or a row of
shops (Fig. 3.1). It is a mean valid graph with d = 2.
• Grid Graph constitutes a conflict graph for a building (Fig. 3.3) or cellular network
with square cells. It is a mean valid graph with d = 4. Three dimensional grid
graph is also a mean valid graph with d = 8.
• Conflict graph of a cellular network with hexagonal cells is also a mean valid graph
with d = 3, if it has an even number of rows and all rows have the same number of
nodes which should be a multiple of 3.
Henceforth, we focus on mean valid graphs in this setting.
of odd numbered nodes and I2 being the set of even numbered nodes. In Fig. 3.3 d = 4, with I1 =
{V1,1, V1,3, . . . , V1,ko , V3,1, V3,3, . . . , V3,ko , . . .}, I2 = {V1,2, V1,4, . . . , V1,ke , V3,2, V3,4, . . . , V3,ke , . . .}, I3 =
{V2,1, V2,3, . . . , V2,ko , V4,1, V4,3, . . . , V4,ko , . . .}, I4 = {V2,2, V2,4, . . . , V2,ke , V4,2, V4,4, . . . , V4,ke , . . .}, where ko
(respectively, ke) denote the greatest odd (respectively, even) integer less than or equal to k.
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3.3.3 A storage & Computation efficient policy
As in any graph, in mean valid graphs, the number of independent sets grows exponen-
tially with the number of nodes. We have to compute probability distribution over all
independent sets in order to find an independent set selection strategy. Thus, compu-
tation and storage requirements grow exponentially as the number of nodes increases.
However, mean valid graphs are characterized by maximal independent sets I1, . . . , Id
which partition the set of nodes. So, if there exists an NE strategy profile which only
selects independent sets amongst I1, . . . , Id, then we only need to store d independent
sets and the corresponding probability distribution. Thus, the storage and computation
requirement only scales with d and does not increase exponentially with the number of
nodes. We therefore examine if there exists an NE strategy profile under which
• Each primary selects only independent sets in {I1, . . . , Id}. Specifically, at channel
state j, independent set Ik, k ∈ {1, . . . , d} is selected with probability tk,j .
Under the policy, thus,
βj(Ik) = tk,j ∀k ∈ {1, . . . d} such that
d∑
k=1
βj(Ik) = 1. (3.12)
Thus, from (3.8) and (3.12) for any two nodes s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
αs,j = αr,j = qjtk,j
d∑
k=1
tk,j = 1. (3.13)
In the next section, we show that there exists a unique symmetric NE strategy which
satisfies (3.13).
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3.3.4 Characterization of Symmetric NE
We first, characterize the properties that any symmetric NE strategy profile of the form
(3.13) must satisfy.
By virtue of Lemma 3.1, we know the penalty selection strategy for each state at a
given node for a given NE independent set selection strategy. The support sets of penalty
distributions are contiguous (3.7). However, the end-points of the support sets are not
necessarily the same across the location. Surprisingly, we show that the upper endpoints
of the penalty selection strategy at a particular channel state i, i = 1, . . . , n are identical
across different locations regardless of the choice of independent sets (Lemma 3.2). We
show that there exists a threshold such that only those independent sets, whose cardinal-
ities are equal to or greater than that threshold, are selected with positive probabilities
(Lemma 3.3). Drawing from the above lemmas we characterize the structure that any NE
strategy profile of the form (3.13) (if it exists) has to satisfy (Theorem 3.1). The proofs
of the results have been provided at the end of this subsection.
We start with some notations which we use throughout. Recall from (2.5) that w(x)
is the probability that there is at least m success out of n− 1 Bernouli events where each
event has success probability of x.
Definition 3.6. Let,
W (x) = 1− w(x). (3.14)
Since w(·) is continuous and strictly increasing (by (2.5)),thus, W (·) is a continuous
and a strictly decreasing function with W (0) = 1.
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Definition 3.7. Let γs,j denote the probability that a channel of state j or higher is
offered at a node of Is. Thus,
γs,j =
n∑
k=j
ts,kqk =
n∑
k=j
αa,k. (3.15)
From (3.15), we obtain a recursive method to calculate γs,j .
γs,j−1 =
n∑
k=j−1
ts,kqk = ts,j−1qj−1 + γs,j . (3.16)
In the class of policies of the form (3.13), αa,j is equal to qjts,j for every node a in
independent set Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Thus, by Lemma 3.1 the penalty selection strategy
at any node of Is is given by (3.7) with qjts,j in place of αj . Thus, by (3.5), (3.6), and
Lemma 3.1, expected payoff obtained by a primary at every node of Is at channel state j
is–
ps,j − c = (fj(Us,j)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=j
ts,iqi))
= (fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) (3.17)
where
Us,j = gj(
ps,j − c
W (γs,j)
+ c) Us,1 = v, Us,j = Ls,j−1 (3.18)
Ls,j = gj(
ps,j − c
W (γs,j+1)
+ c) Ls,0 = v. (3.19)
Remark 3.1. Starting from Us,1 = v, we can find ps,1 using (3.17) which we use to find
Ls,1 (from (3.19)). Since Ls,1 = Us,2, thus utilizing Us,2 we obtain ps,2 (from (3.17))
which in turn gives Ls,2 (from (3.19)). Thus, recursively we obtain Us,j , ps,j , Ls,j for all
s ∈ {1, . . . , d} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, we can easily compute a penalty selection
strategy at each node of Is for a given ts,j .
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Remark 3.2. Note from Lemmas 2.2 and 3.1 that each primary selects penalty only from
the interval [Ls,j , Us,j ] at channel state j at every node of Is when ts,j > 0.
Since ps,j − c is the expected payoff that a primary gets at any node in Is at channel
state j when primaries select Is with probability ts,j > 0, thus, the expected payoff to a
primary at channel state j over independent set Is when ts,j > 0 is
Ms(ps,j − c) = Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) (from(3.17)). (3.20)
Now, we introduce some notations that we use throughout.
Definition 3.8. Let Pj(Ik) denote the maximum expected payoff that a primary can
get at independent set Ik at channel state j when other primaries select a symmetric
NE strategy profile which is of the form (3.13) . Let P ∗j be the maximum among Pj(Ir)
r ∈ {1, . . . , d} i.e.
P ∗j = max
r∈{1,...,d}
Pj(Ir).
Let Bj denote the set of indices out of I1, . . . , Id which are selected with positive proba-
bility under a symmetric NE strategy profile at channel state j.
At channel state j an independent set is selected with positive probability in an NE
strategy profile only if the expected payoff at that independent set is6 P ∗j ; hence when
6Consider that in an NE strategy profile Is is selected w.p. ts,j > 0, but expected payoff is strictly less
than P ∗j which it obtains at Ir (say). Let in the NE strategy profile Ir is selected w.p. tr,j . Note that
the expected payoff of a primary at an independent set only depends on the strategy of other primaries.
Thus, a primary can unilaterally deviate by selecting Ir w.p. ts,j + tr,j and Is w.p. 0; but under the new
strategy profile its expected payoff is strictly higher. Hence, the original strategy profile can not be an
NE.
122
the channel state is j, then
Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j if s ∈ Bj(from(3.20)). (3.21)
Now, we are ready to state the results.
Lemma 3.2. If ts,j > 0, tr,j > 0, then Us,j = Ur,j.
The above lemma shows that upper end points of penalty selection strategy is the same
across the nodes of the independent sets which are chosen with positive probability.7
Remark 3.3. From lemma 3.2 we can write Us,j as Uj ∀s ∈ Bj . So, for any s, r ∈ Bj , we
must have from (3.21)
Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j) = P ∗j .
MsW (γs,j) = MrW (γr,j). (3.22)
Next lemma characterizes the best response set Bj .
Lemma 3.3. There exists an integer dj ∈ {1, . . . , d}, such that I1, . . . , Idj are selected
with positive probability and Idj+1, . . . , Id are selected with zero probability at channel state
j.
Thus, from (3.10), only those independent sets whose cardinalities are greater than
or equal to Mdj are selected with positive probabilities at channels state j . We show in
Lemma 3.7 that this above threshold Mdj is a non-decreasing function in channel state j.
7Note that we have not shown any relation between Ls,j and Lr,j . Thus, even though Us,j = Ur,j , it is
possible that Ls,j 6= Lr,j . But if ts,j+1 > 0, tr,j+1 > 0, then from Lemma 3.2 we obtain Us,j+1 = Ur,j+1;
since Ls,j = Us,j+1, Lr,j = Ur,j+1, thus we have Ls,j = Lr,j . Hence, lower endpoint of penalty selection
strategy at every node of independent sets Is, Ir is also the same if both Is, Ir are selected with positive
probabilities for both the states j and j + 1.
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In an NE strategy only those independent sets are selected with positive probabilities
which give an expected payoff of P ∗j , thus we can evaluate the expected payoff under the
NE strategy using Lemma 3.3. Since we know from Lemma 3.3 that NE strategy profile
only selects those independent sets whose indices are less than or equal to dj , thus, under
NE strategy expected payoff of a primary at channel state j is given by
P ∗j = Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) s ≤ dj . (3.23)
We will also show that P ∗j ≥ Mr(fj(Uj) − c)W (γr,j) for r > dj to prove Lemma 3.3
(Lemma 3.6 in Section 3.3.4). Drawing from the above it readily follows that
Theorem 3.1. The structure of a symmetric NE strategy profile which satisfies (3.13)
(if it exists), is of the following form ∀a ∈ Is for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
αa,j = qjts,j ,
d∑
s=1
ts,j = 1, ts,j > 0, s ≤ dj , ts,j = 0, s > dj (3.24)
such that
M1W (γ1,j) = . . . = MdjW (γdj ,j) ≥Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j)
≥Mdj+2W (γdj+2,j) ≥ . . . ≥MdW (γd,j). (3.25)
Note that the number of equations increases linearly with the number of states n.
Theorem 3.1 provides an iterative way to compute ts,j for all s, j. Noting that γs,n =
ts,nqn, (3.25) has only one variable ts,n at j = n for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Thus, we first compute
ts,n for all s using (3.24) and (3.25) for j = n. From (3.16), γs,n−1 depends on γs,n and
ts,j−1. Since we have already computed ts,n or γs,n, thus we solve for ts,n−1 from (3.24)
and (3.25). Thus, recursively we obtain ts,j for all s and j. A primary only needs to know
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Figure 3.5: This figure shows tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) at channel state j = 1, 2, 3 for Example 3.1.
I1, . . . , Id to compute the independent set selection strategy and does not need to know the
information regarding the network (e.g. edges).
Example 3.1. We consider a grid graph with d = 4 and k = 5 (Fig. 3.3) . Here, M1 =
9,M2 = M3 = 6,M4 = 4. We consider l = 20,m = 6, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2. We first
calculate ts,3 for all s. We obtain M1W (γ1,3) = 7.5324, M2W (γ2,3) = 6,M3W (γ3,3) = 6,
M4W (γ4,3) = 4. Thus, d3 = 1 and the solution of (3.24) and (3.25) is: t3 = (1, 0, 0, 0),
where tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) for j = 1, . . . , 3. Next, we compute ts,2 following the recursive
algorithm we stated. We obtain d2 = 3 and t2 = (0.2532, 0.3734, 0.3734, 0). Finally, we
calculate ts,1. We obtain d1 = 3 and t1 = (0.071, 0.4645, 0.4645, 0) Fig. 3.5 shows plots of
ts,j for all s and j.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
We first deduce some results which we use throughout.
Since γs,j ≤
∑n
i=1 qi < 1, thus ps,j − c > 0. Hence,
fj(Us,j) > c, fj(Ls,j) > c. (3.26)
Now, we provide the expression for expected payoff that a primary attains at Ls,i i =
1, . . . , n at any node in Is at channel state j. Note that players with channel state higher
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than i select a penalty lower than or equal to Ls,i with probability 1 and players with
channel state lower than or equal to i select a penalty lower than or equal to Ls,i with
probability 0 at every node of Is. Thus, the expected payoff to a primary when it selects
penalty Ls,i at channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n} at any node of Is is
(fj(Ls,i)− c)W (
n∑
k=i+1
qkts,k) = (fj(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1). (3.27)
Now, we state and prove Observations 3.1 and 3.2 which we use throughout.
Observation 3.1. γs,k = γs,k1 +
∑k1−1
i=k ts,iqi for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, n ≥ k1 > k.
The observation readily follows from (3.15). Since from (3.15)
γs,k =
k1−1∑
i=k
ts,iqi +
n∑
i=k1
ts,iqi =
k1−1∑
i=k
ts,iqi + γs,k1 .
Observation 3.2. Us,j = Ls,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} if and only if (iff) ts,j = 0. Us,j = Ls,k iff
ts,i = 0 ∀k < i < j. Hence, Us,j = v iff ts,k = 0 ∀k < j.
Proof. Ls,j = Us,j implies from (3.18) and (3.19) that γs,j+1 = γs,j ; thus by Obser-
vation 3.1 we have ts,j = 0. On the other hand if ts,j = 0 then by Observation 3.1
γs,j = γs,j+1. Thus, it follows that Us,j = Ls,j iff ts, j = 0.
Since Ls,k = Us,k+1, hence Us,j = Ls,k iff ts,i = 0 ∀k < i < j. Hence, Us,j = Ls,1 = Us,1
iff ts,i = 0 ∀i < j. On the other hand by (3.18) Us,1 = v. Thus, the result follows.
Now we are ready to show Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Since both s, r ∈ Bj , hence from (3.21)
Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = Mr(fj(Ur,j)− c)W (γr,j) = P ∗j . (3.28)
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Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. Us,j 6= Ur,j when s, r ∈ Bj . Without loss of generality,
we can assume that Us,j > Ur,j . So, Ur,j < v. Thus, by Observation 3.2, there exists k
such that tr,k > 0, k < j and Lr,k = Ur,j . Thus, from (3.21)
P ∗k = Mr(fk(Ur,k)− c)W (γr,k)
= Mr(fk(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1)(from (3.18)&(3.19)). (3.29)
If a primary selects penalty Us,j(= Ls,j−1) at a node of Is when its channel state is k,
then from (3.27) its expected payoff would be
(fk(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = (fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c)
P ∗j
Ms
(from (3.28)).
Thus a primary obtains an expected payoff of at least
Ms(fk(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j
(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c) .
at independent set Is at channel state k. By definition of P
∗
k ,
P ∗j
(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c) ≤ P
∗
k . (3.30)
Since Ur,j = Lr,k and thus fk(Ur,j) > c (by (3.26)). Thus expected payoff at Ir at channel
state j is at least Mr(fj(Ur,j)− c)W (γr,k+1) which is
=
(fj(Ur,j)− c)
fk(Ur,j)− c P
∗
k (from (3.29))
≥ P ∗j
(fj(Ur,j)− c)(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fk(Ur,j)− c)(fj(Us,j)− c) (from (3.30))
> P ∗j (from (3.2), j > k, Us,j > Ur,j)
which is not possible by Definition 3.8.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3
We state and prove Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 which we use to prove Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.4. Ls,k ≥ Uj if s ∈ Bk, s /∈ Bj , k < j, j ≥ 2.
Remark 3.4. Note that if s ∈ Bk ∩ Bj and k < j, then from (3.18), Ls,k ≥ Uj . But, it is
not apriori clear the relationship between Ls,k and Uj when s ∈ Bk but s /∈ Bj for k < j.
The above lemma provides the answer.
Since s ∈ Bk , thus expected payoff obtained at Is at channel state k is P ∗k (by (3.21)).
If Uj > Ls,k for some k < j and s /∈ Bj , then it can be shown that by selecting independent
set Ir (where r ∈ Bj) a primary can attain a strictly higher payoff compared to P ∗k at
channel state k which is not possible by Definition 3.8. The argument will be similar to
the proof of Lemma 3.2. Thus, we omit it.
It is not clear that P ∗j ≥Mr(fj(Uj)−c)W (γr,j) if r /∈ Bj . Since r /∈ Bj , thus, a primary
will not employ any penalty selection strategy at any node of Ir when the channel state
is j. Thus, at any given node in Ir, the expected payoff at Uj is still unknown. The
following lemma provides the answer.
Lemma 3.5. If r /∈ Bj, then P ∗j ≥Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j).
Proof. Since r /∈ Bj , hence we must have tr,j = 0. Suppose the statement is false, then
for some r /∈ Bj , we must have
P ∗j < Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j). (3.31)
Now we show that a primary will attain an expected payoff which is strictly higher than
P ∗j at channel state j at independent set Ir.
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Let, k = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : r ∈ Bi}, if r /∈ Bi,∀i < j, then set k = 0. By definition
of k, tr,i = 0 ∀k < i < j. Thus by Observation 3.1, γr,k+1 = γr,j . Thus, from (3.27) the
expected payoff at Lr,k (if k = 0, then Lr,0 = v) at channel state j is
(fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) = (fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,j). (3.32)
Now from Lemma 3.4 Lr,k ≥ Uj when k > 0. If k = 0, then Lr,k = v by Observation 3.2.
Thus, Lr,k ≥ Uj ∀k. Hence, from (3.32) total expected payoff at Ir is at least
Mr(fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,j) ≥Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j)
> P ∗j (from (3.31) (3.33)
which contradicts P ∗j from Definition 3.8.
Thus, if s, s1 ∈ Bj and s2 /∈ Bj , then we have
P ∗j = Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = Ms1(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs1,j)
≥Ms2(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs2,j) (from Lemma 3.5)
MsW (γs,j) = Ms1W (γs1,j) ≥Ms2W (γs2,j). (3.34)
We now state and prove Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 3.6. MrW (γr,j) ≥MsW (γs,j) if r < s for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Suppose the statement is false i.e. MrW (γr,j) < MsW (γs,j) for some r < s and
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. SinceMr ≥Ms (by (3.10)), thus there must exist a k ∈ {j, . . . , n} such that
MrW (γr,k+1) ≥MsW (γs,k+1) but MrW (γr,k) < MsW (γs,k) with γr,n+1 = γs,n+1 = 0.
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Since γs1,k ≥ γs1,k+1 (by Observation 3.1) ∀s1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and W (·) is strictly de-
creasing function, thus, we have
MrW (γr,k) < MsW (γs,k)
≤MsW (γs,k+1) ≤MrW (γr,k+1). (3.35)
Since W (·) is strictly decreasing function and γr,k = tr,kqk+γr,k+1 (from Observation 3.1),
thus tr,k > 0 from (3.35); which implies that r ∈ Bk. But this contradicts (3.34). Hence,
the result follows.
Now, we are ready to show Lemma 3.3.
proof of Lemma 3.3: Suppose that r < s, but r /∈ Bk, s ∈ Bk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note
from Observation 3.1 that γs,k > γs,k+1 since ts,k > 0. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing
thus W (γs,k) < W (γs,k+1). On the other hand, since r /∈ Bk, thus tr,k = 0. Thus, from
Observation 3.1 γr,k+1 = γr,k and therefore, we obtain W (γr,k+1) = W (γr,k). Thus we
obtain from Lemma 3.6–
MrW (γr,k) = MrW (γr,k+1) ≥MsW (γs,k+1) > MsW (γs,k).
But s ∈ Bk, r /∈ Bk, thus the above inequality contradicts (3.34).
3.3.5 Existence
Theorem 3.1 characterizes the structure of independent set selection strategy which is
of the form (3.13). We have not yet shown whether there exists such a distribution and
whether such a distribution is unique. We resolve both the issues in the following theorem
which we have proved in Appendix 3.A.1:
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Theorem 3.2. There exists a unique probability distribution tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j), j =
1, . . . , n which satisfies (3.24) & (3.25).
We now show that independent set selection strategy profile described in (3.24) and
(3.25) is an NE.
Theorem 3.3. At channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, consider the following strategy profile.
The unique independent set selection strategy profile is given by (3.24) and (3.25) and at
every node of Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, penalty selection strategy is ψj(·) with qjts,j in place of
qj as described in Lemma 2.2. Such a strategy profile constitutes an NE in the class of
mean valid graphs.
Thus, there exists a symmetric NE which selects an independent set among I1, . . . , Id.
Such a selection strategy is storage and computationally efficient as explained in the first
paragraph of Section 3.3.3. By virtue of Theorem 3.1 we also know how to compute the
probabilities of these independent sets by solving n equations.
Outline of Proof of Theorem 3.3
We first show that a primary at channel state j attains an expected payoff of P ∗j at each
independent set Is, s ≤ dj . Subsequently, we show that at any independent set Is, s > dj ,
the maximum attainable payoff of a primary at channel state j is less than P ∗j when
other primaries select strategies according to (3.24) and (3.25). Finally, we show that if
a primary selects an independent set which does not belong to the partition, then, its
maximum expected payoff is also less than P ∗j . Thus, it shows that a primary attains
maximum expected payoff only at independent sets Is, s ≤ dj , hence, a primary does
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not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the strategy profile which proves the
theorem. The detail of the proof is given in Appendix 3.A.2.
3.3.6 Properties of Threshold
Recall from Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.1 that a primary only selects those independent
sets which have cardinalities greater than or equal to Mdj with positive probabilities at
channel state j. In this section, we discuss some important properties of dj , j = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 3.7. Threshold is a non-decreasing function of transmission rate i.e. dj ≥ dj+1
From (3.10) and Lemma 3.7 we have Mdj ≤ Mdj+1 . From Example 3.1, we obtain
d3 < d2 = d1 which validates the above lemma. In Example 3.1 only I1 is selected when
the channel state is the highest i.e. 3. Thus, a primary never selects I2, I3 and I4 when
its channel has the highest transmission rate.
This tells that in practice, secondary users in some locations can never get access to a
channel of higher quality. In Example 3.1, users in the locations belonging to independent
sets I2, I3 and I4 will never get access to the highest quality channel. To avoid such socially
unacceptable situation a social planner may have to provide some incentives to primaries
so that they offer their high quality channels in independent sets of lower cardinalities.
Designing such an incentive constitutes an important problem for future research.
Since ts,j > 0 for s ≤ dj the following result is immediate from Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.1. ts,k > 0 implies that ts,j > 0 where j < k; t1,j > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Thus, independent set I1 is always selected with positive probability at every channel
state (Fig. 3.5). Corollary 3.1 implies that if a given primary offers its channel at an
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independent set Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d} with positive probability when the channel provides
higher transmission rate, then the primary also offers its channel at Is with positive
probability when its channel provides lower transmission rate. But note that the converse
is not always true.
Proof of Lemma 3.7
Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. dj < dj+1 for some j.
From (3.25) we obtain for state j + 1
M1W (γ1,j+1) = MdjW (γdj ,j+1) = Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j+1). (3.36)
Since tdj ,j > 0 thus γdj ,j > γdj ,j+1 by Observation 3.1. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing,
thus we have
W (γdj ,j) < W (γdj ,j+1). (3.37)
Since dj < dj+1, thus tdj+1,j = 0. Thus, from Observation 3.1, γdj+1,j+1 = γdj+1,j . Thus
from (3.36) and (3.37), we obtain
MdjW (γdj ,j) < Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j+1)
= Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j). (3.38)
Since dj < dj+1 thus (3.38) contradicts (3.25).
3.3.7 Uniqueness of Symmetric NE & Implementation Issues
Till now we have shown that when primaries select among maximal independent sets char-
acterizing the mean valid graphs, then there exists a unique symmetric NE (Theorems 3.2
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Figure 3.6: The above mean valid graph has two different sets of partitions: 1) I1 = {1, 3, 5}, I2 =
{2, 4, 6} and 2) I¯1 = {1, 3, 6}, I¯2 = {2, 4, 5}. If αa,j (α¯a,j , respectively) is the node selection
probability at node a under NE strategy profile where primaries select I1, I2 (I¯1, I¯2, respectively),
then according to Theorem 3.4, we obtain αa,j = α¯a,j for all channel states j. There exists
independent sets which are different from I1, I2 and I¯1, I¯2 e.g. {1, 3}, {2, 4}.
and 3.3). Figure 3.6 reveals that partition of nodes amongst maximal independent sets
need not be unique. We have shown that each such partition leads to a unique symmetric
NE (Theorems 3.2 and 3.3). Thus, symmetric NE is not unique.
A primary would not know the partitions other primaries are selecting since the co-
ordination among the primaries is infeasible in a non co-operative game. Theorem 3.4
entails that co-ordination among the players is not required when the independent set
selection strategy is of the form (3.24) and (3.25). We obtain an even stronger result in
a special case: we show that there is a unique symmetric NE in a linear conflict graph
(Theorem 3.5).
Theorem 3.4. Consider that nodes in a mean valid graph can be partitioned into two
different sets of maximal independent sets: i) I1, . . . , Id, and ii) I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯. Suppose at
channel state j = 1, . . . , n, 0 ≤ nj ≤ l number of primaries select independent sets
among I1, . . . , Id and l−nj number of primaries select independent sets among I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯
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according to (3.24) and (3.25). Then the strategy profile constitutes an NE.
Additionally, let αa,j (α¯a,j respv.) be the probability with which primary i offers its
channel at node a at channel state j when it selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id
(I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ reps.) such that (3.24) and (3.25) are satisfied, then αa,j = α¯a,j.
The first part of the above theorem implies that regardless of the partition other
primaries select, a primary can attain its NE strategy profile by selecting independent sets
using one of the partition. Hence, a primary needs not co-ordinate with other primaries
in order to decide which partition it will choose. Thus, the strategy profile of the form
(3.24) and (3.25) is easy to implement.
The second part of the theorem implies that regardless of the partition primary i
selects, the node selection probability will be identical. Thus, the independent set selection
strategies are functionally unique. Note that when different primaries select independent
set selection strategies using different partitions, then the strategy profile is not symmetric,
however, the node selection probabilities will be identical.
In Theorem 3.4 we show that when primaries select independent sets which belong
to a partition, then the symmetric NE will lead to the same node selection probability.
But there are independent sets which do not belong to a partition characterizing the
mean valid graph (Fig. 3.6). We have not ruled out a symmetric NE which selects an
independent set which is outside of a partition characterizing the mean valid graph. We
rule this out in the special class of linear conflict graphs. Linear conflict graphs frequently
arise in practice: e.g. in the modeling of wireless access point across a highway or along
a row of shops.
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We show8 in Appendix 3.A.4–
Theorem 3.5. There exists a unique (not merely functionally unique) symmetric NE
strategy profile in a linear conflict graph. In the symmetric NE each primary selects only
independent sets I1 and I2, where I1 (I2, respectively) consists of odd (even, respectively)
numbered nodes (Fig. 3.1).
Proof of Theorem 3.4
First, we provide an outline of the proof.
Suppose both the partitions 1) I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ and 2) I1, . . . , Id characterize a mean valid
graph G (i.e. they satisfy conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 3.5). Let |I¯s| = M¯s for
s ∈ {1, . . . , d¯} with
M¯1 ≥ M¯2 ≥ . . . ≥ M¯d¯.
We show in Appendix 3.A.3
Lemma 3.8. Ms = M¯s, thus d = d¯.
Thus, |Is| = |I¯s|, s ∈ {1, . . . , d} . Since the solution of (3.24) and (3.25) only depend on
the cardinalities of Is, hence if a primary selects the partition I¯1, . . . , I¯d then a primary
selects independent sets by solving (3.24) and (3.25). Since the solution of (3.24) and
(3.25) is unique by Theorem 3.2, hence, if |Is| = |I¯k|, they are selected with identical
probability. Thus, if a ∈ Is, and a ∈ I¯k such that |Is| = |I¯k| then, the node selection
8In a linear conflict graph, the number of independent sets grows exponentially with M . Since I1, I2
are not the only independent sets (Fig. 3.1), thus, it is not apriori clear whether every NE strategy profile
only selects independent sets among I1, I2 with positive probability.
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probability at node a at any channel state will be identical. However, if a ∈ I¯k and
|I¯k| 6= |Is|, then the node selection probability may be different. We eliminate the above
possibility in the following which we also show in Appendix 3.A.3.
Lemma 3.9. If |Ij | 6= |I¯k|, then Ij ∩ I¯k = Φ.
We have explained the relationship between I1, . . . , Id and I¯1, . . . , I¯d in Fig. 3.7. The
proof of Theorem 3.4 readily follows from the fact that the node selection probability is
identical irrespective of the partitions selected by primaries. The detailed proof is given
below:
Proof of Theorem 3.4: First, we show the following: if αa,j (α¯a,j resp.) is the node
selection probability when a primary selects among independent sets among I1, . . . , Id
(I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ resp.) such that (3.24) and (3.25) are satisfied, then αa,j = α¯a,j . It will
essentially prove the second part of the theorem.
Fix a node a. Let a ∈ Is and a ∈ I¯k. By theorem 3.2 there exists a unique solution
tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) of (3.24) and (3.25). Since a ∈ Is, thus,
αa,j = qjts,j . (3.39)
Since d¯ = d and |I¯s| = |Is| for all s ∈ {1, . . . , d} by Lemma 3.8, thus, (3.24) and (3.25)
are identical irrespective of whether a primary selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id
or I¯1, . . . , I¯d. Since there exists unique solution of (3.25) and (3.24) (by Theorem 3.2)
, thus tj is the only solution of (3.24) and (3.25). Hence, probability with which the
independent set I¯i is selected at channel state j is ti,j . Since node a ∈ I¯k, thus, from (3.8)
α¯a,j = qjtk,j . (3.40)
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Figure 3.7: Independent sets of same cardinality are grouped together. Thus, |I1| = . . . = |Ik1| .
I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 = I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1. If node a belongs to I1, then it must belong to I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1, but it
can not belong to in I¯s, s > k1.
So, it is clear that if s = k, then αa,j and α¯a,j are identical (by (3.39) and (3.40)).
Thus, we are only left to show when s 6= k then (3.39) and (3.40) are equal which we
show in the following.
By Lemmas 3.9 and 3.8, we must have |Ik| = |I¯k| = |Is| since a ∈ Is and a ∈ I¯k. Since
the solution of (3.24) and (3.25) is the unique (by Theorem 3.2), thus,
tk,j = ts,j .
Thus, αa,j and α¯a,j are also identical (by (3.39) and (3.40)) when s 6= k. Hence, we show
that αa,j = α¯a,j .
Now, we show that if a primary selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id irrespective
of partition the other primaries select such that (3.24) and (3.25) are satisfied, then the
strategy profile is an NE. This will conclude the proof since by symmetry, it will follow
that if a primary selects independent sets among I¯1, . . . , I¯d irrespective of the partition
other primaries select then the strategy profile is an NE.
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We have so far showed that every node in Is is selected with identical probability
by each primary irrespective of the partition selected by them when the independent
set selection strategy is of the form (3.24) and (3.25). Thus, at every node a ∈ Is,
each primary offers its channel at node a when the channel state is j or higher w.p.∑n
k=j αa,k =
∑n
k=j qjts,j which is equal to γs,j (recall from (3.15)) irrespective of the
partition selected by the primaries. In proving that a primary does not have any incentive
to deviate unilaterally from the strategy profile which is of the form (3.24) and (3.25)
(Theorem 3.3), we only use the properties of γs,j . Hence, if a primary selects independent
sets among I1, . . . , Id according to (3.24) and (3.25) irrespective of the partitions selected
by other primaries, then it is an NE. Hence, the result follows.
3.4 Different channel states at different locations
At later stages of deployment, the secondary market will operate at a region consisting of
a large number of locations. The channel states will be different at different locations in
this large region which we consider in this section. We first present specific assumptions
that we have made in this scenario (Section 3.4.1). For example, nodes of commonly
observed large conflict graphs exhibit an inherent symmetry in the interference relations,
we therefore consider a class of conflict graphs, known as node symmetric graphs in the
literature [70]. We subsequently obtain a symmetric NE strategy profile SPsym in a
node symmetric graph (Section 3.4.2). We show some important structural properties of
SPsym which are significantly different from the symmetric NE strategy profile obtained
in the scenario where the channel state is identical across the network (Theorem 3.6,
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Lemmas 3.11, and 3.12). We show that SPsym may not be a NE when the conflict graph
is not a node symmetric (Lemma 3.13). Finally, we analytically and empirically evaluate
the computational issues of computing the strategy SPsym and how a primary can attain
a desired trade-off between the expected payoff and the computational cost by selective
estimation of channel states at randomly selected subset of nodes (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Specific Assumptions
We revert to the notations introduced in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Specifically, we do not
need simplifications of the notations used for the first setting which have been introduced
in Section 3.3.1.
n=1
In the previous setting (Section 3.3) we consider that the channel state is the same across
the locations, thus, a primary always selects an independent set from the conflict graph
G whenever the channel is available (i.e. the channel is not in state 0). Thus, a primary
knows that its competitors always select independent sets from G (a primary does not
select any independent set when the channel state is 0). In the current setting, the conflict
graph representation of the region depends on the channel state vectors. Since the conflict
graph representation can be different for different channel state vectors (GJ may not be
equal to GK when J 6= K), thus, a primary does not know the conflict graphs from which
its competitors are selecting their independent sets. Thus, the collection of independent
sets from which a primary selects its independent set may be different for different pri-
maries. Additionally, the strategy space P (|P| = (n + 1)|V | − 1) increase exponentially
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with the number of nodes. Thus, obtaining an NE in this setting is challenging. In order
to simplify the setting, we consider
Assumption 3.2. n = 1 i.e. the channel is either available (i.e. at state 1) or not available
(i.e. at state 0) at each node, but still the channel state can be different at different nodes.
Note that even though n = 1, the cardinality of strategy space P is 2V − 1 which
is still exponential in the number of nodes and the conflict graph representation will be
different for different channel state vectors.
Definition 3.9. Since n = 1, we drop the index j from αa,j and Pa,j in (3.4) corresponding
to the channel state at a given location. We denote αa as the probability with which an
available channel at node a is offered under a symmetric strategy profile and Pa as the
set of channel state vectors where the channel state is 1 at node a.
Note that from Lemma 3.1 and (3.5), the upper endpoint of the penalty selection
strategy is v at all nodes. The maximum expected payoff of a primary at node a under a
symmetric NE strategy is
pa − c = (f1(v)− c)(1− w(αa)) (3.41)
Node Symmetric Graphs
We consider large size wireless networks. As an analytical abstraction, we mainly consider
infinite size conflict graphs. In large conflict graphs, there is an inherent symmetry in
the interference relations among the nodes in the network. We, therefore consider node
symmetric graphs, which in the literature is also known as node transitive graphs [70].
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Figure 3.8: Left hand figure shows a linear graph with 4 nodes. Right hand figure an auto-
morphism where F (1) = 4, F (2) = 3, F (3) = 2, F (4) = 1. However, there is no automorphism
between nodes 2 and 1. If there is an automorphism such that F (2) = 1, then by the property of
automorphism nodes F (2) and F (3) should be adjacent and nodes F (2) and F (1) also should be
adjacent, but since F (2) = 1, thus, either F (3) or F (1) will not be adjacent to node F (2) since
node 1 only has one degree in G.
First, we provide a formal definition of node symmetric graph. Towards that end, we
first define an automorphism in a conflict graph G. We denote V (G) as the set of nodes
of G.
Definition 3.10. An automorphism is a bijective mapping F : V (G)→ V (G) such that
nodes F (a) and F (b) are adjacent9 if and only if nodes a, b are adjacent in G.
In an automorphism, the nodes are renumbered such that it maintains the adjacency
between the nodes. For example, consider a linear graph consisting of 4 nodes. Fig. 3.8
shows an automorphism on this graph. Now we are ready to define the node symmetric
graph.
Definition 3.11. [70] In a node symmetric graph, for every pair of vertices a and b of G,
there is some automorphism F : V (G)→ V (G) such that F (a) = b.
For a graph to be node symmetric every node should be mapped to every other node
through an automorphism. Informally, in a node symmetric graph the graphs looks the
same from each node.
9In an undirected graph, two nodes are adjacent iff there is an edge between them.
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For example cyclic graph is a node symmetric graph. But linear graph with 4 nodes
is not a node symmetric graph since there is no automorphism between nodes 1 and 2
(Fig. 3.8).
Now, we provide some examples of infinite node symmetric graphs which resemble the
conflict graphs of large wireless networks.
• Infinite linear graph with no end points (Fig. 3.10): This is an abstraction of the
conflict graph of the network of a large number of wireless access points arranged
in a linear fashion.
• Infinite square graphs (Fig. 3.11): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph of
wireless networks in a large region with square cells.
• Infinite grid graphs (Fig. 3.12): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph of a
large shopping mall.
• Infinite triangular graphs (Fig. 3.13): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph
representation of large number of hexagonal cells [60].
There are also several commonly observed node symmetric conflict graphs which are finite.
For example, cyclic graph of any size is a node symmetric graph 10. Cyclic conflict graph
represents a collection of wireless access points arranged in a circular fashion, possibly
circumambulating a city or ring size road. Figure 3.9 also shows a finite node symmetric
graph and the corresponding wireless network. The complete graphs 11 are also node
10Note that cyclic graph is not a mean valid graph if |V | > 3 and |V | is odd, thus, node symmetric
graphs may not be mean valid graphs.
11In a complete graph a node has edge with every other node.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.9: Circles in Figure (a) shows the ranges of the wireless access points located at the center
of the circle. Figure (b) shows the corresponding conflict graph with each circle is represented as
a node. Each circle intersects with 1 hop and 2 neighbors, thus, in the conflict graph each node
has edges with 1 hop and 2 hop neighbors. The conflict graph is a node symmetric graph.
Figure 3.10: Infinite linear graph with no end-points: each node has degree 2.
symmetric graphs. We find a symmetric NE in a node symmetric graph irrespective of
whether it is finite or infinite (Theorem 3.6).
Note from Section 3.3.2 that the commonly observed conflict graphs of small networks
are mean valid graphs which we analyze in the previous setting. These graphs may not
be node symmetric graphs.
Probability Distribution of Channel State Vectors
In the previous setting, we consider an extreme case where the channel state is identical
across each location. In a large network, the channel states will be different. However, the
channel states are often spatially proximal. Since the graph is large, like the interference
relationship we expect that the statistical correlation pattern would also exhibit some
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Figure 3.11: Infinite square
graph: each node has degree 4.
Figure 3.12: Infinite Grid
graph: each node has degree 8.
Figure 3.13: Infinite Triangu-
lar Graph: each node has de-
gree 6.
symmetry. We consider one such symmetric relationship among the channel states across
the network which arise naturally.
First, we define an isomorphism between two graphs:
Definition 3.12. Two graphs G and H are isomorphic to each other if there is a bijective
mapping F : V (G) → V (H) such that any two vertices F (a), F (b) are adjacent in H if
and only if a, b are adjacent in G.
Informally, if two graphs look alike subject to renumbering of nodes, then they are
isomorphic to each other. Note that automorphism is a special case of isomorphism which
occurs when H = G (Definition 3.10).
We assume that
Assumption 3.3. qJ and qK are identical whenever the GJ and GK are isomorphic to each
other.
Intuitively, since GJ and GK are alike subject to the renumbering of nodes, we there-
fore expect qJ = qK . We show in Section 3.4.1 that the above assumption implies that
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Lemma 3.10. The probability that a channel of a primary is in state 1 at a given location
is the same across the network.
However, the converse of the above result not true in general.
We now provide some examples of joint probability distributions which arise in practice
and satisfy Assumption 3.3.
Independent and identically distributed channel states: The state of the channel is
i = 1 w.p. q at a given location independent of the channel states at other locations. At
a given channel state vector J , if the channel is available at nj number of nodes, then
qJ = q
nj (1 − q)|V |−nj . When GJ and GK are isomorphic, then both contain the same
number of nodes, thus, the number of locations where the channel state is 1 (0, respv.)
are the same in channel state vectors J and K. Hence, the probability distributions qJ
and qK are identical whenever GJ and GK are isomorphic.
Correlated Channel states: We now show that Assumption 3.3 can accommodate sta-
tistical correlations across the channel states at different nodes. We provide an exam-
ple in a small node symmetric graph. Consider a linear graph with 2 nodes such that
q(1,0) = q(0,1). Since G(0,1) and G(1,0) are the only possible isomorphic graphs in this
case, thus, the above joint probability distribution satisfies Assumption 3.3. Now, if
q(1,1) > q(1,0) = q(0,1) and q(0,0) > q(1,0) = q(0,1), then, the channel states are not inde-
pendent12. Thus, Assumption 3.3 allows correlation among the channel states across the
locations. Also note that the above probability distributions commonly arise in practice.
12Suppose that the channel is in state 1 at node i w.p. qi independent of the channel state at other
location, then, q1,0 = q0,1 implies that q1 = q2. Now, q1(1 − q1) can not be less than both q21(= q1,1) &
(1− q1)2(= q0,0), hence, independent channel states can not satisfy the above joint distribution.
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This is because when the channel is in state 1 (0 respv.) at one location, then there is a
higher probability that the channel is in state 1 (0 respv.) compared to state 0 (1 respv.)
at other location.
The joint probability distributions of random variables associated with spatial loca-
tions and exhibiting correlations are often represented as Markov Random Field. We
provide a formal definition of Markov random field in Appendix 3.A.6 and show that the
Markov random field modeling of channel states where the channel states in neighboring
locations are correlated, satisfy Assumption 3.3 under some additional assumptions which
naturally arise (Lemma 3.25 in Appendix 3.A.6).
Proof of Lemma 3.10
We first show Observation 3.3. Subsequently, we show Lemma 3.10.
Observation 3.3. Consider any pair of nodes a and b. For distinct channel state vectors
J, J1 ∈ Pa (Definition 3.9), there exists distinct channel state vectors K,K1 ∈ Pb such that
GK and GK1 are isomorphic to GJ and GJ1 respectively, such that the in the isomorphic
function F (a) = b (Definition 3.12).
Proof. We first show that for a channel state vector J ∈ Pa there exists a channel state
vector K ∈ Pb such that GK is isomorphic to GJ and in the isomorphic function F (a) = b.
Since the graph is node symmetric, thus, there exists an automorphism F (·) (Defini-
tion 3.10) such that F (a) = b. Now consider the channel state vector K where the
channel is available only at nodes F (a1) if a1 ∈ V (GJ). In the conflict graph representa-
tion of GK , the set of edges are the edges incident on F (a1) where a1 ∈ GJ . Since F (·)
is itself is an automorphism on G, thus F (a1) and F (a2) are adjacent in GK if and only
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if a1 and a2 are adjacent in GJ . Hence, F (·) is an isomorphic mapping from V (GJ) to
V (GK) such that F (a) = b.
Note that since J is arbitrary, thus, if J1 ∈ Pa, then, following the above procedure we
obtain an isomorphic graph GK1 such that F (a) = b in GK1 . Since F (·) is automorphism
and thus, F (·) is bijective. Thus, if J1 6= J , then, using the function F (·) we obtain
a channel state vector K1 which is different from K. Also note that b ∈ V (GK1) since
F (a) = b and a ∈ V (GJ1). Hence, the result follows.
Now, we show Lemma 3.10.
Proof. Consider any two nodes a and b. Recall the definition of Pa (Definition 3.9). First,
note that |Pa| = |Pb| = 2|V |−1 since the channel state must be 1 at node a (node b, respv.)
for every channel state vector in Pa (Pb respv.). Now, the probability that the channel
state is 1 at node a is
βa =
∑
J :J∈Pa
qJ
and the probability that the channel state is 1 at node b is
βb =
∑
K:K∈Pb
qK
Note that by Observation 3.3, for distinct channel state vectors J, J1 ∈ Pa there exist
distinct channel state vectors K,K1 ∈ Pb such that GK , GK1 are isomorphic to GJ and
GJ1 respectively. Also note that cardinalities of Pa and Pb are the same. Since qJ = qK
whenever GJ and GK are isomorphic to each other, thus, we obtain
βa = βb (3.42)
Hence, the result follows.
148
3.4.2 Symmetric NE strategy Profile
We, first, obtain a symmetric NE strategy profile (Theorem 3.6). We then show that
the NE strategy has an important structural difference compared to the NE strategy in
the previous setting (Section 3.3) where the channel state is the same across the network
(Lemmas 3.11, 3.12).
We first start with introducing a notation. Let Imax,J be the set of maximum inde-
pendent sets (i.e. independent sets of highest cardinalities) of the graph GJ .
Strategy Profile (SPsym): A primary selects each of the independent set within the set
Imax,J with probability
1
|Imax,J | and select other independent sets with probability 0 at
channel state vector J .
Theorem 3.6. The Strategy profile SPsym is an NE strategy profile.
A primary only needs to find the maximum independent sets in order to find the
NE strategy profile SPsym. In contrast to SPsym, a primary may select an independent
set which is not a maximum independent set in the scenario where the channel state is
identical across the locations (Theorems 3.1 and 3.3). Note that in SPsym a primary
puts equal weight on each of the maximum independent sets in GJ . Hence, a primary
needs not communicate with other primaries to obtain its strategy. Hence, SPsym is easy
to implement.
Lemma 3.11. Expected payoff at every node is the same under SPsym.
Intuitively, since the graph is node symmetric, each node belongs to the same number
of maximum independent sets, thus a channel is offered with the same probability at every
node under SPsym; thus, the expected payoff is the same at every node. Since each node
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is selected with the same probability, hence there is an equity in secondary access of the
channel amongst different nodes as opposed to that scenario where the channel state is
identical across the network (Example 1).
We show that unlike in the scenario where the channel state is the same across the
network (Theorem 3.5), the symmetric NE may not be unique in linear conflict graph in
this setting.
Lemma 3.12. There may exist infinitely many symmetric NEs in the linear conflict
graph.
The proof of the above lemma is algebraic and we relegate it to Appendix 3.A.5.
We also show in Appendix 3.A.5 that symmetry in interference relations among the
nodes is required for SPsym to be an NE.
Lemma 3.13. SPsym may not be an NE for a finite linear graph which is not a node
symmetric graph.
Proof of Theorem 3.6
We use Observation 3.3 stated in previous subsection (Section 3.4.1). Since the strategy
profile is symmetric, it is enough to show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to
deviate from SPsym when other primaries also select SPsym.
We first give an outline of the proof. First, we show that the maximum expected
payoff attainable by primary 1 is identical across the nodes using the node symmetric
property and Assumption 3.3. Thus, it directly implies that primary 1 will attain the
maximum expected payoff by selecting a maximum independent set. Since SPsym only
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randomizes among the maximum independent sets, thus, primary 1 will not have any
incentive to deviate from SPsym which in turn proves Theorem 3.4. The details of the
proof is given below.
In order to show Theorem 3.6 we show the following:
i) First, we show that the node selection probability αa for a primary is identical when
Assumption 3.3 is satisfied for each node under SPsym using Node symmetric graph and
Observation 3.3.
ii) Subsequently, we show that when all primaries other than primary 1 select SPsym,
then the maximum expected payoff obtained by primary 1 is identical across the nodes.
iii) Finally, we show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally
from SPsym which shows that SPsym is indeed an NE.
Part i): First, we introduce some notations. Let Iamax,J be the set of maximum
independent sets of GJ which contains node a. Note that the node a can only be selected
at a channel state vector J if J ∈ Pa (Definition 3.9).
Thus, under the strategy profile SPsym the node selection probability at node a i.e.
αa is
αa =
∑
J∈Pa
|Iamax,J |
|Imax,J |qJ (3.43)
Now, we show that αa = αb where b 6= a. By Observation 3.3 for every GJ , there
exists a distinct GK which is isomorphic to GJ such that in the isomorphic mapping
F (a) = b. Thus, |Ibmax,K | = |Iamax,J |. Since GJ and GK are isomorphic to each other
thus |Imax,J | = |Imax,K |. Also note that, qJ = qK since GJ is isomorphic to GK by
Assumption 3.3. Finally, note that the cardinalities of Pa and Pb are the same. Hence,
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αa = αb for any two nodes a, b ∈ V by (3.43). Hence, the node selection probability is
the same at every node.
Part ii): When all the other primaries apart from primary 1 selects SPsym, then at
node a , the channel is offered for sale at node a w.p. αa by other primaries apart from
primary 1. Thus, by Lemma 3.1, when all the other primaries select SPsym, then the
maximum expected payoff obtained by primary 1 at node a is (f1(v) − c)(1 − w(αa))
(from (3.41)). Moreover, by Lemma 3.1 the payoff is obtained by selecting any penalty
within [L1, v]. Since αa’s are identical, hence, the maximum attainable expected payoff
by primary 1 is identical at each node.
Part iii): Consider a channel state vector J . Since the maximum attainable expected
payoff at every node is identical, hence, primary 1 can attain the total maximum expected
payoff only by selecting a maximum independent set of GJ when other primaries select
the strategy SPsym. Under SPsym, primary 1 randomizes among the maximum sets of
GJ . Hence, the total expected payoff of primary 1 is equal to the maximum expected
payoff. Hence, primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate from SPsym when other
primaries select SPsym. Thus, SPsym is an NE.
Proof of Lemma 3.11
Note that the proof of this result directly follows from part (ii) of the Theorem 3.6 where
we have shown that primary 1 will attain the same expected payoff at every node of the
conflict graph if primary 1 selects SPsym when the other primaries also select strategy
SPsym.
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3.4.3 Computational Complexity
In SPsym a primary needs to enumerate the maximum independent sets at a given channel
state vector. In general, the number of maximum independent sets scales exponentially
with the number of nodes. But if a graph consists of disjoint components, then a primary
can compute the maximum independent sets of each component and compute the strategy
profile in each component in parallel. Hence, the size of the component will govern the
computation time.
The conflict graph of a primary depends on the channel state vector which evolves
randomly. Hence, the conflict graphs are random graphs. Thus, it is important to find the
average size of a component in a conflict graph which will govern the average computation
time of maximum independent sets. In the following, we provide a bound on the expected
size of a component for some node symmetric graphs that arise in practice. We also
discuss how primaries can govern the component size using random sampling technique
(selecting each node w.p. p) . Throughout this section, we consider that the channel
states are I.I.D. where the channel state is 1 at a given location w.p. q.
Let ∆ be the degree of a node. We consider those node symmetric graphs where ∆ is
finite. Nodes in most of the conflict graphs that we have discussed in Section 3.4.1 have
finite degrees. For example, in cyclic graph (of any size) ∆ = 2, in infinite linear graph
∆ = 2, in infinite square graph (Fig. 3.10), ∆ = 4 (Fig. 3.11), in infinite grid graph ∆ = 8
(Fig. 3.12), in infinite triangular graph ∆ = 6 (Fig. 3.13).
We find out the expected size of a component C originating from node a in a conflict
graph GJ . Since the graph is a node symmetric graph, hence the expected size of a
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component originating from any other node will be the same. Each node has an expected
degree of q∆. The component C grows when GJ contains neighbors of node a, the
neighbors of the neighbors of node a and so on. Thus, the growth of C can be compared to
the Galton-Watson branching process [36] where each individual gives birth to q∆ number
of children on average. The only difference in our approach to the Galton-Watson process
is that the number of nodes added each step may be smaller as some of the neighbors of
a node may already be in C, thus, reducing the number of neighbors that can be added
in C. Thus, the expected size of C can be upper bounded by the expected umber of total
descendants in Galton-Watson process [36]. Hence, the upper bound of expected size of
C is obtained from [36]
Lemma 3.14. E(C) ≤ 1
1− q∆ if q∆ < 1.
A primary can not control q, hence, the component size (and thus, the computational
complexity) can be large for higher q. Thus, a primary may estimate its channel quality
only at a subset of the locations of the region instead of the whole region and sell its
channel only among the locations where it knows the transmission quality in order to
minimize the computation cost. Equivalently, a primary will consider that the channel
state is 0 at locations where it does not estimate its channel quality. In one simplistic
setting which we consider, each primary computes the transmission quality at a node
w.p. p independent of the other nodes. A primary does not know the nodes where its
competitors are estimating their channel states. But , it knows p. Thus, a primary is
aware of the fact that the channel state is 1 at any given node of its competitor w.p. pq
independent of the channel states at other locations. Thus, the probability distribution
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satisfies Assumption 3.3. Hence, the strategy profile SPsym will be a symmetric NE strategy
profile in this setting where the channel states are I.I.D. and the channel is in state 1 at
a given location w.p. pq instead of q. Thus, from Lemma 3.14 the expected size of
component is now upper bounded by
E(C) ≤ 1
1− pq∆ if pq∆ < 1 (3.44)
Note that the above procedure also decreases the measurement and estimation cost, since
a primary only estimates the channel states at a randomly selected subset of locations.
Note that the right hand side in (3.44) increases as pq∆ increases. If a primary selects
lower (higher, respv.) p the expected component size will decrease (increase, respv.), and
thus, the computation complexity will decrease (increase, respv.); The bound in (3.44)
also decreases (increases, respv.). However, the expected payoff of a primary will also
decrease (increase, respv.) with decrease in p (increase, respv.) since the number of nodes
where a primary can potentially sell its channel also decreases (increases, respv). Hence,
a primary has to judiciously select p in order to achieve a desired trade-off between the
computation complexity, and the expected payoff.
We now empirically investigate the variation of the mean size of the largest component
with the number of nodes and the parameter pq. For each value of pq, we generate a certain
number of random graphs. We compute the average of the largest component over 25
samples. The number 25 has been chosen since the average converges in 25 samples.
Figure 3.14 shows the variation of the mean size of the largest component as the number
of nodes increases. Figure 3.14 reveals that the growth of the average size of the largest
component in a square graph is linear (not exponential) with the number of nodes whereas
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Figure 3.14: Mean size of the largest compo-
nent in a Square Graph and Linear graph for
pq = 0.5. The square graph consists of a j rows
and columns. We vary j while we increase the
number of nodes.
Figure 3.15: Mean size of the largest compo-
nent in a Square Graph and Linear graph with
100 nodes.
the growth of the mean size of the largest component in a linear graph is very slow with
the number of nodes. Additionally, when pq = 0.5, the upper bound in (3.44) is infinite
both for square and linear graph, however, Fig. 3.14 shows that the expected size of the
largest component is moderate in the square graph as well as in the linear graph even
when the number of nodes are large. Fig. 3.15 reveals that when pq is exceeds a threshold
the mean size of a largest component increases substantially in both linear conflict graph
and square conflict graph. However, Fig. 3.15 reveals that the upper bound computed
in (3.44) is loose. For example, when 0.25 ≤ pq ≤ 0.6, the upper bound in (3.44) is
infinite for square graph, however, Fig. 3.15 shows that the average size of the largest
component is moderate. In the linear graph, the mean size of the largest component is
small even when 0.5 ≤ pq ≤ 0.75 whereas the upper bound computed in (3.44) is infinite
when 0.5 ≤ pq ≤ 0.75.
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3.5 Random Demand
Till now we have assumed that the number of secondaries (m) is constant at each node.
But our analysis will readily generalize to the scenario where the number of secondaries
at a given location is Z ≥ 1 where Z is a random variable independent of the number of
secondaries at other locations with an additional assumption the p.m.f. Pr(Z = m) = κm
must satisfy the condition
∑l−1
m=1 κm > 0 (i.e. the total number of primaries exceeds the
total number of secondaries with positive probability but not w.p. 1). A primary does
not know Z apriori, however, it knows the p.m.f of Z. The analysis will go through with
the following modifications in (2.5)
w(x) =
min{max(Z),l−1}∑
m=1
κm
l−1∑
i=m
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−i−1 (3.45)
3.6 Numerical Evaluations
We numerically study the impact of competition on the payoffs of the primaries in the
scenarios which we consider. Towards that end, we compare the payoff under the sym-
metric NE strategy, RM,NE , with the maximum possible value of social welfare, ROPT
which is obtained when all the primaries collude.
RM,NE = Number of Primaries × Expected payoff of each primary
Definition 3.13. The efficiency of NE is the ratio of the total expected payoff of primaries
and the optimal value of social welfare (ROPT ).
In other words, efficiency (ηM )=
l ·RM,NE
RM,OPT
.
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Figure 3.16: This figure shows the variation of
efficiency with m. We consider a 5×5 grid graph
(see Fig. 3.3). This is a mean valid graph with
d = 4 and |I1| = 9, |I2| = |I3| = 6, |I4| = 4. We
use the following parameter values, l = 20, n =
3, v = 100, c = 1, gi(x) = x
2 − i3, q1 = q2 =
q3 = 0.2.
Figure 3.17: This figure shows the variation of
efficiency with m when the channel states are
independent and identically distributed at each
location with qi = 0.5, i = 0, 1. We consider a
cyclic graph of 100 We use the following param-
eter values: l = 10, v = 11, c = 1.
Fig. 3.16 shows the variation of efficiency with the number of secondaries (m) in the
scenario where the channel state remains the same throughout the network. Fig. 3.17
shows the variation of efficiency with m in the scenario where the channel state can be
different at different locations. Both the figures reveal that ηM increases with increase
in m. This is because when m is low, competition becomes intense and primaries select
lower penalties. Primaries also select independent sets of lower cardinalities when the
channel state is the same at each location in Fig. 3.16. But if they collude with each
other, they still can offer highest penalty and only select the independent sets of the
largest cardinalities in both of the settings, which lead to high payoff.
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3.7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have studied a price competition model with the spatial reuse property where each
primary selects a price and a set of non-interfering locations depending on the quality of its
channel. We have considered two settings. In the first setting, we consider that the channel
state is the same across the networks. We have shown that there exists a symmetric
NE strategy profile in the class of mean valid graphs and we have computed a storage
and computational efficient NE. The NE strategy profile can be readily implemented as
primaries need not communicate with each other even when the NE strategy is not unique.
We show that the symmetric NE strategy profile is unique in a linear conflict graph.
In the second setting, we allow that the channel state can be different at different loca-
tions. The above consideration significantly complicates the analysis as we have discussed
in Section 3.4.1. We, therefore, consider that the channel is either available or unavailable
at each node. We have shown that there exists a symmetric NE strategy profile in the
class of node symmetric graphs. In order to obtain the symmetric NE strategy, a primary
only needs to enumerate the maximum independent sets. The NE strategy is also easy to
implement. We have shown that symmetric NE strategy may not be unique in a linear
conflict graph in contrast to the first setting.
The characterization of an NE in the second setting where the available channel may
belong to multiple states remains open. The characterization of an NE when the demand
at different locations are correlated is also a work for the future. The analytical results
and tools that we have provided in this chapter may provide the basis for developing a
framework for this problem.
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3.A Appendix
We prove Theorem 3.2 (Section 3.3.5) in Appendix 3.A.1. Subsequently, we show The-
orem 3.3 (Section 3.3.5) in Appendix 3.A.2. We show Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9 used in Sec-
tion 3.3.7 to prove Theorem 3.4 in Appendix 3.A.3. We show Theorem 3.5 (Section 3.3.7)
in Appendix 3.A.4. We prove Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13 (Section 3.4.2) in Section 3.A.5. Fi-
nally, in Appendix 3.A.6 we provide a formal definition of Markov Random Field and show
that Markov random field modeling of correlated channel states satisfy Assumption 3.3
(Section 3.4.1) under some additional assumptions which naturally arise in practice.
3.A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2(Section 3.3.5)
We proceed in two parts. First, we will prove that there exists a distribution tj =
(t1,j , . . . , td,j) which satisfies (3.24) and (3.25). Subsequently, we will prove that such a
distribution is the unique one.
Existence: First, we will show that the statement is true for j = n. Now, let
x ∈ [M1W (qn),M1] and s ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We will show that if x ≤Ms then
MsW (rqn) = x (3.46)
has a unique solution in r, which we will denote as ts,n(x). Let, h(ts,n) = MsW (ts,nqn),
then
h(1) = MsW (qn)
≤M1W (qn) ≤ x (3.47)
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and
h(0) = Ms ≥ x. (3.48)
As W (·) is strictly decreasing and continuous, so is h(·), thus from (3.47) and (3.48), there
exists a unique solution ts,n(x) between 0 and 1, such that h(ts,n) = x. Note that
ts,n(x) = 0 (if x = Ms). (3.49)
h(ts,n) is strictly decreasing in 0 ≤ ts,n ≤ 1. Hence, inverse exists and h−1 is also
continuous as h is continuous. But, x = h(ts,n(x)). Hence, ts,n(x) = h
−1(x). Thus,
ts,n(x) is continuous for x ≤ Ms. For x > Ms, define ts,n(x) = 0. With the above
definition and (3.49) we obtain ts,n(x) is continuous function on [M1W (qn),M1] and thus
ts,n(x) = 0 (if x ≥Ms). (3.50)
Now, let
Tn(x) =
d∑
s=1
ts,n(x). (3.51)
As h(ts,n) is strictly decreasing on 0 ≤ ts,n ≤ 1 for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ts,n(x) is strictly
decreasing for x ≤ Ms. Hence, Tn(x) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ [M1W (qn),M1]. Also,
note that, ts,n(x) = 0 for Ms < x ≤ M1. Thus, for x = M1, ts,n(x) = 0 ∀s, as Ms ≤ M1,
hence for x = M1,
Tn(x) = 0 (3.52)
Now, for x = M1W (qn), t1,n(x) = 1, ts,n(x) ≥ 0 s ∈ {2, . . . , d}, thus
Tn(x) ≥ 1. (3.53)
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As ts,n(x) are continuous, so is Tn(x). Thus, from(3.52), (3.53) and intermediate value
property, there exists a x∗ ∈ [M1W (qn),M1] such that Tn(x∗) = 1 and this is unique
as Tn(·) is strictly decreasing. Let, d′n = max{s : Ms > x∗}. By definition of ts,n, for
s = 1, . . . , d′n, MsW (ts,n(x∗)qn) = x∗ ts,n(x∗) > 0 and for s > d′n, ts,n(x∗) = 0 (by
(3.50)). Since γs,n = ts,nqn (from (3.15)) and W (0) = 1, thus MsW (γs,n) = x
∗ for s ≤ d′n
and for s > d′n MsW (γs,n) ≤ x∗. Hence, {t1,n(x∗), . . . , td,n(x∗)} constitute a probability
distribution and satisfy the equations (3.24) and (3.25), with dn = d
′
n and γs,n+1 = 0.
Thus, the result is true for n.
Let, the statement be true for k + 1, we have to show that the statement is indeed
true for k. As the statement is true for k + 1, thus, there exists unique distribution
tk+1 = (t1,k+1, . . . , td,k+1) such that (3.24) and (3.25) holds for j = k + 1. The ar-
gument will be similar to the case when i = n with finding unique solution to the
equation MsW (ts,k(x)qk + γs,k+1) = x for x ∈ [M1W (qk + γ1,k+1),M1W (γ1,k+1)] for
x > MsW (γs,k+1) and making ts,k = 0 for x ≥ MsW (γs,k+1). Hence we omit the proof.
Thus, the result is true by the principle of mathematical induction.
Uniqueness: We will prove the uniqueness by Induction hypothesis. First, consider
the state n.
To reach a contradiction, assume that there exists e, f ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that t′n =
(t′1,n, . . . , t′d,n), t¯n = (t¯1,n, . . . , t¯d,n), t
′
s,n = 0 (respectively, t¯s,n = 0) for s > e (respec-
tively s > f) and for some y and z:
y =M1W (t
′
1,nqn) = . . . = MeW (t
′
e,nqn) ≥Me+1W (t′e+1,nqn) (3.54)
z =M1W (t¯1,nqn) = . . . = MfW (t¯f,nqn) ≥Mf+1W (t¯f+1qn). (3.55)
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First, suppose e = f , if y = z, then MsW (t
′
s,nqn) = MsW (t¯s,nqn) for s ∈ {1, . . . , e}. But,
W (·) is a strictly decreasing and one-to-one mapping, thus t′s,n = t¯s,n for s ∈ {1, . . . , e}
and t′s,n = 0 = t¯s,n for s > e, which leads to a contradiction.
If e = f , but y > z, then MsW (t
′
s,nqn) > MsW (t¯s,nqn) for s ∈ {1, . . . , e}. As W (·)
is strictly decreasing function, hence we must have t′s,n < t¯s,n. Now, t′s,n = 0 for s > e.
Thus,
d∑
s=1
t′s,n =
e∑
s=1
t′s,n <
d∑
s=1
t¯s,n = 1.
The above inequality lea leads to a contradiction. Thus y > z is not possible, by symmetry,
z > y is not possible.
Now, suppose e > f , thus t′f+1,n > 0. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing function, thus
Mf+1W (t
′
f+1,nqn) < Mf+1. (3.56)
Since t¯f+1,n = 0, thus
Mf+1W (γf+1,n) = Mf+1. (3.57)
Thus from (3.54), (3.55), (3.57) and (3.56), y = Mf+1W (t
′
f+1,nqn) < Mf+1 ≤ z. So, for
s ∈ {1, . . . , f}:
MsW (t
′
s,nqn) < MsW (t¯s,nqn).
Hence, t′s,n > t¯s,n, thus,
∑f
s=1 t
′
s,n >
∑f
s=1 t¯s,n = 1, which leads to a contradiction. Hence,
e > f is not possible, by symmetry, e < f is not possible.
Thus, the result is true for n.
Now, assume that the statement is true for states k+ 1, . . . , n. Since, the statement is
true for states k+1, . . . , n, thus t′s,j = t¯s,j ∀s, ∀j ≥ k+1. Hence,γ′s,j = γ¯s,j ∀s,∀j ≥ k+1.
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From (3.15), γs,k = γs,k+1 + ts,kqk. As γ
′
s,k+1 = γ¯s,k+1, the proof will be similar to the
case when state is n.
The result follows from the induction hypothesis.
3.A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3(Section 3.3.5)
In order to prove Theorem 3.3 we have to show that any independent set selection strategy
of the form (3.24) and (3.25) is an NE. We can not use results derived in Section 3.3.4
which we derive assuming that the strategy profile is an NE. However, we use Lemma 3.7,
and Corollary 3.1 that any independent set selection strategy profile of the form (3.24)
and (3.25) satisfies regardless of whether it is an NE or not. We also use the following
result which can be easily seen from from Lemma 3.7. Since dj ≥ dj+1 (by Lemma 3.7),
hence from (3.24), ts,k = 0 ∀s > dj , k ≥ j. Thus, from (3.15) we obtain
γs,j = 0 for s > dj . (3.58)
Hence, we can write (3.25) as
M1W (γ1,j) = . . . = MdjW (γdj ,j) ≥Mdj+1 ≥Mdj+2 ≥ . . . ≥Md. (3.59)
Now we state and prove Lemmas 3.15 and 3.16 which are satisfied by any strategy profile
of the form (3.24) and (3.25). We use these results to prove Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 3.15. Us,j = Uk,j if ts,j , tk,j > 0
Proof. We prove the statement using induction argument.
The statement is trivially true for j = 1 because Us,1 = v ∀s by (3.18).
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Now, suppose the statement is true for j = i. Then, for any s, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ts,i >
0, tk,i > 0, we have
Us,i = Uk,i (3.60)
Now, let tr,i+1 > 0, tr1,i+1 > 0 for r, r1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Note that Lr,i = Ur,i+1 and Lr1,i =
Ur1,i+1 from (3.18). Thus, from (3.19),
Ur,i+1 = Lr,i = gi(
pr,i − c
W (γr,i+1)
+ c) (3.61)
Ur1,i+1 = Lr1,i = gi(
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i+1)
+ c) (3.62)
From corollary 3.1 tr,i > 0, tr1,i > 0 since tr,i+1, tr1,i+1 > 0. Using (3.60) for r, r1 we have
Ur,i = Ur1,i, hence from (3.18)
pr,i − c
W (γr,i)
=
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i)
(3.63)
Now, since tr,i+1 > 0, tr1,i+1 > 0, tr,i > 0, tr1,i > 0 thus r, r1 ≤ di+1 ≤ di (the last
inequality follows from lemma 3.7). Hence,using (3.25) for r, r1 we obtain
MrW (γr,i) = Mr1W (γr,i) (3.64)
MrW (γr,i+1) = Mr1W (γr1,i+1) (3.65)
Thus, from (3.63), (3.64) and (3.65), we obtain
pr,i − c
W (γr,i+1)
=
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i+1)
Ur,i+1 = Ur1,i+1 (from (3.61) and (3.62))
Hence, Ur,i+1 = Ur1,i+1. The result follows from the induction hypothesis.
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Remark 3.5. Henceforth we denote Us,j as Uj when ts,j > 0 i.e. s ≤ dj . Note
that we have obtained similar result (Lemma 3.2) for any NE strategy profile of the form
(3.13). But Lemma 3.15 is valid for any strategy profile of the form (3.24) and (3.25)
satisfies regardless of whether it is an NE or not.
Lemma 3.16. If j ≥ 2,then for dk ≥ s > dj, Ls,k ≥ Uj, where k < j.
Proof. Let i = max{y ∈ {1, . . . , j−1} : ts,y > 0} . Thus, ts,i > 0, ts,i+1 = 0, and s > di+1.
Since t1,j > 0 ∀j by corollary 3.1, thus Uk > Ui, (or U1,k > U1,i) if k < i. So, it is enough
to show that Ls,i ≥ Ui+1 because i+ 1 ≤ j and thus Ui+1 ≥ Uj .
Since s > di+1, thus s > dk ∀k > i by Lemma 3.7. Thus, ts,k = 0 ∀k > i, thus
γs,i+1 = 0 (from observation 3.1) and thus W (γs,i+1) = 1. Thus, from (3.19)
Ls,i = gi(ps,i − c+ c)
= gi((fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) + c) (from(3.17)) (3.66)
Since L1,i = Ui+1 and p1,i − c = (fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i) from (3.17); hence, from (3.19)
L1,i = Ui+1 = gi(
(fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i)
W (γ1,i+1)
+ c) (3.67)
Since s > di+1, hence using (3.59) for state i+ 1, we obtain
M1W (γ1,i+1) ≥Ms (3.68)
Again using (3.59) for state i and noting that 1, s ≤ di, we obtain
M1W (γ1,i) = MsW (γs,i)
W (γ1,i)
W (γs,i)
=
Ms
M1
≤W (γ1,i+1) (from(3.68)) (3.69)
166
Since gi(·) is strictly increasing, in order to show that Ui ≤ Ls,i, from (3.66) and (3.67) it
is sufficient to show the following
(fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i)
W (γ1,i+1)
≤ (fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) (3.70)
Since fi(Ui) > c, (3.70) readily follows from (3.69).
Now we are ready to show Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: We will show that for channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, probability
distribution ts,j as described in (3.24) and (3.25) for s ∈ {1, . . . , d} is a best response.
1. First, we will show that under the strategy profile for s ≤ dj , at any independent
set Is,maximum expected payoff is given by P
∗
j (equation (3.23)) and the maximum
value is obtained at each penalty value in the interval [Ls,j , Uj ] at every node of Is.
(Case i)
2. Next, we will show that for any choice of penalty a primary can only attain at most
an expected payoff of P ∗j at any Is, s > dj (Case ii and Case iii).
3. Finally, we will show that if a primary selects any other independent set i.e. apart
from I1, . . . , Id then its expected payoff is upper bounded by P
∗
j for any choice of
penalty (Case iv).
Case i :At independent set Is, s ≤ dj .
In this case ts,j > 0. From Lemma 3.1 and (3.17) at a node D ∈ Is, s ≤ dj , a primary gets
a maximum payoff of ps,j − c when the channel state is j. Since s ≤ dj , hence Us,j = Uj .
Thus,
ps,j − c = (fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) (from (3.17)).
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Thus, the expected payoff that a primary obtains when channel state is j, at independent
set Is,
Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j (from(3.23)).
Hence, payoff at each node of independent set Is, s ≤ dj is
(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = ps,j − c =
P ∗j
Ms
. (3.71)
From Lemma 3.1, the best response penalty set is [Ls,j , Uj ] under ts,k k = 1, . . . , n at node
D. Thus, for any x /∈ [Uj , Ls,j ], payoff is atmost equal to (3.71). This completes case i.
Case ii : At independent set Is, whered1 ≥ s > dj .
Note from Lemma 3.7 that di ≥ di+1. Thus, in this case we must have k = max{i ∈
{1, . . . , j − 1} : s ≤ di}. As s ≤ d1, hence this case arises only when j ≥ 2. So, we have
Ls,k ≥ Uj , j > k from Lemma 3.16.
Now, γs,k+1 = 0 as s > dk+1 from (3.58) and thus, W (γs,k+1) = 1. Thus, the expected
payoff to a primary at Ls,k, when the channel state is j, is (fj(Ls,k)− c). So, any penalty
less than Ls,k will fetch a strictly lower payoff compared to penalty Ls,k at any node at
Is. Hence, it is enough to show that if a primary chooses penalty in the interval [Ls,k, v]
at a node of Is, then its payoff will be strictly less than P
∗
j /Ms.
If x ∈ [Ls,k, v] then x must belong to interval [Ls,r, Ls,r−1] for some r ≤ k, with
Ls,0 = v. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x ∈ [Ls,i, Ls,i−1] where i ≤ k .
From Corollary 3.1 ts,i > 0, since ts,k > 0; thus x is a best penalty response for channel
state i by Lemma 3.1. The expected payoff to a primary, when it selects penalty x at
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channel state i at a node D ∈ Is, is given by
(fi(x)− c)P (A) = ps,i − c = (fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) (3.72)
where, P (A) is the probability of winning, when a primary selects penalty x at channel
state i, at any node D ∈ Is.
Since s ≤ di, thus from (3.71) we obtain for state i
P ∗i = Ms(fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) = Ms(fi(x)− c)P (A). (3.73)
Since x ≥ Ls,i and fi(Ls,i) > c from (3.26), thus fi(x) > c. Since probability of winning
only depends on the penalty selected by a primary, thus, when a primary selects penalty
x at node D ∈ Is, at channel state j, its expected payoff is
(fj(x)− c)P (A) = P
∗
i
Ms
fj(x)− c
fi(x)− c (from(3.73)). (3.74)
Since 1 ≤ di, thus expected payoff at any node of I1 at channel state i is given by (3.19)
and (3.71)
p1,i − c = (fi(L1,i)− c)W (γ1,i+1) = P
∗
i
M1
. (3.75)
Again since 1 ≤ dj , thus, at any node of independent set I1, maximum expected payoff
obtained by a primary at channel state j is P ∗j /M1 as given in (3.71). Expected payoff at
L1,i at channel state j is
(fj(L1,i)− c)W (γ1,i+1) ≤
P ∗j
M1
. (3.76)
If s ≤ di+1, then Ls,i = Ui+1; on the other hand if s > di+1, then by Lemma 3.16,
Ls,i ≥ Ui+1. Hence, x ≥ Ls,i ≥ Ui+1. Also, note that i < j by definition of i. Since
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L1,i = Ui+1 (as 1 ≤ di+1); hence, at penalty x, at channel state j and at a node D ∈ Is,
expected payoff to a primary is
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(fj(x)− c)(fi(Ui+1)− c)
(fj(Ui+1)− c)(fi(x)− c) (from (3.75)&(3.76))
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(by (3.2) as x ≥ Ui+1, i < j, fi(Ui+1) > c). (3.77)
Case iii : s > d1.
We have from (3.59)
M1W (γ1,1) = . . . = Md1W (γd1,1) ≥Ms s > d1. (3.78)
Since 1 ≤ dj thus the maximum expected payoff at v is upper bounded by P ∗j /M1 by
(3.71). But, expected payoff to a primary at channel state j at v at any node of I1 is
(fj(v)− c)W (γ1,1) ≤
P ∗j
M1
. (3.79)
Since the expected payoff a primary can attain at a node is at most fj(v)− c at channel
state j. Thus, a primary’s expected payoff at any node D ∈ Is is always upper bounded
by
fj(v)− c ≤ M1
Ms
(fj(v)− c)W (γ1,1) (from(3.78))
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(from (3.79)). (3.80)
Case iv : At any independent set other than I1, . . . , Id:
From (3.71), (3.77) and (3.80), at any node at independent set Is, s > dj , we obtain that
maximum expected payoff a primary can obtain for state j-
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
. (3.81)
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The graph we have considered, is a d-partite graph (Section 3.3.2) . Now, consider an
independent set I which contains ms(I) number of nodes from Is, s = 1, . . . , d. Then at
channel state j, expected payoff at independent set I is sum of all payoffs at all the nodes
contained in I. Hence, from (3.81)
Expected Payoff at I ≤
d∑
s=1
P ∗j
Ms
ms(I)
= P ∗j
d∑
s=1
ms(I)
Ms
≤ P ∗j (from(3.11)).
Thus, at any independent set I, expected payoff to a primary at channel state j is at most
P ∗j for any selection of penalty. From case (i) a primary attains P
∗
j at Is, s ≤ dj following
the strategy profile. Hence, the result follows.
3.A.3 Proof of Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9
Throughout this section we use |Ii| and Mi, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (|I¯i| and M¯i, i = 1, . . . , d¯ respv.)
interchangeably.
Proof of Lemma 3.8
First we show that M1 = M¯1.
Let M1 6= M¯1. Without loss of generality assume that M1 > M¯1. Let I¯1 consists of
ms(I¯1) number of nodes from Is. Then
d∑
s=1
ms(I¯1)
Ms
≥
d∑
s=1
ms(I¯1)
M1
=
M¯1
M1
> 1. (3.82)
which contradicts (3.11).
171
Suppose that Mj 6= M¯j for some smallest index j ∈ {2, . . . , d}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that Mj < M¯j . By the definition of j, Mk = M¯k for k < j, thus∑j−1
k=1Mk =
∑j−1
k=1 M¯k. Note that
Mj−1 = M¯j−1 ≥ M¯j > Mj . (3.83)
We consider two possible scenarios:
Case i : I¯k, k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} does not contain node from Is s ≥ j.
Since
∑j−1
k=1 |I¯k| =
∑j=1
k=1 M¯k =
∑j−1
k=1Mk, thus, I¯j must consist of nodes of only
Is, s ≥ j. Let I¯j consist of ms(I¯j) nodes of Is. Then,
d∑
k=j
mk(I¯j)
Mk
≥
d∑
k=j
mk(I¯j)
Mj
=
|I¯j |
|Ij | > 1 (3.84)
which is not possible by (3.11).
Case ii:I¯k contains at least one node from Is s ≥ j for some k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}.
Let I¯k consist of mi(I¯k) number of nodes from Ii. Since Mj−1 > Mj , thus,
ms(I¯k)
Mi
<
ms(I¯k)
Ms
for any s ≤ j and i > j. By (3.11) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} we have
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≤ 1
j−1∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≤ j − 1. (3.85)
Since I¯k s are disjoint, thus, |I¯1 ∪ . . . I¯j−1| =
∑j−1
k=1 M¯k =
∑j−1
k=1Mk. Thus,
∑j−1
i=1 Mi =∑j−1
k=1
∑d
i=1mi(I¯k). Hence,
d∑
i=j
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k) =
j−1∑
i=1
(Mi −
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)). (3.86)
Since I¯k contains at least one node from Is, s ≥ j, thus, the above expression is strictly
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positive. Note that
j−1∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≥
j−1∑
k=1
(
j−1∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
d∑
i=j
mi(I¯k)
Mj
)
=
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
d∑
i=j
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mj
>
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
j−1∑
i=1
Mi −
∑j−1
k=1mi(I¯k)
Mi
(from (3.86)and Mi > Mj , i < j)
=
j−1∑
i=1
Mi
Mi
= j − 1. (3.87)
which contradicts (3.85), hence this case can not arise. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.9
Let the lowest index be j such that Ij ∩ I¯k 6= Φ but |Ij | 6= I¯k. Thus, Ij contains at least
one node from Ik. Without loss of generality we can assume that |Ij | < |I¯k|.
Since |Ik| = |I¯k| for all k by Lemma 3.8, thus, Mk > Mj . Let k1 = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , j−
1} : Mi > Mj}. Let Ii consists of ms(Ii) number of nodes from I¯s. Thus,
k1∑
i=1
|Ii| =
d∑
s=1
k1∑
i=1
ms(Ii)
k1∑
i=1
d∑
s=k1+1
ms(Ii) =
k1∑
i=1
Mi −
k1∑
i=1
k1∑
s=1
ms(Ii) (3.88)
Note that LHS of (3.88) is always non-negative. Now, we will show that (3.88) is strictly
positive. If it is not strictly positive then we must have
k1∑
i=1
Mi =
k1∑
i=1
k1∑
s=1
ms(Ii). (3.89)
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But RHS of (3.89) is equal to
|(I¯1 ∪ I¯2 . . . ∪ I¯k1) ∩ (I1 ∪ I2 . . . ∪ Ik1)|. (3.90)
and LHS of (3.89) is equal to
|I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1 | = |I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 |. (3.91)
Thus,
I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 = I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1 . (3.92)
But Ij contains at least one node from I¯l and k ≤ k1 < j. Thus, Ij contains at least one
node in common with I1∪ . . .∪Ik1 which is not possible since Ijs are disjoint. Thus (3.88)
is strictly positive. Thus, there must exist a i ∈ {1, . . . , k1} such that Ii contains at least
one node from I¯s s > k1. Since i ≤ k1 and s > k1, thus, |I¯s| = |Is| < |Ii|. Hence, we have
found a i < j such that Ii contains at least one node from I¯s such that |I¯s| < |Ii| which
contradicts the definition of j. Hence, the result follows.
3.A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5 (Section 3.3.7)
In order to prove Theorem 3.5 we must consider all symmetric NE strategy profiles which
need not be of the form (3.13); this precludes the use of the results in section 3.3.4.
First, we characterize some properties that any symmetric NE strategy must follow
(Lemmas 3.18, 3.20) in Appendix 3.A.4. Then we deduce some important properties
(Lemma 3.22 and 3.23) that any NE strategy profile must satisfy in a linear graph in
Appendix 3.A.4. We then use those properties to prove Theorem 3.5.
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Properties of any symmetric NE strategy profile (Lemmas 3.18 and 3.20)
In order to prove Lemma 3.18 we state and prove Observations 3.4, and 3.5 and Lemma3.17.
We subsequently state and prove Lemma 3.19 to prove Lemma 3.20.
We start with some notations, which we use throughout.
Definition 3.14. us,i,max denotes the maximum expected payoff under an NE strategy
for state i at node s 13 .
Recall from (3.8) that the channel is offered at node a when the state is j with
probability αa,j . With slight abuse of notation, we define γa,i for node a in the following
manner:
γa,i =
n∑
j=i
αa,j (3.93)
Thus, γa,i denotes the probability that the channel is offered at node a when the state is
higher or equal to i.
Since we have to consider all NE strategy profiles which may not be of the form (3.13),
thus, the payoff, upper and lower endpoint need not be the identical at each node of Is
at a given channel state. By Lemma 3.1 if αa,j is known then the above parameters can
be obtained using Lemma 2.2 with αa,j in place of qj . With slight abuse of notation we
denote pa,i, La,i and Ua,i for node a i.e. for i = 1, . . . , n
pa,i = c+ (fi(Ua,i)− c)W (γa,i)(from (3.93)&(3.14)) (3.94)
La,i = gi(
pa,i − c
W (γa,i+1)
+ c), Ua,i = La,i−1, La,0 = v (3.95)
13Even if node a is selected with probability 0 when the channel state is i, we can still defined ua,i,max
as the maximum expected payoff that a primary would have obtained if it would select node a
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By Lemma 3.1 pa,i− c is the expected payoff at node a when the channel state is i if node
a is selected with positive probability. By Lemma 3.1 a primary selected penalty from
the interval [Ls,j , Ua,j ] when the channel state is j using the distribution (2.5) with αa,j
in place of qj .
Now we state some observations which we use throughout.
Observation 3.4. At node a, γa,k = γa,k1 +
∑k1−1
i=k αa,i where n ≥ k1 > k.
Observation 3.4 readily follows from (3.93). Since from (3.93)
γa,k =
k1−1∑
i=k
αa,i +
n∑
i=k1
αa,i =
k1−1∑
i=k
αa,i + γa,k1 (from (3.93))
Similar to observation 3.2, using observation 3.4, (3.95) and (3.94) we obtain
Observation 3.5. At node a, Ua,j = La,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} iff ta,j = 0. Ua,j = La,k iff
ta,i = 0 ∀k < i < j. Hence, Ua,j = v iff ta,k = 0 ∀k < j.
Lemma 3.17. Maximum expected payoff under the NE strategy profile at a node s is
obtained at Ls,i when channel states are i and i+1. When the channel state is 1, primary
attains its maximum expected payoff at v at any node.
Note that if αs,i > 0 then by Lemma 3.1 Ls,i is a best penalty response at channel
state i. Here we show that even if αs,i = 0, then the maximum expected payoff is obtained
at Ls,i at node s under any NE strategy profile. The above proof readily follows from
Assumption 3.1. Hence, we omit it here.
Now, we provide expressions for us,i,max, us,i+1,max for node s, i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} in
terms of Ls,iwhich we use to prove Lemmas 3.18 and 3.20.
Since v is a best response at channel state 1 at any node in the network by Lemma 3.17,
176
thus,
us,1,max = (f1(v)− c)W (γs,1) (3.96)
By (3.95) expected payoff at Ls,i is
(fi(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) = us,i,max (3.97)
us,i+1,max = (fi+1(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) (3.98)
Lemma 3.18. i) For, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, if us,i,max ≥ ur,i,max and γs,i ≤ γr,i, αr,i < αs,i,
then us,i+1,max > ur,i+1,max.
ii) If us,i,max ≥ ur,i,max and γs,i < γr,i, αs,i ≥ αr,i, then us,i+1,max > ur,i+1,max.
Proof. First we show part (i). Proof of part (ii) follows by simple modification of the
proof of part (i).
Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. us,i+1,max ≤ ur,i+1,max for some s and r. As
γs,i ≤ γr,i thus,
γs,i+1 + αs,i ≤ γr,i+1 + αr,i (by observation 3.4)
γs,i+1 < γr,i+1 (since αs,i > αr,i) (3.99)
Now, as us,i+1,max ≤ ur,i+1,max, hence from (3.98)
(fi+1(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) ≤ (fi+1(Lr,i)− c)W (γr,i+1)
W (γs,i+1)
W (γr,i+1)
≤ fi+1(Lr,i)− c
fi+1(Ls,i)− c (3.100)
Since γr,i+1 > γs,i+1 (from (3.99)) W (·) is strictly decreasing, thus W (γr,i+1) < W (γs,i+1).
Since fi+1(·) is strictly increasing, thus we obtain from (3.100) Ls,i < Lr,i. Now, from
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(3.100) and the fact that fi(Ls,i) > c , we obtain
W (γs,i+1)
W (γr,i+1)
<
fi(Lr,i)− c
fi(Ls,i)− c (from (3.2) and Ls,i < Lr,i)
(fi(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) < (fi(Lr,i)− c)W (γr,i+1)
us,i,max < ur,i,max (from (3.97))
which contradicts the fact that us,i ≥ ur,i.
Note that, if γs,i < γr,i and αs,i ≥ αr,i, then we also obtain (3.99) by simple algebraic
manipulation, hence the proof of part (ii) is exactly similar to the proof of part (i).
We use the following result in proving lemma 3.20.
Lemma 3.19. Suppose us,k,max > ur,k,max, γs,k < γr,k. Let, i = min{j ∈ {k, . . . , n} :
αs,j < αr,j}, then ∀j such that k ≤ j ≤ i, we must have us,j,max > ur,j,max.
Proof. Suppose the statement is false. So, there exists a j such that k < j ≤ i, us,j,max ≤
ur,j,max
14. Since us,k > ur,k, thus, there must exist a k1 ∈ {k, . . . , j − 1}, such that
us,k1,max > ur,k1,max but us,k1+1,max ≤ ur,k1+1,max. Because otherwise we have us,j,max >
ur,j,max.
Since γs,k < γr,k, thus from observation 3.4
γs,k1 +
k1−1∑
j=k
αs,j < γr,k1 +
k1−1∑
j=k
αr,j (3.101)
By definition of i, αs,k2 ≥ αr,k2 for k ≤ k2 < i, since k1 < j and j ≤ i, thus αs,k2 ≥ αr,k2
∀k2 ∈ {k, . . . , k1}. Hence, from (3.101), we have γs,k1 < γr,k1 .
But αs,k1 ≥ αr,k1 and us,k1,max > ur,k1,max, hence by lemma 3.18 we have us,k1+1,max >
ur,k1+1,max which leads to a contradiction.
14Note that the statement is true at state k, since us,k,max > ur,k,max
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Lemma 3.20. Suppose, us,j,max > ur,j,max, then there must exist a state i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that us,i,max > ur,i,max but αs,i < αr,i.
Proof. First we show that the statement is true when us,1,max > ur,1,max (case i) and then
we show when us,1,max ≤ ur,1,max (case ii); which completes the proof.
Case 1 : Suppose us,1,max > ur,1,max. Since, W (·) is strictly decreasing, thus from
(3.96) we obtain γs,1 < γr,1. Thus, from (3.93), there must exist k = min{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
αs,i < αr,i}. By lemma 3.19, us,j,max > ur,j,max ∀j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Since at k,
αs,k < αr,k, us,k,max > ur,k,max thus, the statement is true for k.
Case 2 Now, assume that us,1,max ≤ ur,1,max. Hence, it is obvious that j 6= 1. So, we
must have k = min{i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : us,i,max ≤ ur,i,max, us,i+1,max > ur,i+1,max}. Note
that if γs,k+1 < γr,k+1, then from (3.93) there must exist i = min{j : {k+1, . . . , n} : αs,j <
αr,j}. Since us,k+1,max > ur,k+1,max, thus by lemma 3.19 at i, us,i > ur,i but αs,i < αr,i.
Thus, the result is true for i if we show that γs,k+1 < γr,k+1. Now we complete the proof
by showing that γs,k+1 < γr,k+1.
Suppose that γs,k+1 ≥ γr,k+1. By definition of k, us,k ≤ ur,k, hence we obtain from
(3.97)
(fk(Ls,k)− c)W (γs,k+1) ≤ (fk(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) (3.102)
Since us,k+1,max > ur,k+1,max, thus from (3.98)
(fk+1(Ls,k)− c)W (γs,k+1) > (fk+1(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) (3.103)
Sinceγs,k+1 ≥ γr,k+1 and W (·) is strictly increasing, hence, Lr,k < Ls,k from (3.103). Thus
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from (3.103)
W (γs,k+1)
W (γr,k+1)
>
fk(Lr,k)− c
fk(Ls,k)− c (3.104)
(from(3.2)as c < fk(Lr,k), Ls,k > Lr,k)
But (3.104) contradicts (3.102). Hence, γs,k+1 < γr,k+1.
Properties of any symmetric NE strategy profile in a linear graph (Lem-
mas 3.22 and 3.23)
We consider a linear graph (fig. 3.1) consisting of M number of nodes. We use the
properties of linear graph and a NE strategy profile to prove the results. First, we state
and prove Lemma 3.21. Subsequently, we show that under an NE strategy profile the
maximum expected payoff to a primary at a channel state at each node of Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}
must be equal (Lemma 3.22). Then, we show that under an NE strategy profile nodes
of Ik, k = {1, 2} are selected with equal probability (Lemma 3.23). Finally, we show
theorem 3.5 using lemmas 3.22 and 3.23.
In order to prove Lemma 3.21 we state and prove Observations 3.6,3.7,and 3.8.
Observation 3.6. An NE independent set selection strategy profile only selects a maximal
independent set with positive probability.
Proof. Suppose not; so an independent set I has been chosen with positive probability
under an NE strategy profile, but it is not maximal which in turn implies that there exists
a node z, such that I¯ = I ∪ {z} is an independent set. Since ∑nj=1 qj = q < 1 (from
(3.9)), hence at node z, primary 1 will attain at least a payoff of (fj(v)− c)W (q) > 0 for
state j when the primary selects the highest possible penalty v. Hence, a primary can
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attain strictly higher payoff by choosing independent set I¯ compared to I. Hence, the
result follows.
Observation 3.6 enables us to focus only on the maximal independent sets for an NE
strategy profile.
Observation 3.7. For a maximal independent set I-
(i) If s ∈ I, but s+ 2 /∈ I, then s+ 3 ∈ I for some s ∈ V .
(ii) If s+ 2 ∈ I, but s /∈ I, then s− 1 ∈ I for some s ∈ V .
Proof. part (i): If it is not then I ∪ {s+ 2} is maximal, since s+ 1 /∈ I (as s ∈ I and I is
an independent set); which contradicts that I is maximal.
part (ii): If it is not then I ∪{s} is an independent set since s− 1 /∈ I, s+ 1 /∈ I which
contradicts that I is maximal.
Observation 3.8. Consider an independent set I, such that s ∈ I, but s + 2 /∈ I, for
some s ∈ {1, . . . ,M −2}; NE independent selection strategy profile selects I with positive
probability, the following condition must be satisfied for s ≤M − 3
us,j,max ≥ us+1,j,max, us+3,j,max ≥ us+2,j,max for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (3.105)
Proof. Note that if s = M − 2, then I does not contain node M,M − 1, hence I is not
maximal. Thus, an NE strategy profile can not select I by Observation 3.6. Hence, we
must have s ≤M − 3.
If us,j,max < us+1,j,max, then we can replace node s with node s+ 1 and we obtain an
independent set I¯ as s+ 2 /∈ I. But, we can get strictly higher payoff at the independent
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set I¯, as all the nodes are same except s and us,j,max < us+1,j,max. This contradicts that
NE strategy profile selects I with positive probability.
Similarly if us+3,j,max < us+2,j,max then we obtain an independent set by replacing
node s+3 with s+2 in I and can get a strictly higher payoff at that independent set.
Lemma 3.21. i) If us,k,max > us+2,k,max, then u1,i,max > u3,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
ii)If us,k,max < us+2,k,max, then uM,i,max > uM−2,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. We prove (i). The proof of (ii) will be similar to the proof of part (i) by symmetry.
Since us,k,max > us+2,k,max, hence, from Lemma 3.20, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
us,i,max > us+2,i,max, but αs,i < αs+2,i. Hence, there must exist a maximal independent
set I such that s /∈ I, but s + 2 ∈ I, which is chosen with positive probability in an NE
strategy profile when the channel state is i. But, as I is maximal, thus, s − 1 ∈ I from
Observation 3.7. Also from Observation 3.8, we must have
us−1,i,max ≥ us,i,max, us+2,i,max ≥ us+1,i,max (3.106)
Since us,i,max > us+2,i,max, thus, from (3.106), we obtain
us−1,i,max > us+1,i,max
Hence, we obtain us−1,i,max > us+1,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only using the fact that
us,k,max > us+2,k,max.Thus, by recurrence on the index s we obtain the result.
Next Lemma characterizes that under an NE strategy profile maximum expected
payoff must be equal at every node of Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}.
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Lemma 3.22. Under NE strategy profile, we must have ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈
{1, 2}
us,j,max = ur,j,max (3.107)
Proof. First, we prove α1,i ≥ α3,i, αM,i ≥ αM−2,i, ∀i.
We show that α1,i ≥ α3,i ∀i; by symmetry we get αM,i ≥ αM−2,i. Suppose, α1,j < α3,j
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, there must exist a maximal independent set I such that
node 1 /∈ I, but node 3 ∈ I; which is not possible (figure 3.1).
Now, we are ready to prove the lemma. Suppose the statement is false. So, we must have
us,j,max > ur,j,max for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}. We rule out s < r, by
symmetry it follows that s > r; which completes the proof.
Since us,j,max > ur,j,max, we must have some a ∈ {s, . . . , r − 2}, such that ua,j,max >
ua+2,j,max. Otherwise, us,j,max ≤ ur,j,max since r − s = 2z for some positive integer z.
But, this entails that u1,i,max > u3,i,max by Lemma 3.21 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which in
turn entails that α1,b < α3,b for some b ∈ {1, . . . , n} (Lemma 3.20). But, we have already
proved that α1,b ≥ α3,b∀b ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, the result follows.
Next, lemma shows that under an NE strategy profile nodes in Ik, k ∈ {1, 2} are
selected with equal probability.
Lemma 3.23. For state z = 1, . . . , n, αz,i = αz,j where i, j ∈ Is, s ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Let, k be the lowest channel state, for which the statement is false. Thus, there
must exist node a, b ∈ Is, s ∈ {1, 2} such that, αa,k > αb,k, but ua,k,max = ub,k,max (by
Lemma 3.22). First we rule out that k = n (case i) and then k < n (case ii).
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Case 1 Suppose, k = n.
By definition of k, αa,j = αb,j ∀j < k, thus from Observation 3.4, we have γa,1 > γb,1.
Since W (·) is strictly decreasing function, thus from (3.96) we obtain ua,1,max < ub,1,max;
which contradicts (3.107).
Case 2 Now, suppose k < n.
Since ua,1,max = ub,1,max by Lemma 3.22, thus from (3.96) γa,1 = γb,1. Thus from Obser-
vation 3.4
γa,k +
k−1∑
j=1
αa,j = γb,k +
k−1∑
j=1
αb,j (3.108)
By definition of k, we have αa,j = αb,j ∀j ≤ k − 1. Hence, from (3.108), γa,k = γb,k.
Since αa,k > αb,k, γa,k = γb,k, and ua,k,max = ub,k,max, hence by Lemma 3.18, we obtain
ua,k+1,max > ub,k+1,max. This expression again contradicts (3.107). Hence k 6= n.
From Lemma 3.23, we have αs,j = αr,j = α¯k,j(let) where s, r ∈ Ik k ∈ {1, 2} j =
1, . . . , n. From Lemma 3.22, we have us,j,max = ur,j,max = u¯k,j(let).
Proof of Theorem 3.5: First, we will show that for any NE strategy profile α¯k,j we
must have
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j ≥ 1 ∀j. Then, we will show that if a primary chooses a maxi-
mal independent set other than I1 and I2 with positive probability, then we must have∑2
k=1 α¯k,j < 1, which completes the proof.
Suppose
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j < 1 but it is an NE for some j. Since I1 and I2 constitute a
partition of V , thus, the expected payoff that any primary at channel state j will get is
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the following
∑
s∈I1
α¯1,jus,j +
∑
r∈I2
α¯2,jur,j
=
2∑
k=1
Mkα¯k,j u¯k,j (since|Ik| = Mk, us,j = u¯k,j , s ∈ Ik) (3.109)
Consider the following unilateral deviation for primary 1 at channel state j: Primary 1
chooses I1 with probability α¯1,j and I2 with probability 1 − α¯1,j . Since u¯k,j remains the
same, is strictly positive, and 1− α¯1,j > α¯2,j , hence primary 1 gets a strictly higher payoff
following the above mentioned strategy by (3.109). This contradicts that α¯k,j is an NE
distribution.
Next, consider an NE strategy profile which selects a maximal independent set I,
which has at least one node both from I1 and I2, with positive probability. Hence, there
exists a node a such that a, a+ 1 /∈ I. Since a and a+ 1 are adjacent, hence both can not
appear in any independent set I¯ ∈ I otherwise I¯ can not be an independent set. Hence,
by valid distribution property, we must have
αa,j + αa+1,j ≤ 1 (3.110)
On the other hand for independent set I, both a, a+1 /∈ I. Since I is chosen with positive
probability, hence from (3.110)
αa,j + αa+1,j < 1 (3.111)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a ∈ I1, hence a+ 1 ∈ I2. Thus, αa,j = α¯1,j
and αa+1,j = α¯2,j . We have already shown that for any NE strategy profile we must have∑2
k=1 α¯k,j = 1 which contradicts (3.111). Hence, a primary can not choose an independent
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set which contains at least one node from I1 and I2 under an NE strategy; since I1 and
I2 constitute a partition of V ; thus, only subsets of either I1 or I2 can be selected with
positive probability. Since proper subsets of either I1 or I2 are not maximal, they can not
be chosen with positive probability under an NE strategy by Observation 3.6. Hence, the
result follows.
3.A.5 Proof of Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13 (Section 3.4.2)
Proof of Lemma 3.12
:In order to prove Lemma 3.12 first, we describe an infinite set of strategy profile SPl,r,r1 .
Subsequently, we show that every strategy profile in SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Note that at a channel state vector J , a linear graph consists of disjoint smaller linear
graphs (Fig. 3.18). First, we introduce some notations. Let Mi be the linear graph which
starts from node i i.e. the channel is not available at node i− 1 if i > 1 (fig. 3.18), but it
is available at node i.
In Mi the two maximal independent sets which partition the set of nodes in Mi are:
I1,i which contains the nodes numbered i, i + 2, . . . and I2,i which contains the nodes
numbered i + 1, i + 3, . . .. In figure 3.18, Mi and Mj constitute two disconnected linear
graphs. The cardinality of Mi can be an even or odd number depending on the number
of consecutive nodes where the channel is available starting from node i. To illustrate the
cardinalities of |Mi|, consider the linear graph with 4 nodes. Here, |M1| can take any value
in {1, 2, 3, 4}. When |M1| = 1, then the channel is available at node 1 but not at node
2. When |M1| = 2, then the channel is available at node 1 and 2, but the channel is not
available at node 3. Here I1,1 = {1} and I2,1 = {2}. When |M1| = 3, then the channel is
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Figure 3.18: Figure shows the linear graph Mi and Mj with |Mi| = k−i+1 and |Mj | = k1−j+1.
Mi and Mj are disconnected. The maximal independent sets in Mi is I1,i and I2,i where I1,i
contains nodes numbered i, i+ 2, . . . and I2,i contains nodes numbered i+ 1, i+ 3, . . ..
available at nodes 1, 2, 3, but the channel is unavailable at node 4. Here, I1,1 = {1, 3} and
I2,1 = {2}. When |M1| = 4, the channel of the primary is available at all nodes. Thus,
I1,1 coincides with I1 and I2,1 coincides with I2 where I1 = {1, 3} and I2 = {2, 4}. Since
for a given channel state vector J , the graph GJ can be partitioned into linear graphs Mi
(fig. 3.18), thus, a primary only needs to select strategy for each such linear graph. Thus,
Lemma 3.24. Obtaining an NE strategy profile is equivalent to obtain an NE strategy at
each possible mean valid graph Mi, i = 1, . . . ,M .
We use the following result to prove Theorem 3.12.
Observation 3.9. When |Mi| is odd, then the only maximum independent set is I1,i, if
|Mi| is even, then both I1,i and I2,i are maximum independent sets of Mi.
Note that when |Mi| is even, there can be other maximum independent sets apart
from I1,i and I2,i
15.
Now, we consider a linear graph with 4 nodes and the channel states are I.I.D. i.e. the
channel is at state 1 at a given node is w.p. q1 = q = 0.5. Let ti,j denote the probability
15For example, when |M1| = 4, then, the following are maximum independent sets, {1, 3}, {2, 4}, and
{1, 4} where the first two independent sets belong to I1,1 and I2,1 respectively
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of the event that |Mi| = j. It is easy to show the following
t1,3 = t2,3, t4,1 = t1,1 (3.112)
t3,1 = t2,1, t3,2 = t1,2. (3.113)
t2,2 = t1,4, t1,2 = 2t1,4, t3,2 = 2t1,4 (3.114)
t2,1 + t1,2 = t1,1, t4,1 = t3,1 + t3,2 (3.115)
Now, we describe an uncountable set of strategy profiles parameterized by parameters
r and r1.
Strategy profile SPl,r,r1 : If |Mi| is odd, then I1,i will be selected w.p. 1. If
|M1| = 2, then I1,1 will be selected w.p. r and I2,1 will be selected w.p. 1− r. If
|M1| = 4 i.e. when the channel is available at all nodes, then I1 will be selected
w.p. r1 and I2 will be selected w.p. 1− r1. If |M2| = 2, then I1,2 will be selected
w.p.
1
2
and I2,2 will be selected w.p.
1
2
. If |M3| = 2, then I1,3 will be selected
w.p. 0.75 + r and I2,3 will be selected w.p. 0.25− r.
where r, r1 ≥ 0 are such that
2r + r1 = 0.75 &r ≤ 0.25 (3.116)
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.25 and 0 ≤ r1 ≤ 0.75, thus, it is easy to discern that the strategy profile
described in SPl,r,r1 constitutes a valid distribution. Note that there are uncountably
infinite numbers of r, r1 satisfying (3.116). Thus, SPl gives rise an infinite number of
strategies.
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Proof of Lemma 3.12: We first prove that for every r, r1 which satisfy (3.116) the
strategy profile SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Towards this end we first show that under the strategy profile SPl,r,r1 the channel is
offered by a primary at every node with the same probability.
Node selection probability of node 1 i.e. α1 is
α1 = t1,1 + t1,3 + t1,2r + t1,4r1 (3.117)
and node selection probability of node 2 is
α2 = t1,2(1− r) + t1,4(1− r1) + t2,1 + t2,3 + t2,2/2 (3.118)
Node selection probability of node 3 i.e. α3 is
t1,3 + t1,4r1 + t2,2/2 + t3,2(0.75 + r) + t3,1 (3.119)
Node selection probability of node 4 is
α4 = t1,4 ∗ (1− r1) + t3,2 ∗ (0.25− r) + t4,1 + t2,3 (3.120)
Note that
2t1,4r1 + 2t1,2r = t1,4(2r1 + 4r) (from (3.114))
= t1,4 ∗ 3/2 (from (3.116)) (3.121)
Thus, from (3.117) and (3.118), we obtain that α1 − α2 is equal to
t1,1 − t1,2 − t2,1 + t1,3 − t2,3 + 2t1,2r + 2t1,4r1 − t1,4 − t2,2/2 (3.122)
Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (3.112) and t1,1 = t2,1 + t1,2 by (3.115). Since t2,2 = t1,4 from
(3.114), thus it readily follows from (3.122) that α1 = α2. From (3.119) and (3.118) we
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obtain α2 − α3 is equal to
t2,1 − t3,1 + t2,3 − t1,3 + t1,4 + t1,2 − 0.75t3,2 − rt3,2 − rt1,2 − 2t1,4r1 (3.123)
Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (3.112), t1,2 = t3,2 and t2,1 = t3,1 by (3.113). Thus, from (3.123)
α2 − α3 = t1,4 + t1,2/4− 2rt1,2 − 2r1t1,4 (3.124)
Also note from (3.114) that t1,4 = t1,2/2. Thus, t1,4 + t1,2/4 = t1,4 ∗ 3/2. Thus, from
(3.121) and (3.124) it readily follows that α3 = α2. From (3.119) and (3.120) we obtain
that α3 − α4 is equal to
t1,3 − t2,3 + t3,1 + t3,2 − t4,1 + t2,2/2− t1,4 − t3,2/2 + 2t1,4r1 + 2rt3,2 (3.125)
Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (3.112). Also note that t4,1 = t3,1 + t3,2 by (3.115). Thus, from
α3 − α4 = t2,2/2− t1,4 − t3,2/2 + 2t1,4r1 + 2rt3,2 (3.126)
Since t3,2/2 = t1,4 by (3.114), thus, we obtain t1,4 + t3,2/2 − t2,2/2 = t1,4 ∗ 3/2. Since
t1,2 = t3,2 by (3.113), thus, from (3.121) and (3.126) it readily follows that α4 = α3.
Hence, we obtain α1 = α2 = α3 = α4.
Since node selection probability is identical across the nodes, thus, when all the other
primaries select a strategy profile in the set SPl,r,r1 , then, the maximum payoff of primary
1 at a node i is (f1(v)− c)(1− w(αi)) by Lemma 3.1 and (3.41) and this is obtained for
any penalty in the interval [L1, v] with αi in place of q1 by Lemma 3.1. Hence, the
maximum attainable expected payoff of primary 1 at each location is the same since αi’s
are identical.
Now, we show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate from a strategy
profile for fixed r, r1 when other primaries also select that strategy profile.
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When |Mi| is odd, then by Observation 3.9 I1,i is the only maximum independent
set in Mi. Since the maximum attainable expected payoff for primary 1 is the same at
every node, thus, the expected payoff at I1,i is the highest for primary 1 when all the
other primaries select a strategy profile in SPl,r,r1 . Hence, primary 1 does not have any
incentive to deviate from SPl,r,r1 when |Mi| is odd since under SPl,r,r1 primary 1 selects
I1,i w.p. 1 when |Mi| is odd.
When |Mi| is even, then |I1,i| = |I2,i|. By Observation 3.9 both I1,i, I2,i are the
maximum independent sets. Since the maximum attainable expected payoff is the same
at each node, thus, any strategy profile which randomizes between I1,i and I2,i gives the
highest expected payoff to primary 1. Thus, primary 1 does not have any incentive to
deviate from SPl,r,r1 when |Mi| is even since under SPl,r,r1 primary 1 only randomizes
between I1,i and I2,i.
Though we only consider primary 1 since the every strategy in SPl,r,r1 is symmetric,
hence, no primary will have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the strategy profile
for a fixed r, r1. Thus, we show that every r, r1 which satisfy (3.116), the strategy set in
SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Since there are uncountable number of r, r1s which satisfy (3.116), hence there are
multiple NEs in this setting.
Proof of Lemma 3.13
We show that SPsym is not a NE strategy profile in the above linear graph with 4 nodes
where the channel is in state 1 at a given location w.p 0.5 irrespective of the channel
states at other locations. In order to prove the result we use some of the results which we
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derived in the previous section to prove Lemma 3.12.
First, we point out the how SPsym (described in Section 3.4.2) is different from the
class of strategy profile SPl,r,r1 (described in the previous section). Then, we show that
SPsym is not an NE in this setting.
Since I1,i and I2,i are the only maximum independent sets of Mi when |Mi| = 2 by
Observation 3.9, thus, according to SPsym (Section 3.4.2), when |Mi| = 2, I1,i and I2,i
must be selected w.p
1
2
. Note that in SPl,r,r1 when |M1| = 2, I1,1 is selected w.p. r, and
I2,1 is selected w.p. 1− r where r ≤ 0.25. Thus, I1,1 and I2,1 are not selected with equal
probabilities even though they are of same sizes. Thus, SPsym does not belong to SPl,r,r1 .
Now we show that SPsym can not be an NE.
SPsym puts equal weight on every maximum independent sets. When |M1| = 4, then
under SPsym, each of the maximum independent sets {1, 3}, {2, 4} and {1, 4} with equal
probabilities. Hence, the channel is offered at node 1 w.p. t1,4 ∗2/3 when |M1| = 4. Thus,
under SPsym, the node selection probability is
α1 = t1,1 + t1,3 + t1,2/2 + 2t1,4/3 (3.127)
and node selection probability of node 2 is
α2 = t1,2/2 + t1,4/3 + t2,1 + t2,3 + t2,2/2 (3.128)
Now, we show that α1 > α2. Since t1,3 = t2,3 (by (3.112)) and 2t1,4/3 > t1,4/3, thus, we are
left to show that t1,1 > t2,1 + t2,2/2. By simple algebraic calculation for q1 = q0 = q = 0.5,
we have t1,1 = 0.25, t2,1 = 1/8, t2,2 = 1/16. Hence t1,1 > t2,1 + t2,2/2. Thus, α1 > α2.
Thus, by the single location pricing strategy the maximum expected payoff attained
by a primary at node 1 is (f1(v) − c)(1 − w(α1)) (from (3.41)) and the expected payoff
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attained by a primary at node 2 is (f1(v) − c)(1 − w(α2)) ( by (3.41)) when the other
primaries select SPsym. Since α1 > α2 and w(·) is strictly increasing, thus, the expected
payoff at node 2 is strictly higher compared to the node 1. Thus, when |M1| = 2, if a
primary selects node 2 w.p. 1, then it would attain strictly higher payoff compared to the
strategy SPsym where a primary selects node 2 w.p.
1
2
and node 1 w.p.
1
2
when |M1| = 2.
Hence, a primary has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from its strategy profile. Hence,
SPsym is not an NE.
3.A.6 Markov Random Field
Background
A Markov random field is a graphical model which represents the joint probability distri-
butions of random variables having Markov property. It is represented by an undirected
graph H = (V,E) in which the nodes V represents the random variables. The edges E
encodes the dependencies among the random variables in the following way: if N(A) is
the set of neighbors of A, then in a Markov random field[54],
A ⊥ other random variables|N(A)
Figure 3.19 provides a cyclic Markov random field. Here, A ⊥ C|B,D. The channel states
in a conflict graph are random variables whose values are either 0 or 1. Since the channel
states at adjacent locations are likely to be correlated, we model the correlation amongst
the adjacent locations in the conflict graph using the Markov Random field where the
nodes in the Markov random field represent the channel states of the corresponding nodes
of conflict graph G. Figure 3.19 represents a Markov random field when the conflict graph
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Figure 3.19: A cyclic Markov Random field.
Figure 3.20: The figure shows a Markov Ran-
dom Field. Here the Maximal cliques are
(ABC,CD).
is a cyclic graph with 4 nodes and the values of the random variables A,B,C,D ∈ {0, 1}
represent the channel states at nodes A,B,C,D of conflict graph G respectively.
We now discuss the joint probability distribution in the Markov random field. Markov
random fields provide a compact representation of the joint probability distribution in
terms of product of potential functions. Potential functions are defined on the set of
maximal cliques, C, in the graphical representation of the Markov random field H. A
potential function ζC(·) represent the values of the random variable of the maximal clique
C ∈ C. For example, in figure 3.19 the set {AB} is a maximal clique, thus, ζAB(a, b)
denote the value of the potential function when the random variables A = a and B = b,
a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Note that ζC(·) is defined on the vector c which represents the values of the
random variables represented by nodes in the clique C. Formally, the probability of the
channel state J is given by:
qJ =
1
Z
∏
C∈C
ζC(cJ) (3.129)
where Z is a normalization factor and cJ denote the channel states in clique C when the
overall channel state vector is J .
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For example, in figure 3.19 the set of maximal cliques C is AB,BC,CD,DA. The
joint probability distribution is given by
PA,B,C,D(a, b, c, d) =
1
Z
ζAB(a, b)ζBC(b, c)ζCD(c, d)ζDA(d, a)
Since A,B,C,D only take values in {0, 1}, we can represent ζ as a matrix where ζAB(a, b)
denote the value of the (a, b)th position of the matrix. For example, ζ can be the following:
ζAB = ζBC = ζCD = ζDA =
0.8 0.2
0.2 1
 (3.130)
In Figure 3.20, the maximal cliques are (ABC,CD). Hence, the joint probability distri-
butions are
PA,B,C,D(a, b, c, d) =
1
Z
ζABC(a, b, c)ζCD(c, d) (3.131)
Definition 3.15. The Markov random field representation of random variables is sym-
metric if i) the maximal cliques are of identical sizes and ii) suppose c1 corresponds to
the channel state vector of maximal clique C1 and c2 corresponds to the channel state
vector of maximal clique C2, then
ζC1(c1) = ζC2(c2) (3.132)
for every c1 and c2 such that c1 and c2 contain the same number of 1s (and thus, the
same number of 0s since C1, C2 are of same sizes).
(3.130) provides an example of potential functions which are symmetric and identical.
But potential functions in Fig. 3.20 can not be symmetric since the sizes of the maximal
cliques are different.
Now, we are ready to provide an example which satisfies Assumption 3.3.
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Result
Lemma 3.25. The probability distributions on the channel states satisfy Assumption 3.3
if
i) The channel states constitute a Markov random field,
ii) The graphical representation of the Markov random field H is the same as the node
symmetric graph G,
iii) The Markov random field relation is symmetric16, and
iv) There are fixed integers r1, r2 . . . such that every clique containing j ≥ 1 number of
nodes is a subset of identical (rj) number of maximal cliques in G.
First, it is easy to discern that the condition (iv) is satisfied by a large class of node
symmetric conflict graphs including cyclic graph, infinite linear graph (Fig. 3.10), in-
finite square graph(Fig. 3.11), infinite grid graph (Fig. 3.12), infinite triangular graph
(Fig. 3.13). For example, in the infinite triangular graph (Fig. 3.21), a clique containing
3 nodes is a maximal clique and hence, it is a part of only 1 maximal clique; any clique
containing 2 nodes is a subset of 2 maximal cliques; a single node is a part of 6 maximal
cliques.
In order to prove the above lemma, we first show the following for any node symmetric
graph G which satisfies condition (iv):
Observation 3.10. Let nj be the number of maximal cliques in G which contains exactly
j nodes of GJ , then there are exactly nj number of maximal cliques in G which contains
exactly j nodes of GK , when GK is isomorphic to GJ .
16In a node symmetric graph, the maximal cliques are of the same size
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Figure 3.21: Infinite triangular graphs: the black colored node is a part of 6 maximal cliques.
Any clique containing two nodes is a part of 2 maximal clique. A clique containing 3 nodes is a
maximal clique in this graph.
Proof. Let GJ and GK be isomorphic (Definition 3.12) to each other, where GJ and GK
are the conflict graphs corresponding to the channel state vectors J and K respectively.
Since GJ and GK are isomorphic, there is an isomorphic function F1(·) between the nodes
of GJ and GK .
Suppose that there is a maximal clique C which contains j nodes of GJ . Thus, this
set of j nodes is a subset of a maximal clique. The isomorphic function F1(·) maps those
j nodes into j different nodes of GK . Also note that since these j nodes of GJ belong
to a clique in the original graph G, hence they are adjacent to each other, since F1(·) is
isomorphic, thus, the mapped j nodes must also be adjacent to each other, hence that set
of mapped j nodes is also a subset of a maximal clique in the original graph G.
Suppose the statement in the result is false. Thus, there must exist a set Vj of j nodes
of GJ which is a subset of r1 number of maximal cliques in the original graph, however
the mapped set of nodes F1(Vj) of GK is only a subset of r2 number of maximal cliques in
the original graph where r2 < r1. Thus, this violates the condition (iv). Hence, r2 ≥ r1.
By symmetry, we can also show that the situation where r2 > r1 can not arise. Hence,
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the result follows.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 3.25.
Proof. Let GJ and GK be isomorphic to each other, where GJ and GK are the conflict
graphs corresponding to the channel state vectors J and K respectively. We have to show
that qJ = qK . Let cJ be the channel state vector at the nodes of C when the channel
state vector is J .
Now, at channel state vector J , the potential function value at maximal clique is
ζC(cJ). Thus, the channel state vector qJand qK are given by
qJ =
∏
C∈C
1
Z
ζC(cJ)
qK =
∏
C∈C
1
Z
ζC(cK) (3.133)
By Observation 3.10, the number of maximal cliques which contain j number of nodes of
GJ and GK are identical. Note that at channel state vectors J and K, the nodes where
the channel state is 1 are only the nodes of GJ and GK respectively. Hence, the number of
maximal cliques which contain exactly j number of 1s are the same (and thus, the number
of 0s since in the node symmetric graph, the size of maximal cliques are the same) in the
channel state vectors J and K. Hence, qK = qJ from (3.132) and (3.133).
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Chapter 4
Provision of acquiring the CSI of
the competitor
In this chapter we investigate the setting where a primary can acquire its competitor’s
CSI (C-CSI) by incurring a cost. As discussed in Section 1.4 we consider that there are
two primaries. We formulate a non cooperative game where each primary decides whether
to acquire C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We introduce the class
of [T, p] strategies and show that there exist NE strategies which belong to this class. In a
[T, p] strategy a primary i) acquires the C-CSI with probability (w.p.) p if the acquisition
cost is below T , and ii) does not acquire the C-CSI if the acquisition cost is above T . We
show that in the NE strategy the p increases as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI decreases.
We first consider a basic model (Section 4.2) where each primary accurately estimates the
channel state of its competitor by acquiring its CSI. The channel availability probability
and the acquisition costs are also the same for both the primaries. In this setting, we find
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that the expected payoff of a primary is independent of the cost of acquiring the C-CSI
and is the same as in the setting where acquiring the C-CSI is not possible. Thus, we have
the following counter-intuitive result: the ability to acquire the C-CSI does not increase
the expected payoff of the primary. We also characterize the NE pricing strategies.
We, subsequently, investigate the impact of the estimation error on the decision, payoff
and the pricing strategy of a primary (Section 4.3). We show that there exists a [T, p] type
NE strategy where the threshold T decreases as the estimation error increases. Interest-
ingly, we find that the expected pay-off of a primary is higher when there is an estimation
error. Thus, it negates conventional wisdom that the payoff of the primary should decrease
as the error increases. In contrast to the basic model, the expected payoff increases as
the cost of acquiring the C-CSI decreases. We characterize the NE pricing strategies and
show that there exist important structural differences compared to the basic model.
We, subsequently, investigate the setting where different primaries may have different
costs of acquiring the CSI of their competitors (Section 4.4); we consider that primary 1
has a lower acquisition cost compared to primary 2. We show that primary 1 acquires
the C-CSI with a higher probability compared to the primary 2. The expected payoff of
primary 2 is independent of the cost of acquiring the C-CSI and it is the same primary
2 would obtain when it does not acquire the C-CSI . In contrast to the basic model, the
expected payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to the expected payoff of the primary 2
when primary 1 acquires the C-CSI. The expected payoff of the primary 1 decreases as
the difference between the acquisition costs decreases. We characterize the NE pricing
strategies and show that there exist important structural differences compared to the
basic model.
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We, subsequently, investigate the impact of primaries having different availability
probabilities on the competition (Section 4.5); we consider that primary 1 has a higher
availability probability compared to primary 2. We compute a NE strategy which is of the
form [Ti, pi] for primary i. We show that T1 > T2 and p1 > p2. Thus, primary 1 acquires
the C-CSI for a larger value of the acquisition cost, and also with a higher probability
compared to primary 2. The expected payoff of primary 1 is also higher compared to
primary 2 in contrast to the basic model. Moreover, the expected payoff of primary
2 decreases as the acquisition cost of the C-CSI decreases which negates conventional
wisdom that the payoff of a primary should not decrease as the cost of acquiring the C-
CSI decreases. We also characterize the NE pricing strategies and show that there exist
some structural differences compared to the basic model.
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We consider a secondary spectrum market with two primaries (players) and one or
more secondaries. The choice of 2 primaries is partly motivated to simplify the analysis
and it partly motivated by the fact that in most of the countries, the wireless market is
mostly shared by two service providers. For example, in the USA, the market share of
two primaries Verizon and AT&T is 70%.
4.1 System Model
We consider a secondary spectrum market with two primaries (players) and one sec-
ondary1. We first provide the basic system model in Section 4.1.1 and subsequently, we
specify certain generalizations of the model in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Basic Model
The transmission rate offered by a primary’s channel evolves randomly because of the
fading and the usage of the primary’s customers. We consider that the primary’s channel
is available for the secondary if the transmission rate is higher than a threshold, otherwise
it is rendered unavailable. For analytical exposition, we define the channel to be in state
1 if it is available, otherwise it is in state 0. Each primary’s channel is available with
probability (w.p.) q, where 1 > q > 0 and q is of common knowledge.
If a primary’s channel is available, the primary can sell it for the secondary use. In this
1If there are more that one secondary, then the decision of the primary is trivial, it will always sell its
channel, thus, it will select the highest possible price and will never acquire the CSI. Our model can also
accomodate the setting where the number of secondaries is not known apriori and follows a distribution
function such that the probability of the event there is exactly one secondary is non-zero.
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case, it decides whether to estimate (or, acquire) competitor’s channel state information
(C-CSI) before deciding the price for its available channel. The C-CSI estimation is
accurate and thus, a primary knows the exact competitor’s channel state (CCS). However,
the primary incurs a cost s if it estimates the C-CSI.
The secondary is willing to pay up to v for an available channel. If the channels of
both the primaries are available for sale, then, the secondary will buy the lower priced
channel. If the two available channels have the same price, then a secondary will choose
either of them w.p. 1/2.
4.1.2 Generalization of the Model
Estimation Error
In Section 4.3 we generalize the basic model by considering that the estimated channel
state is accurate only with probability qs. Specifically, if a primary acquires the C-CSI,
then, it will estimate that the CCS is 1 (0, resp.) w.p. qs if the original CCS is 1 (0,
resp.). Without loss of generality, we assume that2 1/2 < qs ≤ 1. Note that when qs = 1,
there is no estimation error and a primary accurately estimates the CCS, thus, the basic
system model is a special case of this model.
Different Costs of Acquiring the C-CSI
In Section 4.4 we generalize the basic model to allow each primary i to incur a different
cost, si, for acquiring the C-CSI.
2If qs = 1/2, then there is no point of estimating the CCS as the setting becomes equivalent to the
setting where a primary does not know the channel state of its competitor.
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Different Channel Availability Probabilities
We generalize the basic model in Section 4.5 by allowing each primary i to have different
availability probability qi.
4.1.3 Payoff of a primary
If primary i sets its price at x and it decides to acquire the C-CSI, then, its payoff is
x− c− si, if the primary is able to sell its channel,
−si, otherwise.
where c is a transaction cost incurred when the secondary buys the channel. Note that
when both the primaries incur the same cost to acquire the C-CSI, then we have si = s.
When a primary does not acquire the C-CSI, then its payoff at price x is
x− c, if the primary is able to sell its channel,
0, otherwise.
4.1.4 Strategy of a Primary
If the channel of a primary is available for sale3, it will take a decision D ∈ {Y,N} where
Y denotes that the primary decides to incur the cost s to estimate the C-CSI and N
denotes that the primary decides not to acquire the C-CSI. Primary i also sets a price
for its available channel. Note that the primaries’ decisions are simultaneous so that no
primary is aware of the decision of its competitor when making its own decision. If a
primary selects Y , it selects a price using either a distribution F1(·) or F0(·) depending
3If the channel of the primary is unavailable, then its decision is immaterial.
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on whether it estimates the CCS as 1 or 0, respectively. If a primary selects N , then it
does not acquire the C-CSI, so it only selects its price using a single distribution F (·).
Definition 4.1. The strategy Si of primary i = 1, 2 is σ(D,F) where F = (F0, F1) when
D = Y , F = (F, F ) when D = N , and σ(D,F) is a probability mass function over the
strategies (D,F).
The strategy of the primary other than i is denoted as S−i.
Definition 4.2. E{ui(Si, S−i)} denotes the expected payoff of primary i when its channel
is available, it uses strategy Si and the other primary uses strategy
4 S−i.
4.1.5 Solution Concept
We consider a non-cooperative game where each primary only wants to maximize its own
expected payoff. We use the Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept.
Definition 4.3. A Nash equilibrium (NE) (S1, S2) is a strategy profile such that no
primary can improve its expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy [59].
Thus,
E{ui(Si, S−i)} ≥ E{ui(S˜i, S−i)} ∀ S˜i. (4.1)
A strategy profile is symmetric if Si = Sj for any pair of players i and j.
4Note that we consider the expected payoff of a primary as the expected payoff conditioned on the
channel of the primary being available. Naturally if the channel of the primary is unavailable, it will
attain a payoff of 0.
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4.2 Results of the Basic Model
We, first, investigate the system model depicted in Section 4.1.1. Note that this setting
is a special case of each of the more generalized settings depicted in Sections 4.1.2,4.1.2,
and 4.1.2.
4.2.1 Goals
Acquiring the CSI of the competitor has potential advantages. For example, if a primary
knows that the channel of its competitor is unavailable, then, the primary can select a
high price because of the lack of competition. However, a primary has to incur a cost to
acquire the CSI. Thus, conventional wisdom suggests that as the cost of acquiring the CSI
decreases, a primary should more frequently acquire the CSI and thereby gain a higher
payoff in an NE. However, conventional wisdom is not definitive because of the following.
The payoff of a primary (1, say) also inherently depends on the decision of other primary
(2,say). If the primary 2 decides to acquire the CSI of primary 1, then primary 2 selects a
lower price when the channel of primary 1 is available, thus, in response5, the primary 1
also selects a lower price in the NE which reduces its payoff. On the other hand, acquiring
the CSI of the competitor is also not ruled out either. This is because a primary may
acquire the CSI of its competitor and take advantage of the extra information. Thus, it
is not apriori clear whether a primary will acquire the CSI of its competitor. It is also
not clear even if a primary decides to acquire the CSI at what values of s it will do so.
We resolve all the above quandaries.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitor’s decision also complicates the pricing
5In an NE, each player selects a best response strategy in response of the strategy of the other player.
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strategy of the primary. If primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available,
its pricing decision still depends on if primary 2 also know that its channel is available;
if not then the primary 2 may randomize among multiple prices, enabling primary 1 to
charge a higher price. If primary 2 knows that the channel of primary 1 is available,
primary 2 selects a lower price, in response primary 1 also selects a lower price. On the
other hand, if the primary does not know the channel state of its competitor, then it may
have to randomize over prices from an interval which is not known apriori. Thus, it is
also not apriori clear how a primary will select its price. We also characterize NE pricing
strategies.
4.2.2 Results
A class of Strategy for selecting Y
We first define a class of strategies for selecting Y .
Definition 4.4. A [T, p] strategy is a strategy where a primary selects
Y, w.p. p when s < T
N, w.p. 1 when s ≥ T
for 0 < p ≤ 1. The probability p may be a function of s.
We show that in the basic model as well as in different generalizations, the NE strategy
is a [T, p] strategy where p is a strictly decreasing function of s. We also characterize T ,
and p in different generalizations of the basic model.
It is intuitive that in an NE, a primary will choose Y with a probability p = f(s)
where f(·) is a decreasing function. It is also intuitive that f(s) = 0 when s > (v − c) as
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the maximum expected payoff that a primary attains is v − c. We, however, show that
f(s) can be 0 even for smaller values of s. We also show that p never becomes 1 for any
positive value of s. We fully characterize the function f(·) and the value of the threshold
T above which a primary does not select Y .
Main Results
Our main results are–
• Regardless of the cost s, there is no NE where both the players have full knowledge
of each other’s channel states w.p. 1 (Theorem 4.1). There is no NE where one
primary has the complete knowledge of the channel state of its competitor, but
the other does not (Theorem 4.2). Thus, a primary can only select Y , if the other
primary randomizes between Y and N .
• We show that the unique NE strategy is a [T, p] strategy where T = q(v − c)(1 −
q) (Theorems 4.3 and 4.4). Note that T increases when the uncertainty of the
availability of the channel increases i.e. q becomes closer to 1/2. Intuitively, when
either q is large or small, the uncertainty of the competitor’s channel decreases,
thus, a primary selects N for higher values of s. We also characterize the value of
p as a function of s and show that p is a decreasing function of s.
• The expected payoff that a primary attains in any NE strategy profile is (v−c)(1−q)
(Theorems 4.3 and 4.4). Thus, the expected payoff of a primary is independent of
the value of s. [45] shows that when a primary can not acquire the CSI of the
competitor, then its payoff is (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, the provision of acquiring the
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CSI of the competitor does not impact the expected payoff of a primary.
• Theorem 4.3 shows that when each primary selects N , then each primary randomizes
its price from the interval [p˜, v]. Theorem 4.4 shows that when a primary selects Y
(N , resp.) and the channel of its competitor is available, then the primary selects
its price from the interval [p˜1, p˜2] ([p˜2, v],resp.). Intuitively, as the uncertainty of
the availability of the competitors increases, a primary selects a higher price. We
also show that p˜ < p˜1. Thus, a primary selects its price from a larger interval when
it randomizes between Y and N .
We now describe the results in details. We first state some price distributions φ(·) and
ψ(·) which we use throughout.
φ(x) =0 if x < p˜
1
q
(
1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c
)
if p˜ ≤ x ≤ v
1 if x > v. (4.2)
ψ(x) =0 if x < p˜
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ) if p˜ ≤ x < v
1− q, if x = v
1 if x > v. (4.3)
where p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c. (4.4)
4.2.3 Does there exist an NE where both primaries select Y ?
Theorem 4.1. There is no Nash equilibrium where both the primaries choose Y w.p. 1.
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Outline of the proof : Assume both players choose Y , so that they know each other’s
channel state. Thus, the competition becomes similar to Bertrand Competition [59], i.e.
if the channel of its competitor is unavailable, then the primary will set its price at the v,
otherwise it will set its price at the lowest value c. Now, the probability with which the
channel of a primary is available is q. Thus, the expected payoff of a player is
(v − c− s)(1− q) + (c− c− s)q (4.5)
Now consider the following unilateral deviation for a primary: Primary 1 selects N and
sets its price at v w.p. 1. The channel of primary 1 will be bought when the channel of
primary 2 is not available for sale. Since primary 1 decides not to incur the cost s, thus,
its expected payoff is
(v − c)(1− q) (4.6)
This is strictly higher than (4.5). Hence, the strategy profile can not be an NE.
The above theorem means that there will be at least one primary which will be unaware
of its competitor’s channel state with a non-zero probability.
4.2.4 Does there exist an NE where one selects Y and the other selects
N?
Theorem 4.2. For positive s > 0, there is no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and
the other selects N w.p. 1.
First, we provide the intuition behind the result. The primary (say, 1) which selects
Y tends to select lower prices with higher probability when it knows that the channel of
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the other primary is available. Thus, in response the primary 2 (which selects N) selects
higher prices with higher probabilities in order to gain a high payoff in the event that the
channel of primary 1 is unavailable since it knows that its probability of selling is very
low in the event that the channel of primary 1 is available. The primary 1 can then gain
a higher payoff by selecting N and higher prices as it does not have to incur the cost
s. Hence, the primary 1 has an incentive to deviate from its own strategy. The detailed
proof is given below.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that primary 1 selects Y and primary 2 selects
N . First, we discuss the pricing strategies of primaries 1 and 2 and calculate the expected
payoff of primary 1, subsequently, we show that primary 1 has an incentive to deviate.
When primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is not available, then primary
1 will be able to sell its channel at the highest possible price, thus, it will select v w.p. 1
and its payoff if (v − c)− s. The above event occurs w.p. 1− q.
Now, we consider the case when the channel of primary 2 is available. While deciding
its price, primary 2 only knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. However,
while selecting its price primary 2 knows that the primary 1 will know the channel state
of primary 2 if the channel of primary 1 is available. Hence, when primary 1 knows
that the channel of primary 2 is available, then the pricing decision becomes equivalent
to the setting where primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. 1
and primary 2 knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. The NE pricing
strategy in the last setting has been studied in [45] and using Theorem 2 in [45] we have
Lemma 4.1. Primary 1 must select its price according to φ(·) (given in (4.2)) and pri-
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mary 2 must select its price according to ψ(·) (given in (4.3)).
By Lemma 4.1 when the channel of primary 2 is available for sale, then expected
payoff of primary 1 at any p˜ ≤ x < v
(x− c)(1− ψ(x))− s = (v − c)(1− q)− s. (4.7)
At x < p˜, the payoff of primary will be strictly less than the expression in (4.7). On the
other hand at v, primary 1 will get strictly a lower payoff compared to the payoff at a
price just below v since ψ(·) has a jump at v. Hence, the maximum expected payoff to
primary 1 in this case is (v − c)(1− q)− s.
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s. (4.8)
Now, we show that if primary 1 selects N , then the primary can achieve strictly higher
payoff. For x ∈ [p˜, v), the expected payoff of primary 1 at N is
(x− c)(1− qψ(x)) = (x− c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q) (4.9)
Thus, for every positive s there exists a small enough  > 0 such that at x = (v − c− ),
it will attain strictly higher payoff than (4.8). Hence, if primary 1 selects N and the price
v −  w.p. 1 then primary 1 attains a strictly higher payoff. The result follows.
4.2.5 Does there exist an NE where both primaries select N?
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that each primary selects the strategy (N,φ) (φ(·) is given in
(4.2)). The above strategy profile is the unique NE when s ≥ q(v − c)(1− q).
However, the above is not an NE when s < q(v − c)(1− q).
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We provide an intuition behind the result. When s is high, if a primary selects Y ,
then it has to incur high cost compared to the potential gain it will achieve, thus, no
primary has any incentive to deviate. When s is low, if a primary deviates and selects Y ,
then it can gain higher payoff by taking advantage of the CSI of the other primary. Thus,
the strategy profile fails to be an NE when s is low. We prove that the strategy profile is
an NE in Theorem 4.5 where we consider there is an error in estimating the competitor’s
channel state. We prove the uniqueness in Section 4.A.
Remark: The result shows that when the cost s is high, in an equilibrium both the
primaries select N . It is obvious that if s > (v − c), then a primary will never opt for Y .
The above theorem shows that even if s ≥ (v − c)q(1− q), primaries will select N .
4.2.6 Does there exist an NE when s is low?
Note from Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 that if s is low, then there is no NE strategy where
each primary selects either Y or N w.p. 1. Thus, at least one primary must randomize
between Y and N when s is low.
Now, consider the following price distributions
ψ1(x) =

0, if x < p˜1,
1
p
(1− p˜1 − c
x− c ) if p˜1 ≤ x ≤ p˜2,
1, if x > p˜2.
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and
ψ2(x) =

0, if x < p˜2
1
q(1− p)(1−
(v − c)(1− q)
x− c − qp) if p˜2 ≤ x ≤ v
1, if x > v
where p˜1 and p˜2 are
p˜1 =
(v − c)(1− q)(1− p)
1− qp + c, p˜2 =
(v − c)(1− q)
1− qp + c (4.10)
Note that both ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) are continuous. In the following, we show that a strategy
profile based on these distribution is a NE when s is small enough.
Theorem 4.4. Consider the following strategy profile: Each primary selects Y w.p. p
and N w.p. 1− p where p = q(v − c)(1− q)− s
q(v − c)(1− q)− sq . When choosing Y , the primary selects
its price according to ψ1(·) when it knows that the channel state of the other primary
is available, otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. When choosing N , the primary selects price
according to ψ2(·).
The above strategy profile is the unique NE if s < q(v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff
that a primary attains in the NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1− q).
We prove that the above straegy profile is an NE in Theorem 4.6 where we consider that
there is an estimation error. We prove the uniqueness in Section 4.A. Discussion: Note
from the above theorem that when s is low there exists an NE where both the primaries
randomize between Y and N . It is also easy to discern that as s decreases, p increases
and as s → 0, p → 1 (Fig. 4.1). Thus, when the cost of obtaining the competitor’s CSI
decreases, then the primaries will be more likely to acquire that information.
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Figure 4.1: Variation of p as a function of s
in an example setting: v = 11, c = 1, q = 0.5.
When s ≥ 2.5, p = 0. p→ 1 as s→ 0.
Figure 4.2: Variation of p as a function of q
in an example setting: v = 11, c = 1, s = 2.
When either q ≤ 0.28 or q ≥ 0.72, p = 0. p is
maximized at q∗ = 0.55, maximum value of p
is 0.35.
Note that q(1 − q) is the measure of uncertainty, if the uncertainty if higher (i.e.
q = 1/2), then the threshold is also higher. A primary never selects Y if s ≥ (v − c)/4.
By differentiating, it is easy to discern that when s < (v − c)/4, then p is maximized at
q∗ = 1−√s/(v − c) (Fig. 4.2). Since s < (v− c)/4, q∗ > 1/2. Note also that q∗ decreases
as s increases. Intuitively, when s increases, primaries tend to select Y only when the
uncertainty of the availability of channel increases.
The support set of ψ1(·) is [p˜1, p˜2] and ψ2(·) is [p˜2, v]. Thus, under Y a primary selects
lower prices when the primary knows that the channel of its competitor is available com-
pared to the setting where the primary is not aware of the channel state of its competitor.
This is because in the former case the uncertainty of the appearance of the competitor is
reduced.
Since p increases as s decreases, thus, from (4.10), p˜1 increases as s decreases. Thus,
a primary selects its price from a larger interval when s decreases. Also note that p˜2 also
increases as s decreases. Thus, the support set of ψ1(·) increases as s decreases.
Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 imply that the expected payoff of a primary is (v−c)(1−q). Note
215
Figure 4.3: Mean price paid by the secondary
that when the primaries always know each other’s channel states, the competition becomes
equivalent to the Bertrand competition [59] and the expected payoff is 6 (v − c)(1 − q)
and when the primaries are constrained to select only N , the expected payoff is again
(v− c)(1− q) [45, 21]. Hence, our result also builds the bridge between the two extremes.
Specifically, it shows that the cost s or the availability of the competitor’s CSI does not
impact the expected payoff.
4.2.7 Welfare of the Secondaries
Fig. 4.3 shows the variation of the expected price paid by the secondary. Initially, the
expected price decreases as the C-CSI acquisition cost s increases. The expected price
reaches the minimum value, and then increases with the increase in s. When s ≥ q(v −
c)(1− q) i.e. the primaries select N w.p. 1, the expected price is the same in the setting
with s = 0 i.e. when the primaries select Y w.p. 1. Fig. 4.3 shows that the expected
price paid by the secondary is minimum at a positive cost; the minimum is not attained
when s = 0 which negates the conventional wisdom. Note that the expected payoffs of
the primaries are independent of the cost s. Thus, the expected social welfare which is
the sum of the expected payoffs of the primaries and the expected utility of the secondary
6It can also be obtained from (5).
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(which is the negative of the price paid by the secondary) is in fact minimum at s = 0.
4.3 Impact of Error in the Estimation
We, now, investigate the impact of the estimation error. Towards this end, we consider
the system model specified in Section 4.1.2. Specifically, if a primary estimates the CSI
of its competitor, the estimation is accurate only with probability qs (1/2 < qs ≤ 1).
4.3.1 Goals
The impact of error in the estimation on the decision and the payoff of each primary
is not apriori clear. The conventional wisdom suggests that the error in the estimation
should decrease the payoff. However, the conventional wisdom is not definitive because of
the following. If there is an error in estimating the channel state of the competitor, then,
the primary 2 selects a higher price even when it estimates that the channel state of the
primary 1 is 1, thus, in response, the primary 1 selects a higher price without reducing the
winning probability, which may increase the payoff. It also remains to be seen whether
the expected payoff of a primary is independent of s like in the basic model. Even if the
selection of Y belongs to the class [T, p] (Recall Definition 4.4), the dependence of T and
p on the estimation error is also not apriori clear.
The pricing strategy also depends on the estimation error. For example, when the
estimation error is 0, then a primary selects a high price when the estimated channel
state of the competitor is 0 as the channel of the competitor is unavailable. However,
when there is an error in estimated channel state, the actual channel state may not be
0 even when the estimated channel state is 0. Thus, a higher price may reduce the
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probability of winning and a lower price may reduce payoff in the event of a selling. Our
goal is to characterize the pricing strategies of the primaries.
4.3.2 Main Results
We now summarize our main findings in this section here–
• We show that the NE strategy is a [T, p] strategy (Definition 4.4) with T = q(2qs−
1)(v − c)(1 − q) (Theorems 4.5, 4.6). Note that in the basic model, we have also
seen [T, p] type strategy for selecting Y . However, due to the estimation error, the
threshold is different compared to the basic model. The threshold decreases as qs
decreases i.e. primaries select N w.p. 1 for larger values of s. Intuitively, the
uncertainty regarding the channel state increases as the estimation error increases,
thus, the uncertainty of the channel state increases even when primary selects Y . A
primary is more reluctant to select Y . Hence, primary selects N w.p. 1 for smaller
values of s. We also characterize p as a function of s and show that p decreases
monotonically with s.
• The expected payoff of each primary is strictly higher than (v − c)(1 − q) when a
primary randomizes between Y and N (i.e. s < T ) and qs < 1. In the basic model,
we have shown that the expected payoff of each primary is (v−c)(1−q) irrespective
of the value of s. Thus, the error in estimation increases the payoff of each primary
which negates the conventional wisdom that expected payoff of a primary should
increase as the estimation error decreases. The payoff of each primary also increases
with the decrease in s when qs < 1. Hence, in contrast to the basic model, the
218
expected payoff of each primary depends on the value of s.
• In NE pricing strategy:
– When a primary selects Y and estimates that the channel state of its competitor
is 1, then it selects its price from the interval [p˜1, LN ].
– When a primary selects N , then it selects its price from the interval [LN , L0].
– When a primary selects Y and estimates that the channel state of its competitor
is 0, then it selects its price from the interval [L0, v].
If qs = 1, a primary always selects v w.p. 1 when the primary selects Y and the
channel state of the competitor is 0 since the primary will always be able to sell
its channel because of the unavailability of its competitor. However, when qs < 1,
there is a potential error in the estimation, thus, a primary randomizes among
prices from an interval [L0, v] even when the primary estimates that the channel
state of its competitor is 0. Also note that when a primary estimates that the
channel state of its competitor is 1 (0,resp.), then its competitor is more likely to be
available (unavailable, resp.), hence, the primary selects lower (higher, resp.) prices
compared to the setting where a primary selects N .
4.3.3 High s
First, we state some results which we use throughout this section. Note that when a
primary decides to estimate the CSI of its competitor, it estimates the channel state of
its competitor is 1 w.p. qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) and the primary estimates the channel state
of its competitor is 0 w.p. (1− q)qs + q(1− qs). Note that when qs = 1, then the above
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probabilities becomes q and 1−q respectively. If a primary estimates that its competitor’s
channel state is 1, then the actual channel state is 1 w.p.
qsq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) . (4.11)
Similarly, if a primary estimates that its competitor’s channel state is 0, then the actual
channel state of its competitor is 1 w.p.
q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) . (4.12)
Note that when qs = 1, then both the above probabilities become 1.
Our main result in this section shows that
Theorem 4.5. There exists a NE where each primary selects N w.p. 1 if s ≥ (v− c)(1−
q)(2qqs − q). In the NE pricing strategy, each primary selects its price according to φ(·)
(described in (4.2)). The expected payoff of each primary is (v − c)(1− q).
Proof. We show that a primary does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when
the other primary follows the strategy prescribed in the theorem. Towards this end, we,
first, show that under N the maximum expected payoff of a primary is (v−c)(1−q) (Step
i). It is attained when the primary follows the strategy φ(·) (Step ii). Subsequently, we
show that if the primary selects Y , then its expected payoff is at most (v−c)(1−q) which
will show that the primary does not have any profitable unilateral deviation (Step iii).
Step i: At any price x ∈ [p˜, v] the expected payoff of a primary is
(x− c)(1− qφ(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) (from (4.2)) (4.13)
A price strictly less than p˜ will fetch a payoff strictly less than (v − c)(1− q) (by (4.4)).
Thus, the maximum expected payoff of a primary under N is (v − c)(1− q).
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Step ii: Note from (4.13) that a primary attains the maximum expected payoff when
it selects its price from the interval [p˜, v].
Step ii: Now, we show that if primary 1 selects Y , it can not get a strictly higher
payoff when s ≥ (v− c)(1− q)(2qqs− q). Towards this end, we show that when a primary
selects Y and estimates that the channel state of the other primary is 1, then it will attain
a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q)− s (Step ii.a). Subsequently, we show that
if the primary selects estimates that the channel state of the competitor is 0, then it will
attain a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q) qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s (Step ii.b.).
Finally, we show that the expected payoff of the primary is at most (v − c)(1 − q) when
it selects Y (Step ii.c.).
Step ii.a: Suppose that the primary 1 selects Y and estimates that the channel state
of primary 2 is 1. Using (4.11) the expected payoff of primary 1 at any price x ∈ [p˜, v] is
(x− c)(1− qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)φ(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)(1−
p˜− c
x− c))− s
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜− c)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s (4.14)
Note that p˜− c = (v− c)(1− q). Since qs > qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) when qs > 1/2, thus, the
above is maximized at p˜, hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain
when it estimates the channel state of its competitor is 1 is
(v − c)(1− q)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (v − c)(1− q)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s
= (v − c)(1− q)− s (4.15)
Step ii.b: Now, suppose that the primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary
221
2 is 0. Using (4.12) the expected payoff of primary 1 at any price x ∈ [p˜, v] in this case is
(x− c)(1− (1− qs)q
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)φ(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)(1−
p˜− c
x− c))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)) + (p˜− c)
1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s (4.16)
The above is maximized at x = v. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that a primary
can attain is
(v − c) (1− q)(2qs − 1)
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) + (v − c)(1− q)
1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s
= (v − c)(1− q) qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s (4.17)
Step ii.c: Note that a primary estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0 w.p.
(1 − qs)q + qs(1 − q) and the channel state of primary 2 is 1 w.p. qqs + (1 − q)(1 − qs).
The primary also incurs the cost of s when it selects Y . Hence, from (4.15) and (4.17)
the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain by selecting Y is
(v − c)(1− q)qs + (v − c)(1− q)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))− s
= (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q + 1)− s (4.18)
However, since s ≥ (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q), thus the maximum expected payoff that a
primary can attain by selecting Y is (v − c)(1− q). Hence, a primary does not have any
profitable unilateral deviation.
Note that the threshold (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q) increases as qs increases. Intuitively,
as qs increases, the uncertainty regarding the channel state of the competitors reduces,
thus, a primary tends to select N for a smaller range of the values of s.
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The expected payoff of each primary is identical and equal to (v − c)(1 − q). Since
both the players select N , thus, the expected payoff does not depend on s in this case.
4.3.4 Low s
Now, we show that there exists a NE where each primary randomizes between Y and
N when s < (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q). Towards this end, we introduce some distribution
functions parameterized by p. The significance of p is shown later.
ψY,1(x) =0, x < p˜1
α1,p(1− p˜1 − c
x− c ), p˜1 ≤ x ≤ LN
1, x > LN (4.19)
ψN (x) =0, x < LN
αN,p(1− p˜2 − c
x− c − βN,p) LN ≤ x ≤ L0
1, x > L0 (4.20)
and, when qs < 1, then
ψY,0(x) =0, x < L0
α0,p(1− p˜3 − c
x− c − β0,p) L0 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (4.21)
if qs = 1, then
ψY,0(x) = H(x− v) (4.22)
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where H(·) is the heaviside step function or unit step function and
p˜3 − c = (v − c)(1− q)qs
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) , p˜2 − c =
(v − c)(1− q)qs(1− (1− p)q − pqqs)
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
L0 − c = (p˜2 − c)/(1− (1− p)q − pqqs), LN − c = (p˜2 − c)/(1− pqqs)
p˜1 − c = (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qqs + (1− qs)(1− q) . (4.23)
and
α1,p =
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
pqq2s
, αN,p =
1
(1− p)q , βN,p = pqqs
α0,p =
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)
pq(1− qs)2 , β0,p =
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) . (4.24)
It is easy to discern that all the above distribution functions are continuous when qs < 1.
When qs = 1, then only ψY,0(·) is discontinuous which has a jump of 1 at v. Also note
that the structures of ψY,1(·), ψN (·) and ψY,0(·) are similar (i.e. variation with x is the
same). However, their support sets, the scaling parameters (i.e. α1,p, αN,p, α0,p), and the
constants (i.e β0,p , βN,p ) are different.
When qs = 1, the values of the parameters in (4.23) are greatly simplified which are
given by–
p˜3 − c = v − c, p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q), L0 − c = v − c
LN − c = p˜2 − c
1− pq , p˜1 − c = (LN − c)(1− p) (4.25)
Thus, L0 − c and p˜3 − c are the highest when qs = 1. Intuitively, when qs = 1, a
primary knows that the channel state of its competitor is unavailable w.p. 1 if the primary
estimates that the channel state of the competitor is 0. Thus, the primary selects v w.p.
1.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
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Theorem 4.6. Consider the following strategy profile: Each primary selects Y w.p. p
and N w.p. 1− p where p satisfies the following equality
p˜2 − c = (p˜1 − c)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜3 − c)(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s (4.26)
where p˜1, p˜2 and p˜3 are given in (4.23). While selecting Y , each primary selects its price
from ψY,1(·) (given in (4.19)) if the estimated channel state of the other primary is 1 and
each primary selects its price from ψY,0(·) (given in (4.21)) if the estimated channel state
of the other primary is 0. While selecting N , each primary selects its price using ψN (·)
(given in (4.20)).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s < (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q). The above
strategy profile is unique in the class of symmetric NE strategies. The expected payoff that
each primary gets is p˜2 − c.
Discussion: Note that when qs = 1, we know from Theorem 4.4 that the strategy
profile is unique one among all strategy profiles not only symmetric ones. There is no
equilibrium where both the players select Y w.p. 1 even when qs < 1 (we have already
shown the above for qs = 1 in Theorem 4.1).
Now, we show that there exists a unique solution of (4.26) in p in the interval 0 < p < 1
when 0 < s < q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1).
Observation 4.1. There exists a unique solution in p ∈ (0, 1) of the equation (4.26) when
0 < s < (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q). As s decreases p increases.
Proof. First noe that (4.26) can be written as
p˜2 − c− (p˜1 − c)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) = (p˜3 − c)(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s.mber
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Using (4.23) we can rewrite the above as
(v − c)(1− q)qs 1− (1− p)q − pqqs
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
(
1− (qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs))
(1− pqqs)
)
= (v − c)(1− q)qs − s (4.27)
First, we show that the left hand of (4.27) is strictly increasing in p (Step i). Next, we
show that when p = 0, the left hand side of (4.27) is less than the right hand side and
when p = 1, the left hand side of (4.27) is greater than the right hand side (Step ii).
Since the left hand side of (4.27) is continuous in p and strictly increasing in p, there
exists a unique solution p ∈ (0, 1) of (4.27). The last part easily follows as the right hand
side of (4.27) decreases with s, the left hand side of (4.27) is strictly increasing in p and
independent of s. Now, we show steps i and ii.
Step i: By differentiating the left hand side of (4.27) we can show that
1− qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
1− pqqs (4.28)
is strictly increasing in p when qs > 1/2. On the other hand, it is easy to discern that
(v − c)(1 − q)qs 1− (1− p)q − pqqs
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q) is non-decreasing in p when qs > 1/2. Thus, the
left hand side of (4.27) is strictly increasing in p.
Step ii: When p = 0, then the value of left hand side of the equation (4.27) is
(v − c)(1− q)(1− qqs − (1− q)(1− qs)) = (v − c)(1− q)(qs + q − 2qqs) (4.29)
Now, (v − c)(1 − q)qs − (v − c)(1 − q)(qs + q − 2qqs) = (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q). Since
s < (1− q)(v − c)(2qqs − q), thus, the left hand side of (4.27) is less than the right hand
side.
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Now when p = 1, then the left hand side of (4.27) is
(v − c)(1− q)qs[ 1− qqs
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs −
qqs(1− qs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ]
= (v − c)(1− q)qs[ qq
2
s + q + qs − 3qqs
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ]
= (v − c)(1− q)qs[q(1− qs)
2 + qs(1− q)
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ] = (v − c)(1− q)qs (4.30)
Since s > 0, thus, the left hand side of (4.27) is greater than the right hand side.
Since the left hand side of (4.27) is continuous function of p, thus, by intermediate
value theorem there exists a solution in the interval (0, 1).
Next, we show that the expected payoff of a primary is a strictly greater than (v −
c)(1− q) when qs < 1 and the payoff increases with the decrease in s.
Lemma 4.2. When qs < 1, p˜2 − c increases with the decrease in s and p˜2 − c is strictly
greater than (v − c)(1− q) when s < (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q).
Proof. Now, it is easy to discern that p˜2 − c is strictly increasing in p when qs < 1. Now,
p increases with the decrease in s (by Observation 4.1) when s < (v− c)(1− q)(2qqs− q).
Hence, p˜2 − c is a strictly decreasing function in s when qs < 1.
When p = 0, then p˜2− c = (v− c)(1− q) (by (4.23)). Since p˜2− c is strictly increasing
in p when qs < 1 and s < q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1), hence p˜2 − c > (v − c)(1− q).
Note from Theorem 4.6 that the expected payoff attained by a primary under the
NE is p˜2 − c. From (4.25) note that p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1 − q) when qs = 1. Thus, the
above lemma entails that the expected payoff of each primary increases when there is an
error in estimating the channel state of the competitor. This contradicts the conventional
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wisdom that the payoff should increase with the decrease in error in the estimation. In
Section 4.3.2 we have already explained the apparent reason behind this result.
The above lemma entails that the expected payoff increases as s decreases when qs < 1.
Note that when qs = 1, the expected payoffs of primaries are independent of s which we
have already seen in the basic model (Section 4.2).
Note that when qs = 1, then ψY,0(·) has a jump of size 1 i.e. a primary will select v
w.p. 1 as the primary will always be able to sell its channel. However, when qs < 1, then
a primary selects its price using a continuous distribution from the interval [L0, v] where
L0 < v. We have already explained the reason behind this in Section 4.3.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.6
Before digging into the details of proof, we state few more results which we use throughout.
Note from (4.23) that
(p˜3 − c)(qs(1− q) + q(1− qs))/[qs(1− q) + pq(1− qs)2] = L0 − c (4.31)
Since qs > 1/2, thus, by cross multiplication, it is easy to see that
qs((1− qs)q + (1− q)qs)
(1− qs)(qqs + (1− qs)(1− q)) > 1 (4.32)
We show that primary 1 can not gain higher profit by deviating from the strategy
prescribed in Theorem 4.6 when primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 4.6.
This will complete the proof. Toward this end, we first show that when primary 1 selects
Y and it estimates that the channel state of its competitor is 1, then it will attain a
maximum expected payoff of p˜1 − c− s. The maximum expected payoff is attained when
it follows the strategy ψY,1(·) (Step i). Subsequently, we show that under Y , when the
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primary estimates the channel state as 0, then the maximum expected payoff that primary
1 can attain is p˜3 − c− s and it is attained when the primary follows the strategy ψY,0(·)
(Step ii). Subsequently, we show that the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can
attain under Y is p˜2 − c and it is attained when primary 1 follows the strategy (Step iii).
Subsequently, we show that when primary 1 selects N , then its maximum expected payoff
is p˜2− c and it is attained when the primary follows the strategy ψN (·) (Step iv). Finally,
we show that the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 is p˜2 − c and it is attained if
primary 1 follows the strategy profile (Step v).
Step i: Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and estimates that the channel state of
primary 2 is 1. We show that the maximum expected payoff attained by the primary 1
is p˜1 − c− s and this is attained only when the primary selects its price from the interval
[p˜1, LN ]. Toward this end, we first show any price in the interval [p˜1, LN ] will fetch an
expected payoff of p˜1 − c− s (Step i.a.). Subsequently, we show that if primary 1 selects
a price from the interval [LN , L0] and [L0, v] it will fetch an expected payoff of less than
p˜1 − c− s in Step i.b. and Step i.c. respectively. Note that at any price less than p˜1 will
fetch a strictly lower payoff compared to the price at p˜1 as primary 2 does not select any
price lower than or equal to p˜1. Thus, this will complete step i.
Step i.a: Here, we are considering the scenario where primary 1 estimates that the
channel state of primary 2 is 1. Under Y , when the primary 1 estimates that the channel
state of primary 2 is 1, then the probability that the channel state of primary 2 is 1 is
qsq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) (4.33)
Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. When the channel state
229
of primary 2 is 1 it will select a price less than or equal to x only if it selects Y , it estimates
the channel state of primary 1 as 1 and selects a price less than or equal to x.The primary
2 selects Y w.p. p. Now, when the channel of primary 1 is available, then primary 2
estimates the channel state of primary 1 as 1 w.p. qs and selects a price less than or equal
to x w.p. ψY,1(x). The channel state of primary 2 is 1 with probability given in (4.33).
Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 when its channel is available and selects a price
x in the interval [p˜1, LN ] is
(x− c)(1− pqsqqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψY,1(x))− s = p˜1 − c− s from (4.19). (4.34)
Step i.b.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [LN , L0]. Note that if the
channel of primary 2 is available, it will select a price less than or equal to x if if one of
the following occurs–i) primary 2 selects Y and estimates the channel state of primary 1
is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with
probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1− p)ψN (x). Since primary 1 estimates
that the channel state of primary 2 is 1, thus, the probability that the true state of the
channel of primary 2 is indeed 1 is given by (4.33). Thus, the probability that the primary
2 will select a price less than or equal to x is
pq2sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) +
(1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψN (x)
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Thus, at x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is–
(x− c)(1− pq
2
sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) −
(1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψN (x))− s
= (x− c)(1− pq
2
sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) −
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)(1−
p˜2 − c
x− c − pqqs))
− s from (4.20)
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜2 − c)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s (4.35)
Since qs > 1/2, the co-efficient is negative. Thus, the above is maximized at x = LN .
Using (4.23) , the above expression is thus, upper bounded by
(LN − c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (LN − c)
qs(1− pqqs)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s
= (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s = p˜1 − c− s from (4.23) (4.36)
Step i.c: From steps i.a. and i.b. we have already shown that when the maximum
expected payoff of primary 1 is p˜1− c− s at a price in the interval [p˜1, L0]. When qs = 1,
L0 = v (from (4.25)). Thus, it shows that when qs = 1, the maximum expected payoff of
primary 1 is indeed p˜1 − c− s.
Now, we consider the case where qs < 1 and primary 1 selects price x ∈ [L0, v]. When
the channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal
to x if one of the following occurs–i) it selects Y and estimates that the channel state
of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N , iii) primary 2 selects Y , estimates that the
channel state of primary 1 is 0 and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with
probability pqs since the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with probability
1 − p. (iii) occurs with probability p(1 − qs)ψY,0(x) (since the channel of primary 1 is
available). On the other hand the probability that the channel of primary 2 is available
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is given by (4.33). Hence, the probability that primary 2 selects a price less than or equal
to x is
pqq2s + (1− p)qqs + pqqs(1− qs)ψY,0(x)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
Thus, at any price x ∈ [L0, v], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pqq
2
s + (1− p)qqs + pqqs(1− qs)ψY,0(x)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) )− s
= (x− c)(1− pqq
2
s + (1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))− s
− (x− c) qs[(1− q)qs + (1− qs)q]
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)] (1−
p˜3 − c
x− c −
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + (1− qs)q )
from (4.21)
= (x− c)(1− [q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)]qs
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)] )
+ (p˜3 − c) [q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)]qs
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)] − s (4.37)
By (4.32) the co-efficient of (x−c) is negative, thus, the maximum of the above expression
is attained at x = L0. Thus, the expected payoff at x is upper bounded by expected payoff
at L0. From (4.36) (which also gives the expected payoff at L0) we have already bounded
the expected payoff at L0 which is p˜1 − c− s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that
primary 1 can attain in this case is p˜1− c−s and it is attained at any price in the interval
[p˜1, LN ].
Step ii: Suppose that primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0.
When qs = 1, then the channel of primary 2 is unavailable with probability 1. Hence,
primary 1 will attain the highest possible payoff at v and the payoff is (v−c)−s = p˜3−c−s
(by (4.25)). Thus, we consider the case when qs < 1. We show that the maximum expected
payoff attained by primary 1 is p˜3 − c − s and it is attained at any price in the interval
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[L0, v]. Towards this end, we first show that any price from the interval [L0, v] will fetch
an expected payoff of p˜3 − c− s (Step ii.a.). Subsequently, we show that any price in the
interval [LN , L0] and [p˜1, LN ] will fetch an expected payoff of at most p˜3 − c − s (Steps
ii.b. and ii.c. resp.). Any price less than p˜1 will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than
the payoff at p˜1, thus, this will complete Step ii.
Step ii.a: When primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0, then the
probability that the channel state of primary 2 is 1 is
q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) (4.38)
Suppose that primary 1 selects a price in the interval x ∈ [L0, v]. If the channel of primary
2 is available, then, the primary 2 will select a price less than or equal to x if one of the
following occurs–i) it selects Y and estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii)
primary 2 selects N , iii) primary 2 selects Y , estimates that the channel state of primary
1 is 0 and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs since
the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with probability 1 − p. (iii) occurs
with probability p(1 − qs)ψY,0(x) (since the channel of primary 1 is available). On the
other hand the probability that the channel of primary 2 is available is given by (4.38) as
primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0. Hence, the probability that
primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x is
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs) + pq(1− qs)2ψY,0(x)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) .
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Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) −
pq(1− qs)2
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)ψY,0(x))− s
= p˜3 − c− s from (4.21) (4.39)
Step ii.b.: Now, suppose primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [LN , L0]. When the
channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x
if one of the following occurs–i) primary 2 selects Y and estimates the channel state of
primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i)
occurs with probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1− p)ψN (x). Given that the
primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0, the probability that channel
of primary 1 is available is given by (4.38). Thus, the probability that primary 2 selects
a price less than or equal to x is given by
(pqs + (1− p)ψN (x))q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) (4.40)
Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) −
(1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)ψN (x))− s
= (x− c)(1− pqqs(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))
− (x− c) 1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)(1−
p˜2 − c
x− c − pqqs)− s from (4.20)
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) + (p˜2 − c)
1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s (4.41)
By (4.32) the above is maximized at x = L0. Hence, the maximum possible expected
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payoff is
(L0 − c)(1− 1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) + (L0 − c)
(1− qs)(1− (1− p)q − pqqs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s
= (L0 − c)(1− [(1− p)q + pqqs](1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) )− s
= (L0 − c)pq(1− qs)
2 + qs(1− q)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s = p˜3 − c− s from (4.23) (4.42)
Step ii.c.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. Now, if
the channel of primary 2 is available, then it selects a price less than or equal to x if it
selects Y , estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 1 and selects a price less than
or equal to x. The above occurs with probability pqsψY,1(x). The probability that the
channel state of primary 2 is 1 given that the primary 1 estimates that the channel state
of primary 2 is 0 is given by (4.38). Hence at x the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qsψY,1(x)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s
= (x− c)(1− (1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)]
qs[q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)] (1−
p˜1 − c
x− c ))− s from (4.19)
= (x− c)(1− (1− qs)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))
qs((1− qs)q + qs(1− q)) )
+ (p˜1 − c)(1− qs)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))
qs(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) − s
By (4.32) the above is maximized at x = LN . Thus, the expected payoff at any x ∈
[p˜1, LN ] is upper bounded by the expected payoff at LN . Now, from (4.42) (which also
gives the expected payoff at LN ) we have already shown that the expected payoff at LN is
upper bounded by p˜3 − c− s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary
1 in this case is p˜3 − c− s and it is attained at price in the interval [L0, v].
Step iii: In Step (i), we have shown that under Y if primary 1 estimates that the
channel state of primary 2 is 1, then the maximum expected payoff is p˜1 − c− s. In Step
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(ii), we have shown that if primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0,
then the maximum expected payoff is p˜3 − c − s. Primary 1 estimates that the channel
state of primary 2 is 1 w.p. qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) and the channel state of primary 2 is 0
w.p. (1− q)qs + q(1− qs). Thus, under Y , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1
can attain is
(p˜1 − c− s)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜3 − c− s)((1− q)qs + q(1− qs))
= p˜2 − c from (4.26). (4.43)
We have already shown that the payoff is achieved when primary 1 follows the strategy
prescribed in the theorem.
Step iv: Now, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary
1 can attain is p˜2 − c and it is attained at every price in the interval [LN , L0]. Toward
this end, we first show that if primary 1 selects a price from the interval [LN , L0] it will
fetch an expected payoff of p˜2 − c (Step iv.a). Subsequently, we show that if the primary
selects any price from the interval [L0, v] or [p˜1, LN ] it can only get an expected payoff of
at most p˜2 − c (Step iv.b. and Step iv.c. resp.).
Step iv.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [LN , L0]. When the channel
of primary 2 is available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x if one of
the following occurs–i) primary 2 selects Y and estimates the channel state of primary
1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs
with probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1 − p)ψN (x). Now, when primary
1 selects N it only knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q. Thus, the
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expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)qψN (x)) = p˜2 − c from (4.20). (4.44)
Step iv.b: Note that when qs = 1, then L0 = v. Thus, we consider the case when
qs < 1. Suppose primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [L0, v]. If the channel of
primary 2 is available, then, the primary 2 will select a price less than or equal to x if
one of the following occurs–i) it selects Y and estimates that the channel state of primary
1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N , iii) primary 2 selects Y , estimates that the channel state
of primary 1 is 0 and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability
pqs since the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with probability 1 − p. (iii)
occurs with probability p(1−qs)ψY,0x) (since the channel of primary 1 is available). When
primary 1 selects N , it only knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p q. Thus,
the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)q − pq(1− qs)ψY,0(x))
= (x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)q)
− (x− c)(1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs (1−
p˜3 − c
x− c −
pqqs(1− qs) + (1− p)q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) )
= (x− c)(1− (1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs ) + (p˜3 − c)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs
Since qs > 1/2, the above is maximized at x = L0. Thus, using (4.31), the above
expression is upper bounded by
(L0 − c)(1− (1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs ) + (L0 − c)
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
1− qs
= (L0 − c)(1− q(1− qs)(1− p(1− qs))
1− qs ) = (L0 − c)(1− (1− p)q − pqqs) = p˜2 − c.
(4.45)
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where the last equality follows from (4.23).
Step iv.c: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. Now,
if the channel of primary 2 is available, then it selects a price less than or equal to x if it
selects Y , estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 1 and selects a price less than
or equal to x. The above occurs with probability pqsψY,1(x). The channel of primary 2
is available w.p. q. Thus, at any price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ] the expected payoff of
primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pqqsψY,1(x))
= (x− c)(1− qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
) + (p˜1 − c)qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
cf (4.19).
Since qs > 1/2, the above is maximized at x = LN . Thus, using (4.23), the maximum
expected payoff is
(LN − c)(1− qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
) + (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
= (LN − c)(1− qqspqs
qs
) = p˜2 − c. (4.46)
Again the last equality follows from (4.23).
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 under N is p˜2 − c. This
is attained at any price in the interval [LN , L0] which we have shown in Step iv.a.
Step v: Thus, either under Y or under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary
1 can attain is p˜2 − c. Hence, any randomization between Y and N will also yield an
expected payoff of p˜2− c. Primary 1 can attain the payoff of p˜2− c following the strategy
profile. Hence, primary 1 does not have any unilateral profitable deviation. Hence, the
result follows.
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Figure 4.4: Variation of p
with qs for an example setting:
v = 50, c = 0, s = 4, q = 0.5.
p is 0 for qs ≤ 0.67, as s
is above the threshold q(v −
c)(1 − q)(2qs − 1) for this re-
gion.
Figure 4.5: Variation of the
expected payoff of a primary
with qs in the same example
setting considered in Fig. 4.4.
Figure 4.6: Variation of the
expected payoff of a primary
with s in an example setting:
v = 50, q = 0.5, c = 0, qs =
3/4.
4.3.5 Numerical Results
Fig. 4.4 shows that the probability p with which a primary selects Y increases as qs
increases. Intuitively, when qs increases, the uncertainty of the channel state of the
competitor decreases when a primary selects Y , thus, the primary selects Y with a higher
probability. Additionally, Fig. 4.4 shows that the increment of p is sub-linear with qs.
Fig. 4.5 shows the variation of the expected payoff of a primary with qs. When
0.5 < qs ≤ 0.67, a primary selects N w.p. 1, hence, the expected payoff is (v − c)(1− q)
for qs ≤ 0.67. The expected payoff increases as qs increases when 0.67 < qs ≤ 0.83.
After that the payoff decreases and ultimately the expected payoff again becomes equal
to (v − c)(1 − q) when qs = 1. Thus, the payoff of a primary is higher when there is an
error in estimation of the channel state compared to the setting where there is no error
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Figure 4.7: Variation of p with s in the same
example setting as considered in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.8: Variation of the variance of the
price selected by a primary for an example
setting:v = 51, c = 1, q = 0.5
in estimation which negates the conventional wisdom that the payoff should increases
with the decreases in the error in the estimation. We have already provided the potential
reasons behind this behavior in the section 4.3.2.
Fig. 4.6 shows the variation of the expected payoff of a primary with s. Note from
Lemma 4.2 that the expected payoff of a primary increases as s decreases when a primary
selects Y with a positive probability. Fig. 4.6 verifies the above result. Specifically, as s
increases, the expected payoff decreases when s < 6.5. Additionally, the expected payoff
decreases sub-linearly. When s ≥ 6.5, a primary only selects N and attains an expected
payoff of (v − c)(1− q), thus, the payoff becomes independent of s in this regime.
Fig. 4.7 shows that p, the probability with which a primary selects Y increases as s
decreases. When s ≥ q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1) = 6.25, then the primary selects N w.p. 1
i.e. p = 0. Additionally, Fig. 4.7 shows that p decreases sub-linearly as s increases.
Fig. 4.8 shows the variation of the variance of the price selected by a primary with s
and qs. Note that the variance decreases as s decreases. Thus, when a primary selects N
with a higher probability, the price volatility is lower. When s ≥ q(v− c)(1− q)(2qs− 1),
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Figure 4.9: Variation of upper and lower end-
points of the support sets of ψY,1 (L1 (= p˜1)
and LN , resp.), ψN (LN , and L0 resp.) and
ψY,0 (L0 and v) with s in the same example
setting considered in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.10: Variation of upper and lower end-
points of the support sets of ψY,1 (L1 and LN ,
resp.), ψN (LN , and L0 resp.) and ψY,0 (L0 and
v) with qs in the same example setting consid-
ered in Fig. 4.4.
each primary selects N w.p. 1, thus, the variance becomes independent of s. This is
because φ(·), the price selection strategy from which a primary selects its price when
s ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q)(2qs − 1), is independent of s. Note that Fig. 4.8 also shows that the
variance also decreases as qs decreases. Intuitively, as qs decreases, a primary selects N
with a higher probability, thus, the variance decreases. Note that buyers in general do
not like a market where the prices have higher variances. Thus, when s is low or qs is
high, a buyer may not like the setting.
Fig. 4.9 shows the variations of the end-points of the support sets of the price distri-
butions. Note that when s = 0, LN = L0 as primaries select N with 0 probability. As s
increases, LN and L0 increase as primaries select N with positive probability; primaries
select prices from a larger interval when it selects N as s increases. Note that the lower
end-point of ψY,1(·), p˜1 (L1 in the figure) also increases as s increases. Thus, the price
interval from which a primary selects its price Y decreases as s increases. Intuitively, as
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s increases, a primary selects Y with a lower probability, thus the support also decreases.
When s ≥ 6.25, the primary only selects N , thus, p˜1 = LN and L0 = v.
Fig. 4.10 shows the variation of the end-points of the support sets of the price distri-
butions. When qs ≤ 0.67, primaries only select N . Thus, p˜1 = LN and L0 = v. When
qs > 0.67, primaries select Y with positive probabilities. p˜1 decreases as qs increases.
Thus, a primary selects a lower price when it selects Y and estimates that the channel
state of the competitor is 1. Intuitively, as qs increases, the uncertainty reduces, thus,
the competitor’s channel is more likely to be available when a primary estimates that the
channel state of the primary is 1. Hence, the primary selects a lower price. Since primary
selects Y when qs > 0.67, L0 decreases initially. However, L0 increases when qs becomes
very high. Note that when qs is very high, then a primary is aware that the channel of
the competitor is more likely to be unavailable, hence it selects a high price. Thus, L0 is
close to v when qs is very high. Note also that LN increases with qs. Intuitively, when qs
increases, a primary selects N with a lower probability, thus, a primary selects its price
from a shorter interval when it selects N .
4.3.6 Price volatilities and payoffs in two settings
Note that in Chapter 2 we consider the setting where a primary can not acquire the CSI
of the competitor. In this chapter, we consider the setting where a primary can acquire
the CSI of the competitor by incurring a cost.
Note that when qs = 1, the expected payoff of the primary is the same in both the
settings. Thus, the primaries do not have any strict preference of one setting over another.
However, Fig. 4.8 shows that the variance of the price increases when a primary acquires
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the CSI of the competitor. Thus, the regulator (e.g. FCC) and the secondary may prefer
the setting where the primary does not acquire the CSI of the competitor.
Above remark also shows that the current auction framework in the TV white space
trading (where the spectrum brokers gather the information of the unused spectrum)
may have high price volatility. In such a trading, if the demand is low the price will
be c, otherwise it will be v, (similar to the Bertrand model). Thus, the price will have
higher volatility compared to the setting where the primary does not acquire the CSI of
the competitor7. It shows one additional disadvantage of using Auction mechanism or
the spectrum brokers in the real time secondary spectrum market.
When qs < 1, the price volatility decreases but still the price volatility is higher
compared to setting where the primary does not acquire the competitor’s CSI. However,
in this case the expected payoff of the primary is higher.
4.4 Unequal Costs
We, now, investigate the generalization of the basic model where each different primaries
incur different costs to acquire the CSI of their respective competitors depicted in Sec-
tion 4.1.2. Primary i incurs the cost si to acquire the CSI of its competitor. Without loss
of generality we assume that s1 < s2.
7Though, in this chapter we have only considered the setting where n = 1, similar remark can also be
made when n > 1. In Chapter 2 we have seen that the price volatility decreases as n increases as primaries
select prices using pure strategies (Fig. 2.4).
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4.4.1 Goals
The impact of different acquisition costs on the payoff of each primary and the frequency
with which each primary selects Y is not apriori clear. For example, primary 1 which has
a lower acquisition cost of CSI, can gain more compared to primary 2 by acquiring the CSI
of primary 2 by paying a lower cost. However, primary 2 also acquires the CSI of primary
1 and selects a lower price when the channel of primary 1 is available, thus, primary 1
also selects a lower price in response, which in turn reduces the payoff of primary 1. The
pricing decision of each primary also depends on the frequencies with which each primary
selects Y . We resolve all these quandaries.
4.4.2 Results
We summarize our main findings here–
• The NE strategy is of the form [T, pi] for primary i with T = q(v − c)(1 − q).
Note that T is the same as the basic model, however, since different primaries have
different acquisition costs, pis are different. For example, when s1 < T ≤ s2, then
primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1, but primary 2 does not select Y . Even when s2 < T ,
then primary 2 selects p2 where p1 > p2 as s1 < s2.
• The difference in the acquisition costs lead to different payoffs for the primaries.
In contrast to the basic model, primary 1 attains a higher payoff compared to the
expected payoff of primary 2 when primary 1 selects Y with a positive probability
(i.e. s < T ) (Theorems 4.8, 4.9). The expected payoff of primary 1 becomes close
to the payoff of the primary 2 as the difference between s1 and s2 decreases. The
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expected payoff of primary 2 is in fact independent of s2. The expected payoff of
the primaries are the same when s1 ≥ T , as both of them only select N .
• Primary i selects its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v], resp.) , when the primary
selects Y (N , resp.) and the channel of the competitor is available. However,
there are also some differences in the pricing structure compared to the basic model
because of different acquisition costs. Primary 2 selects v with a positive probability
when it selects N when s1 < q(v − c)(1 − q) and the probability decreases as the
difference between s1 and s2 decreases (Theorems 4.9). Thus, the primary 2 has
a discontinuity at v in contrast to the basic model where primaries select prices
from continuous distribution. Additionally, we show that p˜1 > p˜2. Thus, primary
2 selects lower prices when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
On the other hand, when primary 2 selects N , its selects higher prices with higher
probabilities.
4.4.3 High s1, s2
Our first result in this section shows that
Theorem 4.7. When s1 ≥ q(v−c)(1−q), then in the unique NE, both the primaries select
N w.p. 1 and select their prices according to φ(·) (given in (4.2)). Both the primaries
attain an expected payoff of q(v − c)(1− q).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, thus, we omit it here.
Note that since s2 > s1, s2 > q(v − c)(1 − q). Thus, the above theorem shows that
the expected payoff of primaries are identical when sis are sufficiently high as both the
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primaries select N .
4.4.4 Low s1, high s2
Now, we consider the setting where s1 < q(v − c)(1 − q), but s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q). We
show that there exists a NE where primary 1 randomizes between Y and N , and primary
2 selects N .
We first introduce some pricing distributions which we use throughout this section–
ψ1,Y (x) =0, if x < p˜
1
qp1
(1− p˜− c
x− c), if p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1
1, if x > p˜1 (4.47)
ψ1,N (x) =0, if x < p˜1
1
q(1− p1)(1−
p˜− c
x− c − qp1)if p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, if x > v (4.48)
ψ2(x) =0, if x < p˜
(1− p˜− c
x− c), if p˜ ≤ x < p˜1
1
q
(1− p˜N − c
x− c ), if p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, if x ≥ v. (4.49)
where
p˜N = (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + c
p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c. p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)
1− qp1 . (4.50)
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and
p1 =
1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 ) (4.51)
Note from (4.50) and (4.51) that
p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
(v − c)(1− q)2 =
(v − c)(1− q)− s1
1− q (4.52)
ψ2(·) clearly has a jump at v as s1 < q(v − c)(1 − q). From the expression of ψ2(·) one
may think that ψ2(·) has a jump at p˜1. We first rule out the above possibility.
Observation 4.2. ψ2(·) does not have any jump except at v.
Proof. First, note that since s1 < q(v − c)(1− q), thus, ψ2(·) has a jump at v.
Next, we show that ψ2(·) does not have any jump at p˜1. The continuity of ψ2(·) at
any other point can easily be observed.
Note from (4.52) the left hand limit is
1− (v − c)(1− q)
p˜1 − c = 1−
(v − c)(1− q)2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (4.53)
Again from (4.52), the right hand limit and the value of ψ2(·) at p˜1 is
1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
p˜1 − c
=
1
q
(1− (1− q)[(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
(v − c)(1− q)− s1
= 1− (v − c)(1− q)
2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (4.54)
Hence, ψ2(·) does not have any jump at p˜1. Hence, the result follows.
The continuity of ψ1,Y (·) and ψ1,N (·) can be easily concluded. Note that the variations
of ψ1,Y (·), ψ1,N (·) and ψ2(·) are similar they differ only in the support and the scaling
parameters.
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Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.8. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1 and
N w.p. 1−p1 (p1 is given in (4.51)) and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y , if
the channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 1 selects its price according to ψ1,Y (·),
otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. While selecting N , primary 1 selects its price according to
ψ1,N (·). Primary 2 selects its price according to ψ2(·).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s2 ≥ q(v− c)(1− q) and s1 < q(v− c)(1− q).
The expected payoff that primary 1 attains is (v− c)(1− q) + q(v− c)(1− q)− s1 and the
expected payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q).
Discussion: Note that when s1 < q(v− c)(1− q) and s2 ≥ q(v− c)(1− q), the payoff of
primary 1 is higher compared to the primary 2. Apparently, when s1 is low, then primary
1 takes advantage of the acquired CSI and gains more compared to primary 2. Primary 2
can not do the same as the cost s2 is high. The expected payoff of primary 1 also increases
with the decrease in s1. Note that the threshold above which primary i only selects N is
q(v − c)(1− q); the threshold is the same for both the players.
The probability p1 increases with decrease in s1, hence, primary 1 is more likely to
select Y with the decrease in s1.
Since p1 increases as s1 decreases. p˜1 also increases as s1 decreases (from (4.52)) .
Thus, ψ1,Y (·) has larger support as s1 decreases.
Under Y , primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜, p˜1] when the channel of primary
2 is available; under N , primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜1, v]. Hence, primary
1 selects higher price under N as the uncertainty of the CSI of other primary increases.
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Also note that ψ2(·) overlaps both with ψ1,Y (·) and ψ1,N (·).
Also note that ψ2(·) has a jump at v. Thus, primary 2 selects v with a positive
probability. Intuitively, primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability. Thus, primary 1
knows the channel state of primary 2 with a higher probability and thus and selects a
lower price. In response, primary 2 has two options– i) selects a high price with high
probability ( at least it can gain more when the channel of the primary 1 is not available),
ii) selects a low price ( it can increase the probability of winning). Our result shows that
primary 2 selects the first option.
Proof of Theorem 4.8
First, we show that there is no profitable deviation for primary 1 when primary 2 follows
the prescribed strategy stated in Theorem 4.8 (Case I), subsequently, we show that there is
also no profitable deviation for primary 2 when primary 1 follows the prescribed strategy
stated in Theorem 4.8 (Case II).
Case I: In the first step (i), we show that primary 1 can attain a maximum expected
payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − s under Y . Next in step (ii), we show that
primary 1 can attain a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
under N . Finally in step (iii), we show that primary 1 attains the maximum expected
payoff following the strategy which will show that primary 1 does not have any profitable
unilateral deviation.
Step (i): Primary 1 selects Y . Suppose that the channel of primary 2 is available,
then primary 1 will know that w.p. 1. At any x such that p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1 the primary 1 gets
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under Y is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s1 = (v − c)(1− q)− s1 from (4.49)&(4.50). (4.55)
If primary 1 selects a price strictly less than p˜, then, its payoff is strictly less than p˜− c−
s1 = (v − c)(1− q)− s1.
Now, at any v > x ≥ p˜1, the expected payoff of primary 1 in this setting is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s1
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
x− c ))− s1from (4.49)
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
) +
(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
q
− s1 (4.56)
Since 1/q > 1, thus, the supremum is attained at x = p˜1. Now from (4.52), the maximum
value is
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (4.57)
Since ψ2(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than the value at
a price close to v. Hence, when the channel of primary 2 is available, then the maximum
expected payoff that primary 1 can attain at Y is (v− c)(1− q)− s1 and it is attained at
any price in the interval [p˜, p˜1].
Now, when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable, the expected payoff of primary 1
is (v − c)− s1. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains in Y is
(v − c− s1)(1− q) + q[(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
= (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (4.58)
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Step (ii) Now suppose primary 1 selects N and a price x such that p˜1 ≤ x < v.
Primary 2 selects a price less than x if the channel of primary 2 is available and selects
a price less than or equal to x (it occurs w.p. qψ2(x)). By the continuity of ψ2(·) in the
interval [p˜1, v), the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− qψ2(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 from (4.49). (4.59)
Since ψ2(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is strictly less at a
price close to v compared to v. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at v is strictly less
than (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1.
Now, at any x such that p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1, the expected payoff of primary 1 under N is
(x− c)(1− qψ2(x)) = (x− c)(1− q(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ))
= (x− c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q) from (4.49). (4.60)
The supremum is attained at x = p˜1. Putting the value of p˜1 from (4.52) we obtain
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + q(v − c)(1− q) (4.61)
The expected payoff at a price strictly less than p˜ will fetch a payoff which is strictly less
than the payoff attained at p˜. Thus, primary 1 can attain at most an expected payoff of
(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 under N . The maximum expected payoff is attained
at any price in the interval [p˜1, v).
Step (iii): Hence, we show that the primary 1 can attain an expected payoff of (v −
c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − s under either Y or N . Thus, any randomization between
Y and N will also give an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1. Now,
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under the strategy profile the expected payoff is also (v− c)(1− q) + q(v− c)(1− q)− s1,
hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable deviation.
Case II: Now, we show that primary 2 does not have any profitable deviation when
primary 1 selects the prescribed strategy stated in the theorem. Towards this end, we
first show in Step (i) that any price in the interval [p˜, p˜1] will give an expected payoff of
(v− c)(1− q) to primary 2 when it selects N , subsequently, we show that any price in the
interval [p˜1, v] will also provide an expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) to primary 2 when
it selects N . In step (iii), we show that any price x < p˜ will give a strictly lower payoff
compared to (v−c)(1−q) when it selects N . Finally in step (iv), we show that if primary
2 selects Y , then it can only get a payoff of at most (v−c)(1−q) when s2 ≥ q(v−c)(1−q).
This will show that primary 2 attains the maximum expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q) and
it is attained when it selects N and selects a price in the interval [p˜, v].
Step (i): Note that when x ∈ [p˜, p˜1] primary 1 can select a price less than x only when
the channel of primary 1 is available and primary 1 selects Y , thus, at any x such that
x ∈ [p˜, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− qp1ψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (4.47). (4.62)
Step (ii) When x ∈ [p˜1, v], then primary 1 selects a price lower than x only if the channel
of primary 1 is available and either it selects Y or while selecting N it selects a price less
than x. Hence, the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− qp1 − q(1− p1)ψ1,N (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (4.48). (4.63)
(iii) At any price less than p˜ will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than p˜− c. However,
p˜ − c = (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 is strictly less than
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(v − c)(1 − q) at any price less than p˜. Hence, primary 2 can only attain a maximum
expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q) and it is attained at the prices in the interval [p˜, v].
(iv) Now, suppose primary 2 selects Y . If the channel of primary 1 is available, then
at any x ∈ [p˜, p˜1], it will get an expected payoff of
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c )− s2
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 (4.64)
Since 1/q > 1, thus the above is maximized at x = p˜, and the maximum expected payoff
is (v − c)(1− q)− s2 since p˜− c = (v − c)(1− q).
Now, if primary 2 selects a price in the interval [p˜1, v] when the channel of primary 1
is available, then the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N (x)− p1)− s2
= (x− c)(1− p1 − 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c − qp1))− s2 from (4.48)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2
< (p˜− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 = (v − c)(1− q)− s2
since p˜− c = (v − c)(1− q).
Thus, primary 2 attains an expected payoff of at most (v − c)(1− q)− s2 when it selects
Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
Now, when the channel of primary 1 is unavailable the payoff that primary 2 earns is
v − c− s2. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 can earn by selecting Y
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is
q[(v − c)(1− q)− s2] + (1− q)(v − c− s2) = q(v − c)(1− q) + (v − c)(1− q)− s2
(4.65)
when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q), thus, the primary attains at most a payoff of (v − c)(1 − q).
Hence, primary 2 also does not have any profitable deviation.
4.4.5 Low s1, s2
Lastly, we show that if s2 < q(v− c)(1− q) then, there exists an NE where primary 2 also
randomizes between Y and N .
Again, we introduce some price distribution functions
ψ1,Y =0, x < L
1
p1
(1− L− c
x− c ), L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1
p1q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ), p˜2 < x ≤ p˜1
1, x > p˜1 (4.66)
ψ2,Y =0, x < L
1
p2
(1− L− c
x− c ), L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1, x > p˜2 (4.67)
ψ1,N =0, x < p˜1
1
q(1− p1)(1−
(v − c)(1− q)
x− c − p1q), p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (4.68)
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and
ψ2,N =0, x < p˜2
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
x− c − p2), p˜2 ≤ x < p˜1
1
q(1− p2)(1−
p˜1,N − c
x− c − p2q) p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (4.69)
where
p˜1,N − c = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1, L− c = s2
q
, p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c.
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q)/(1− p2q), p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)
1− p1q (4.70)
The values of p1 and p2 are
p1 =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
q(v − c)(1− q)− qs1 , p2 =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s2
q(v − c)(1− q)− qs2 (4.71)
Since s1 < s2, p1 > p2. Note that pi, i = 1, 2 only depends on si. Using the values of p1
and p2, we obtain from (4.70)
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q)− s2
1− q =
s2
q(1− p2) (4.72)
and
p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)− s1
1− q =
s1
q(1− p1) (4.73)
We also use the above equalities throughout this section.
It is easy to discern that ψ1,N (·) and ψ2,Y (·) are continuous. Now, we show that
ψ1,Y (·) is also continuous.
Observation 4.3. ψ1,Y (·) is a continuous function.
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Proof. We only show that ψ1,Y (·) is continuous at p˜2, it is easy to discern that ψ1,Y (·) at
other values. Note from (4.72) and (4.70), the left hand limit is
1
p1
(1− L− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1
p2
Now from (4.70), the right hand limit and the value of ψ1,Y (·) at p˜2 is
1
qp1
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
p˜2 − c ) =
1
qp1
p2q = p2/p1
Hence, ψ1,Y (·) does not have a jump at p˜2.
Next, we show that ψ2,N (·) is continuous everywhere but at v.
Observation 4.4. ψ2,N (·) is continuous except at v.
Proof. Since s1 < s2, thus, it is easy to discern that ψ2,N (·) has a jump at v.
Now, we show that ψ2,N (·) does not have a jump at p˜1. It is easy to discern that
ψ2,N (·) can not have a jump at any other point.
From (4.73), we have
(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
p˜1 − c
= [(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1] 1− q
(v − c)(1− q)− s1
= 1− q + s2 1− q
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (4.74)
Thus, the left hand limit at p˜1 is
1
q(1− p2)(1−
(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
p˜1 − c − p2q)
= 1− s2(1− q)
q(1− p2)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1] (4.75)
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Now, the right hand limit and the value of ψ2,N (·) at p˜1 is
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
p˜1 − c − p2) = 1−
s2(1− q)
q(1− p2)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1] from (4.73). (4.76)
Hence, ψ2,N (·) does not have a jump at p˜1.
Note that though ψ2,N (·) has a jump at v, the variation of ψ2,N with x is similar to
the other distributions ψ1,N (·), ψ1,Y (·) and ψ2,Y (·).
Now, we are ready to state the main result in this section.
Theorem 4.9. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1 and
N w.p. 1 − p1 and primary 2 selects Y w.p. p2 and N w.p. 1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are
given in (4.71). While selecting Y , primary i = 1, 2 selects its price according to ψi,Y (·)
when the channel of primary j, j 6= i is available and will select the price v if the channel
of primary j is unavailable; while selecting N , primary i selects its price according to
ψi,N (·).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s2 < q(v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff
that primary 1 attains is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and primary 2 attains is (v − c)(1− q).
Discussion: Since s2 > s1, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher compared
to primary 2. Since s2 < q(v − c)(1 − q), thus by Theorem 4.8 the expected payoff of
primary 1 is lower compared to the setting where s2 ≥ q(v− c)(1− q). Note also that the
payoff of primary 1 decreases with s2, but increases with s1. Thus, if s2 decreases it only
impacts the payoff of primary 1, it does not affect the payoff of primary 2. The payoff of
primary 1 also becomes closer to the payoff of primary 2 as s2 becomes closer to s1 and
ultimately becomes equal when s2 = s1 which we have already seen in Section 4.2 where
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we analyze the scenario when both the primaries have identical cost to acquire the CSI
of their respective competitors i.e. s2 = s1 = s.
p1 (p2,resp.) increases with the decrease in s1 (s2, resp.). Thus, primaries are more
likely to select Y as the cost s1, s2 decrease. When s→ 0, then p1 → 1, and when s2 → 0,
then p2 → 1. Since s1 < s2, thus, p1 > p2. Primary 1 is more likely to select Y compared
to primary 2.
Note that under Y , primary 1 (primary 2, resp.) selects its price from the interval
[L, p˜1] ([L, p˜2], resp.) when the channel of its competitor is available. Note that L is less
than p˜ (given in (4.50)) as s2 < q(v − c)(1 − q). Hence, each primary selects its price
from a larger interval when both primaries randomize between Y and N . Also note that
L decreases as s2 decreases. However, L is independent of s1. Since p˜1 > p˜2, hence, under
Y primary 1 selects its price from a wider interval compared to primary 2. Also note from
(4.72) and (4.73) p˜1 and p˜2 increase as s1 and s2 decrease respectively. Hence, ψi,Y (·) has
larger supports as si decreases.
ψ2,N (·) has a jump at v similar to the setting when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q) but s1 <
q(v − c)(1− q).
Proof of Theorem 4.9
First, we show that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for primary 1 when primary
2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 4.9 (Case I). Subsequently, we also show
that there is no unilateral profitable deviation for primary 2 when primary 1 follows the
strategy prescribed in Theorem 4.9 (Case II).
Case I: First, we show that under Y , when the channel of primary 2 is available, then
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the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is L− c− s1 and it is attained at
prices in the interval [L, p˜1] (Step i). Next, we show that when the channel of primary 2
is not available, then under Y the primary 1 attains a payoff of (v − c)− s1 (by selecting
price v). This shows that the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains under Y
is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that under N , the maximum
expected payoff that a primary can attain is (v − c)(1 − q) + s2 − s1 and it is attained
only at the prices in the interval [p˜1, v) (Step iii). Finally, we show that the maximum
expected payoff attained by primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and it is attained when
primary 1 follows the strategy (Step iv).
(i) Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available. First,
we show that at any price x ∈ [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 1 in this case is
L− c− s1 (Step i.a.). Subsequently, we show that at any price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] the expected
payoff of primary 1 is L − c − s1 (Step i.b.). Next, we show that at any price price
x ∈ [p˜1, v] the expected payoff of primary 1 is at most L − c − s1 (Step i.c.). Note that
at a price less than L will fetch a payoff of strictly less than the payoff of L − c − s1.
Hence, this will show that when the channel of primary 2 is available, then under Y the
maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 is L− c− s1 and it is attained only at
prices [L, p˜1].
Step i.a.: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Since the primary 2
selects a price less than or equal to x if it selects Y and then selects a price less than or
equal to x (it occurs w.p. p2ψ2,Y (x)). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2ψ2,Y (x))− s1 = L− c− s1 from (4.67).
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Step i.b.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 2
selects a price less than or equal to x if it either selects Y or it selects N and then selects
a price less than or equal to x. Thus, at any price x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)ψ2,N (x)− p2)− s1 = L− c− s1 from (4.69).
Thus, at any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1] fetches the primary an expected payoff of L−c−s1.
Step i.c: Now, at any price in the interval [p˜1, v) the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)ψ2,N (x)− p2)− s1
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
x− c − qp2)− p2)− s1from (4.69)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + ((v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1)/q − s1 (4.77)
Since the co-efficient of (x− c) is negative, the above is maximized at x = p˜1. Now, from
(4.73)
(p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q) = −((v − c)(1− q)− s1)/q
Thus, (4.77) is upper bounded by L− c− s1.
Since ψ2,N (·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at v is strictly
less than the expected payoff at a price close to v. Thus, the maximum expected payoff
attained in the interval [p˜1, v] is s2/q − s1 = L− c− s1 (by(4.70)).
Thus, under Y when the channel of primary 2 is available, the maximum expected
payoff of primary 1 is L− c− s1 and it is attained in every price in the interval [L, p˜1].
(ii) When the channel of primary 2 is unavailable, then the payoff of primary 1 is
(v − c) − s1 as primary 1 selects v and is still capable of selling its channel. Hence, the
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maximum expected payoff of primary 1 under Y is
qs2/q + (v − c)(1− q)− s1 = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 (4.78)
(iii) Now, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 is at
most (v−c)(1−q)+s2−s1 and it is attained when it follows the strategy ψ1,N (·). Toward
this end, we first show that if primary 1 selects a price in the interval [p˜1, v] the expected
payoff is (v− c)(1− q) + s2− s1 and it is attained at any price in the interval [p˜1, v) (Step
iii.a). Subsequently, we show that if primary 1 selects a price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then
the expected payoff under N is at most (v − c)(1 − q) + s2 − s1 (Step iii.b.). Finally,
we show that even if primary 1 selects a price in the interval [L, p˜2), then the expected
payoff is also at most (v− c)(1− q) + s2− s1 under N (Step iii.c.). Note that at any price
less than L will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff at L. Hence, this will
complete the proof.
Step iii.a: Now, suppose primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v). Now, primary 2 selects
a price less than or equal to x if the channel of primary 2 is available, and one of the two
things occur–(i) primary 2 selects Y , and (ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less
than or equal to x. (i) occurs w.p. p2 and (ii) occurs w.p. (1− p2)ψ2,N (x). The channel
of primary 2 is available w.p. q. Thus, at x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)qψ2,N (x)− p2q) = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 from (4.69) (4.79)
Since ψ2,N (·) has a jump at v, hence, primary 1 attains strictly higher payoff at a price
just below v compared to the payoff at v. Hence, the expected payoff at v is strictly less
than (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1.
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Step iii.b: Now, if primary 1 selects any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then its expected
payoff is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)qψ2,N (x)− p2q) = (x− c)(1− q(1− L− c
x− c )) from (4.69)
= (x− c)(1− q) + [L− c]q (4.80)
which is maximized at x = p˜1. Now, from (4.73) (p˜1 − c)(1 − q) = (v − c)(1 − q) − s1.
Since (L− c)q = s2 (by (4.70), hence the maximum expected payoff is
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + s2 (4.81)
Step iii.c: Suppose that the primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [L, p˜2). Since
primary 2 does not select any price in this interval when the channel of primary 2 is
unavailable or primary 2 selects N . Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− p2qψ2,Y (x))
= (x− c)(1− q(1− L− c
x− c )) (from (4.67)) = (x− c)(1− q) + (L− c)q
< (p˜1 − c)(1− q) + (L− c)q = (v − c)(1− q)− s1 + s2 (4.82)
Hence, under N , the maximum expected payoff that a primary can attain is (v − c)(1−
q) + s2 − s1 and this is attained at any price in the interval [p˜1, v).
(iv) Under Y or N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is (v −
c)(1 − q) + s2 − s1. Thus, any randomization of Y and N also yields the same expected
payoff. Under the strategy profile, the primary 1 attains the payoff of (v−c)(1−q)+s2−s1,
hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Case II: We now show that primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral
deviation. Toward this end we first show that when primary 2 selects Y and primary
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1 is available, then the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is L − c − s2 and it is
attained at any price in the interval [L, p˜2] (Step i). Subsequently, we show that under
Y , the maximum expected attained by primary 2 is (v − c)(1 − q) and it is attained
when primary 2 follows the strategy (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that under N , the
maximum expected payoff that primary 2 attains is (v − c)(1− q) and it is attained at a
price in the interval [p˜2, v] (Step iii). Finally, we show that the maximum expected payoff
that primary 2 attains is (v − c)(1 − q) and it is attained when primary 2 follows the
strategy (Step iv).
Step i: Suppose that primary 2 selects Y and primary 1 is available. We show that
the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 attains is L − c − s2 and it is attained at
any price in the interval [L, p˜2]. Toward this end, we first show that at any price [L, p˜2],
the expected payoff is L− c− s2 (Step i.a.). At any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1] and [p˜1, v]
the expected payoff is at most L − c − s2 (Steps i.b. and i.c. respectively). This will
complete the proof.
Step i.a.: Suppose x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Since primary 2 selects Y , primary 2 knows that
primary 1 is available. Primary 1 selects a price in the interval [L, p˜2] if primary 1 selects
Y (which occurs w.p. p1). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = L− c− s2 from (4.66). (4.83)
Thus, the expected payoff at any price x ∈ [L, p˜2] is L− c− s2.
Step i.b.: Suppose x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1]. The expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− p˜− c
x− c))− s2 from (4.66).
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (p˜− c)/q − s2. (4.84)
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Since the coefficient of x is negative, the above is maximized at p˜2. Thus, the expected
payoff is upper bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + (p˜− c)/q − s2
= (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 from (4.70)
= s2/q − (v − c)(1− q)/q + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 from (4.72)
= L− c− s2 since L− c = s2/q (cf.(4.70)). (4.85)
Thus, at any x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is L− c− s2.
Step i.c.: Now, suppose x ∈ [p˜1, v]. The expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N (x)− p1)− s2
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− p˜− c
x− c − p1q)− p1)− s2 from (4.68)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + p˜− c
q
− s2
< (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + p˜− c
q
− s2 since p˜2 < p˜1, = L− c− s2 from (4.85). (4.86)
Thus, from Steps i.a., i.b. and i.c. the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2
in this case is L− c− s2 and it is attained at the prices in the interval [L, p˜2].
Step ii: When primary 1 is unavailable, then primary 2 attains a payoff of v − c− s2.
Hence, under Y , the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is
(L− c− s2)q + (v − c− s2)(1− q) = q(L− c) + (v − c)(1− q)− s2
= (v − c)(1− q) from (4.70). (4.87)
It is attained when primary 2 follows the strategy.
Step iii: Now, we show that when primary 2 selects N , then, its maximum expected
payoff is (v − c)(1− q) and it is attained at any price in the interval [p˜2, v]. Toward this
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end, we show that at any price in the intervals [p˜2, p˜1] and [p˜1, v], the maximum expected
payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q) (Steps iii.a. and iii.b.). Subsequently, we show that
the maximum expected payoff attained by the primary at any x ∈ [L, p˜2], the maximum
expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q).
Step iii.a: Suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1]. Since primary 2 selects N ,
thus, it only knows that primary 1 is available w.p. q. Thus, at x, the expected payoff of
primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1qψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (4.66) (4.88)
Step iii.b.: Suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v]. Then the expected payoff of
primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q − (1− p1)qψ1,N (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (4.68). (4.89)
From Steps iii.a. and iii.b., the expected payoff of primary 2 at [p˜2, v] is (v − c)(1− q).
Step iii.c: Now, suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2] is
(x− c)(1− p1qψ1,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q) + (L− c)q from (4.66) (4.90)
The above is maximized at x = p˜2 as the coefficient of x is positive. Hence, the maximum
expected payoff of primary 2 is upper bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− q) + (L− c)q = (v − c)(1− q)− s2 + (L− c)q from (4.72).
= (v − c)(1− q) since (L− c)q = s2 from (4.70). (4.91)
Thus, the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is (v− c)(1− q) and it is attained only
at prices in the interval x ∈ [p˜2, v] (by Steps iii.a. and iii.b.).
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Step iv: By Step (ii), the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is (v−c)(1−
q). From Step (iii), the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under N is (v− c)(1− q).
Thus, any randomization between Y and N will yield a maximum expected payoff of
(v − c)(1 − q). This maximum expected payoff is attained by primary 2 when it follows
the strategy.
4.5 Unequal Channel availability probabilities
We, now, consider the setting, where different primaries may have different availability
probabilities depicted in Section 4.1.2. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q1 and the channel of primary 2 is available w.p.
q2 where q1 > q2.
4.5.1 Goals
The impact of different availability probabilities on the frequency with which a primary
selects Y can not be readily concluded. If primary 1 acquires the CSI of primary 2, it
will more often find that that the channel of primary 2 is unavailable which may increase
its payoff. However, primary 2 itself may also acquire the CSI of primary 1 and select a
lower price, in response primary 1 selects a lower price which may reduce the payoff of
primary 1. Even if the NE strategy is of the form [T, p], the values of the thresholds may
be different for different primaries. Additionally, it is not clear whether the threshold will
be higher for primary 1. This is because if the availability probability of primary 2 is low,
primary 1 may select Y for very small values of s, but primary 2 may still select Y for
larger values of s as the channel availability probability of the primary 1 is higher.
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The impact of different availability probabilities on the payoff of each primary is also
not apriori clear. Conventional wisdom suggests that as s decreases the payoff of a primary
should not decrease. However, the conventional wisdom is not definitive because of the
following. Since the channel of primary 1 is available with a higher probability, when
primary 2 acquires the CSI of primary 1, then, primary 1 selects a lower price more often
which may reduce the payoff of primary 2. The pricing strategy also inherently depends
on the frequency with which a primary selects Y . We resolve all these quandaries.
4.5.2 Results
We first discuss the main insights provided by our analysis.
• The NE strategy for primary i is of the form [Ti, pi] (Definition 4.4). However, Ti is
different for different primaries due to different availability probabilities. Our result
shows that T1 = q2(v−c)(1−q2) (Theorem 4.10) and T2 = q2(v−c)(1−q1)/(1−q1+q2)
(Theorem 4.11) where T1 > T2. Note that in the basic model, we have shown that
the threshold depends on the variance of the availability of the competitor’s channel.
Thus, T1 = q2(v−c)(1−q2) is expected. However, the expression of T2 is surprising.
Additionally, we show that T1 > T2 which is again not completely intuitive. Also
note that when T2 ≤ s < T1, primary 2 selects Y w.p. 0, but primary 1 selects Y
w.p. p1. Even when s < T2, pis are different with p1 > p2 (Theorem 4.12). Thus,
primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability.
• Different availability probabilities also lead to different payoffs for the primaries. In
contrast to the basic model, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher than that
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of primary 2 when primary 1 selects Y with positive probability (Theorems 4.11
and 4.12). Additionally, the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s decreases.
Thus, the expected payoff of a primary decreases with the ease of acquiring the CSI
which negates the conventional wisdom. Intuitively, since primary 1 selects Y with a
higher probability as s decreases, it selects a lower price when the channel of primary
2 is available. In response, primary 2 either must select a high price (so that, it can
get a high payoff in the event when the channel of primary 1 is unavailable) or select
a low price (so that, it can increase its probability of winning). Since the channel
of primary 1 is available with a higher probability, the first option fetches a lower
payoff compared to the latter one. Thus, primary 2 also selects a lower price. Thus,
the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s decreases. The expected payoff of
primary 2 becomes close to that of primary 1 as the difference between q1 and q2
decreases.
• Price strategies also exhibit some similarities with the basic model. Specifically,
primary i selects its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v], resp.) when it selects Y
(N , resp.) and the channel of the competitor is available. However, since primaries
have different availability probabilities, the price selection strategies also have some
differences compared to the basic model. For example, p˜1 > p˜2. Thus, primary 2
selects a lower price when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
Additionally, primary 1 selects v with a positive probability when it selects N and
the probability decreases as q2 becomes close to q1. Thus, primary 1 selects a price
from a distribution function which has a discontinuity whereas in the basic model,
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each primary selects its price from a continuous distribution function. Intuitively,
since primary 1 has higher channel availability probability, it selects a higher price
when it selects N .
4.5.3 High s
Our first result shows that
Theorem 4.10. If s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q2) then in an NE, both the primaries select N w.p.
1. The expected payoff of both the primaries is (v − c)(1− q2)
Note that when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2) both the primaries attain identical expected
payoff though the availability probabilities are different.
Proof. When both players select N , then the setting becomes equivalent to the setting
where primary 1 (primary 2, resp.) only knows that the channel of primary 2 (primary
1, resp.) is available w.p. q1 (q2 resp.). The above setting has already been considered in
[45]. From [45],
Lemma 4.3. In the unique NE pricing strategy under N , primary i should select its
pricing strategy using ψi(·), where
ψ1(x) =

0 x < p¯
1
q1
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p¯ ≤ x < v
1 x > v
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ψ2(x) =

0 x < p¯
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p¯ ≤ x ≤ v
1 x > v
where p¯− c = (v − c)(1− q2). ψ1(·) has a jump of q1 − q2
q1
at v.
It is easy to show that each primary will attain an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q2).
Now, we show that each primary can not attain higher payoff by selecting Y . First, we
show that primary 1 can not attain more by selecting Y (Step i). Subsequently, we show
that primary 2 can not attain more by selecting Y (Step ii).
Step i: Suppose that primary 1 deviates and selects Y . When the channel of primary
2 is available, then the expected payoff of primary 1 at any [p¯, v] is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s (4.92)
The above is maximized at p¯ as the co-efficient of x is negative. Since p¯−c = (v−c)(1−q2)
(from Lemma 4.3), hence, the above is upper bounded by
(v − c)(1− q2)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s = p¯− c− s. (4.93)
The price at any x < p¯ will fetch an expected payoff of strictly less than p¯− c− s. Thus,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains in this setting is p¯− c− s.
When the channel of primary 2 is not available, then the payoff of primary 1 is (v −
c) − s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain by deviating
unilaterally is
q2(v − c)(1− q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)− s (4.94)
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When s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q2), then, primary 1 will attain an expected payoff of strictly less
than (v − c)(1− q2). Hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Step ii: By applying the similar method we can show that the maximum expected
payoff attained by primary 2 under Y is
q1(v − c)(1− q2) + (v − c)(1− q1)− s (4.95)
However, the above is strictly less than q2(v− c)(1− q2) + (v− c)(1− q2)−s since q1 > q2.
If s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2), then the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 will attain
under Y is strictly less than (v − c)(1 − q2). However, primary 2 attains an expected
payoff of (v − c)(1 − q2) following the strategy profile at N , hence, primary 2 does not
have any profitable unilateral deviation.
4.5.4 s is neither too high nor too low
Now, we show that when
q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 ≤ s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2) then there is an NE
where primary 1 randomizes between Y and N , however, primary 2 only selects N . First,
we introduce some price distribution functions.
ψY (x) =0, x < L
1
p1q1
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x ≤ p˜
1, x > p˜ (4.96)
271
and
ψ1,N (x) =0, x < p˜
1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
L− c
x− c − p1q1) p˜ ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (4.97)
ψN (x) =0, x < L
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x < p˜
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p˜ ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (4.98)
where
L− c = s
q2
(4.99)
p˜− c = L− c
1− p1q1 (4.100)
p1 =
(v − c)(1− q2)− s/q2
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s (4.101)
Replacing the value of p1 from (4.101) in p˜ we obtain
p˜− c = (s/q2)(q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s− q1(v − c)(1− q2) + sq1/q2
=
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
(1− q2) (4.102)
It is easy to discern that ψY (·) is continuous. We, also, show that ψN (·) is a continuous
function.
Observation 4.5. ψN (·) is a continuous function.
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Proof. It is easy to discern that ψN (·) is continuous every except x = p˜. Now, we show
that ψN (·) is also continuous at p˜. The left hand limit of ψN (·) is 1 − L− c
p˜− c . Now, the
right hand limit is
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
p˜− c )
=
1
q2
(1− (p˜− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2
p˜− c ) from (4.102) and (4.99)
= 1− L− c
p˜− c (4.103)
Hence, ψN (·) does not have any jump at p˜.
Now, we show that ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v.
Observation 4.6. ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v.
Proof. Note that s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2), hence, L− c
v − c ≥
1− q1
1− q1 + q2 > 1− q1
as q1 > q2 and L− c = s/q2. Thus,
1− 1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
L− c
v − c − p1q1) > 1−
1
(1− p1)q1 (1− 1 + q1 − p1q1) = 0 (4.104)
Hence, ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v.
Now, we are ready to state the main result.
Theorem 4.11. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1
(given in (4.101)) and N w.p. 1− p1 and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y ,
primary 1 selects its price according to ψY (·) when the channel of primary 2 is available
and selects v when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable. While selecting N , primary
1 selects its price according to ψ1,N (·). Primary 2 selects its price according to ψN (·).
273
The above strategy profile is an NE when q2(v− c)(1− q2) > s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1−
q1 + q2)
8. The expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1 − q2) and the expected payoff of
primary 2 is s/q2.
Discussion: Since s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2), hence, s/q2 < (v − c)(1 − q2). Thus, the
expected payoff of primary 2 is lower compared to the expected payoff of primary 1. The
expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s decreases. This negates conventional wisdom
which suggests that the expected payoff of a primary should increase when s decreases.
Note that the support of ψY is [L, p˜] and the support of ψN is [L, v]. Thus, the support
of ψY and ψN overlap with each other. Also note that ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v, where
as ψN (·) does not have any jump. Intuitively, since primary 1 has higher availability
probability, primary 1 selects higher prices with higher probabilities.
p1 increases with decrease in s. L decreases when s decreases (by (4.99)). Thus,
primaries select their prices from a larger interval as s decreases. Also note that L only
depends on q2, it is independent of q1.
Also note from (4.102) that p˜ increases as s decreases. Thus, ψY (·) has a larger support
as s decreases and primary 1 selects its price from a larger interval when it selects Y , and
the channel of primary 2 is available.
Now, we prove the above theorem.
Proof. First, we show that primary 1 does not have any profitable deviation when primary
2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 4.11 (Case I). Subsequently, we show that
primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when primary 2 follows
8Note that (1− q2)(1− q1) + q2(1− q2) > (1− q1) as q2 < q1, thus, (1− q2) > 1− q1
1− q1 + q2
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the strategy prescribed in Theorem 4.11 (Case II).
Case I: First, we show that under Y , if the channel of primary 2 is available, then
primary 1 can attain a maximum expected payoff of L − c − s (Step i). When the
channel of primary 2 is unavailable primary 1 will attain the payoff v − c − s. Thus, it
shows that under Y , the expected payoff that primary 1 attains is (v − c)(1 − q2) (Step
ii). Subsequently, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1
attains is (v−c)(1−q2) (Step iii). Finally, we show that primary 1 achieves the maximum
expected payoff under the prescribed strategy (Step iv).
(i): Suppose primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available. The at
any price x ∈ [L, p˜], the expected payoff of primary 1 under Y is
(x− c)(1− ψN (x))− s = L− c− s from (4.98). (4.105)
At any price less than or equal to L will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than L−c−s.
At any price x in the interval [p˜, v] the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− ψN (x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ))− s from (4.98)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s
The above is maximized at p˜. Putting x = p˜, and from (4.102) we obtain
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
1− q2 (1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s = s/q2 − s
= L− c− s by (4.99) (4.106)
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 is L− c−s and it is attained
at any price in the interval [L, p˜].
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(ii): Now, when the channel of primary 2 is not available, then the payoff that primary
1 achieves under Y is (v − c) − s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1
can achieve under Y is
q2(L− c− s) + (v − c− s)(1− q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) (4.107)
By following the strategy profile, primary 1 achieves the above payoff under Y .
(iii): When primary 1 selects N , then it only knows that the channel of the primary
2 is available w.p. q2. Thus, under N , at any price x in the interval [p˜, v] the expected
payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− q2ψN (x)) = (v − c)(1− q2) (4.108)
Similarly, at any price x in the interval [L, p˜], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− q2ψN (x)) = (x− c)(1− q2(1− L− c
x− c )) from (4.98)
= (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 (4.109)
The above is maximized at x = p˜. Putting the value of p˜ we obtain
(p˜− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 = (p˜− c)(1− q2) + s by (4.99)
= (v − c)(1− q2) by (4.102). (4.110)
At any price less than L fetches a payoff of strictly less than L which is less than (v −
c)(1 − q2). Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains under N is
(v − c)(1− q2). This is achieved at any price in the interval [p˜, v].
(iv): We have shown that under Y or under N , the maximum expected payoff that
primary 1 can attain is (v − c)(1− q2). Thus, any randomization between Y and N also
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yields at most an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q2). Primary 1 attains the above payoff
when it follows the prescribed strategy. Hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable
deviation.
Case II: Now, we show that primary 2 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Toward this end we first show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary
2 attains is L − c (Step i). Subsequently, we show that under N , the primary 2 attains
the maximum expected payoff L − c when it selects price in the interval [L, v) (Step ii).
Subsequently, we show that if primary 2 deviates and selects Y , then it can only attain a
payoff of at most L− c when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 (Step iii).
Step (i): Suppose that primary 2 selects N . Suppose that primary 2 selects a price x
in the interval [L, p˜]. If the channel of primary 1 is available, then it selects a price less
than or equal to x where x ∈ [L, p˜] if primary 1 selects Y and then selects a price less
than or equal to x. The above occurs w.p. p1ψY (x). The channel of primary 1 is available
w.p. q1. Hence, by the continuity of ψ1,Y (·) at x the expected payoff of primary 2 under
N is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψY (x)) = L− c from (4.96). (4.111)
Now, suppose that primary 2 selects a price x from the interval [p˜, v). If the channel of
primary 1 is available, then primary 1 selects a price less than or equal to x when x ∈ [p˜, v)
if–i) primary 1 selects Y or ii) primary 1 selects N and selects a price less than or equal
to x. (i) occurs with probability p1 and (ii) occurs with probability (1− p1)ψ1,N (x). The
channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q1. Since ψ1,N is continuous in [p˜, v), the expected
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payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)q1ψ1,N (x)− p1q1) = L− c from (4.97). (4.112)
Since ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than the expected
payoff just below v. On the other hand a price less than L will fetch a payoff strictly less
than L− c. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 can attain under N is
L− c.
Step ii: Primary 2 attains a payoff of L− c under N and it is attained only at prices
in the interval [L, v).
Step (iii): Now, we show that if primary 2 selects Y , then it will not attain a payoff
higher than s/q2. Towards this end, we show when the channel of primary 1 is available,
then the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is L− c− s (Step iii.a). When
the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff attained by primary 2 is v− c−s.
Subsequently, we show that the maximum expected payoff attained under Y is at most
L− c when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 (Step iii.b.). This will complete the proof.
Step iii.a: When the channel of primary 1 is available then the expected payoff of
primary 2 at any price x in the interval [L, p˜] is
(x− c)(1− p1ψY (x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (L− c)/q1 − s cf (4.96). (4.113)
The above is maximized at x = L since the co-efficient of x is negative, hence, the
maximum value is L− c− s.
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Similarly, the expected payoff of primary 2 at any price x in the interval [p˜, v) is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N (x)− p1)− s
= (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (L− c)/q1 − s from (4.97)
< (L− c)− s since p˜ > L. (4.114)
The payoff at a price less than L fetches a payoff which is strictly less than L− c− s.
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 when the channel of
primary 1 is available is L− c− s.
Step iii.b: When the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff that primary
2 attains is (v − c)− s. Hence, the expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is
q1(L− c− s) + (v − c− s)(1− q1) = q1s
q2
+ (v − c)(1− q1)− s
= (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)
q2
≤ s/q2 as q2(v − c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2) ≤ s
= L− c (4.115)
But primary 2 attains L− c under N following the strategy ψN (·). Thus, primary 2 does
not have any profitable unilateral deviation. Hence, the result follows.
4.5.5 Low s
Now, we show that when s <
q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 then there exists an NE where both the
primaries randomize between Y and N . Again we first introduce some pricing distribu-
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tions.
ψ1,Y (x) =0, x < L
1
p1
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x < p˜2
1
p1q1
(1− p¯− c
x− c) p˜2 ≤ x ≤ p˜1
1, x > p˜1 (4.116)
ψ2,Y (x) =0, x < L
1
p2
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1, x > p˜2 (4.117)
ψ1,N (x) =0, x < p˜1
1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
p¯− c
x− c − p1q1) p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (4.118)
ψ2,N (x) =0, x < p˜2
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
x− c − p2), p˜2 ≤ x < p˜1
1
(1− p2)q2 (1−
(v − c)(1− q2)
x− c − p2q2) p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (4.119)
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where
p¯− c = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (4.120)
p1 =
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− s(q1/q2 − q1 + q2)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s (4.121)
p2 =
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− s(1− q1 + q2)
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s (4.122)
L− c = s/q2
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
1− p2q1 , p˜1 − c =
p¯− c
1− p1q1 (4.123)
First, we show some results which we use throughout this section. Replacing the value
of p2 in p˜2 we have
p˜2 − c = [q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s][(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2]
q2(v − c)(1− q1)2 + s(q1 − q21 + q1q2 − q2)
=
[q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s][(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2]
q2(v − c)(1− q1)2 + sq2(1− q1)(q1 − q2)/q2
=
(v − c)(1− q1)− s
(1− q1) (4.124)
L− c
1− p2 =
s
q2(1− p2) =
((v − c)(1− q1)− s)s
s(1− q1)
=
(v − c)(1− q1)− s
1− q1 = p˜2 − c (4.125)
Also note from (4.123) and (4.121) that
p˜1 − c = [(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2][q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s]
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− sq1 − q21(v − c)(1− q2) + sq21/q2 − sq21 + sq1q2
=
[(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2][q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s]
q1(1− q2)[(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2]
=
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
1− q2 (4.126)
ψ1,Y (·), ψ2,Y (·) and ψ2,N (·) are continuous. However, ψ1,N (·) is not continuous.
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Observation 4.7. ψ1,N (·) is continuous except at v.
Proof. It is easy to discern the continuity at every other point except v. Note from (4.118)
ψ1,N (·) has a jump of s(q1 − q2)
(v − c)(1− p1)q1q2 at v.
Observation 4.8. ψ1,Y (·) is continuous.
Proof. It is easy to verify that ψ1,Y (·) (cf. (4.116)) is continuous everywhere except at p˜2.
We now show that it is also continuous at p˜2. The left hand limit at p˜2 is
1
p1
(1− L− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1
(1− (1− p2)) from (4.125)
=
p2
p1
(4.127)
The right hand limit (cf.(4.116)) is
1
p1q1
(1− p¯− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1q1
(1− 1 + p2q1) from (4.123)
=
p2
p1
(4.128)
which is equal to the left hand limit.
Observation 4.9. ψ2,N (·) is continuous.
Proof. It is easy to verify that ψ2,N (·) (cf. (4.119)) is continuous everywhere except at
p˜1. Now, we also show that ψ2,N (·) is continuous at p˜1. First note from (4.126) that
(v − c)(1− q2)
(1− q2)(p˜1 − c) = 1 +
s
(1− q2)(p˜1 − c) (4.129)
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The right hand limit at p˜1 is
1
(1− p2)q2 (1−
(v − c)(1− q2)
p˜1 − c − p2q2)
=
1
(1− p2)q2 (1− (1− q2)−
s
p˜1 − c − p2q2) from (4.129)
= 1− s
(1− p2)q2(p˜1 − c) = 1−
L− c
(1− p2)(p˜1 − c) since L− c = s/q2
=
1
(1− p2)(1−
L− c
p˜1 − c − p2) (4.130)
which is the left hand limit (cf.(4.119)). Hence, the result follows.
Note from (4.121) and (4.122) that pi i = 1, 2 both depend on q1 and q2. Next, we
show that p1 > p2.
Lemma 4.4. p1 > p2 when q1 > q2.
Proof. From (4.121) and (4.122), we need to show that
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− s(q1/q2 − q1 + q2)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s >
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− s(1− q1 + q2)
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s (4.131)
By cross multiplication it is sufficient to show that
(v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)− s(v − c)[(q1 − q1q2 + q22)(1− q1)− (q1 − q21 + q1q2)(1− q2)]
+ s2(q22 − q1q2 − q1q2 + q21) > 0
The last expression is s2(q1 − q2)2 which is always positive when q1 > q2. Thus, it is
283
sufficient to show that
(v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)−
s(v − c)[q1 − q1q2 + q22 − q21 + q21q2 − q1q22 − q1 + q21 − q1q2 + q1q2 − q21q2 + q1q22] > 0
Or, (v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)− s(v − c)[q22 − q1q2] > 0
(v − c)s(q1 − q2)(q2 − q1q2) > 0 (4.132)
as q1 > q2, the above expression is indeed positive. Hence, the result follows.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.12. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary i selects Y w.p. pi (cf.
(4.121)& (4.122))and N w.p. 1− pi. While selecting Y , primary i = 1, 2 selects its price
according to ψi,Y (·) when the channel of primary j 6= i is available and selects v when
the channel of primary j is unavailable. While selecting N , primary i selects its price
according to ψi,N (·).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s < q2(v − c)(1 − q1)/(1 − q1 + q2). The
expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1 − q2) and the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2.
Discussion: Since p1 > p2 (by Lemma 4.4), primary 2 selects Y with a lower proba-
bility compared to primary 1. Both p1 and p2 increase as s decreases. Both p1 and p2 go
to 1 as s→ 0. Note that threshold Ti above which primary i selects only N is higher for
primary 1 i.e. T1 > T2. Hence, primary 1 selects Y for a wider value of s.
Note that the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases with the cost of acquiring the
CSI s. This negates conventional wisdom which suggests that the expected payoff of a
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primary should increase as s decreases. The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent
of s. The expected payoff of primary 2 is lower than that of primary 1. The expected
payoff of primary 2 becomes equal to that of the primary 1 when q2 becomes equal to q1.
Note that ψ1,N (·) (see (4.118)) has a jump at v since q1 > q2. The jump decreases
as the difference between q1 and q2 decreases. Since primary 1 has a higher availability
probability, thus, it selects higher prices when it selectsN . ψ1,N (·) is continuous elsewhere.
It is easy to show that ψ1,Y , ψ2,Y and ψ2,N are continuous everywhere. Note that L
decreases as s decreases. Thus, a primary selects its price from a larger interval as s
decreases. p˜1 and p˜2 both decrease with s (from (4.124) and (4.126)). Hence, ψ1,Y (·) and
ψ2,Y (·) have larger supports when s decreases.
Proof of Theorem 4.12
First, we show that primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when
primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in the theorem (Case I). Subsequently, we show
that primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when primary 1
follows the strategy prescribed in the theorem (Case II).
Case I: First, we show that under Y , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1
can attain is (v − c)(1− q2) (Step i). Toward this end, we first show that when primary
1 selects Y and the channel of the primary 2 is available, then the expected payoff that
primary 1 will attain is at most L − c − s (Step i.a.). When primary 1 selects Y and
the channel of the primary 2 is unavailable, then the payoff of the primary 1 is v − c− s
which will in turn show that the maximum payoff attained by primary 1 under Y is
(v − c)(1− q2) (Step i.b). Subsequently, we show that under N , the maximum expected
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payoff that primary 1 can attain is (v − c)(1 − q2) (Step ii). Finally, we show that the
maximum expected payoff is attained by primary 1 when it follows the strategy profile
(Step iii).
Step i.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available.
Then, at any price x in the interval [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2ψ2,Y (x))− s = L− c− s from (4.117) (4.133)
Now suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 2 selects
a price less than or equal to x if (i) primary 2 selects Y which occurs w.p. p2 and (ii)
primary 2 selects N and then selects a price less than or equal to x which occurs w.p.
(1− p2)ψ2,N (x). Thus, by the continuity of ψ2,N (·) the expected payoff of primary 1 at x
is
(x− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)ψ2,N (x))− s = L− c− s from (4.119). (4.134)
Similarly, when primary 1 selects a price x from the interval [p˜1, v], then its expected
payoff is
(x− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)ψ2,N (x))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1
q2
) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s from (4.119). (4.135)
Thus, the above is maximized at p˜1 since the coefficient of x is negative. Hence, the
maximum value is
(p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s
= (p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q2) + (p˜1 − c)(1− q2)/q2 + s/q2 − s (from (4.126))
= L− c− s from (4.123).
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Any price which is strictly less than L will fetch a payoff of less than L − c − s. Hence,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is L− c− s when the channel of
primary 2 is available and it is achieved at any price in the interval [L, p˜1].
Step i.b.: Note that the payoff that primary 1 attains when the channel of primary 2
is unavailable is (v− c)− s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains
under Y is
(L− c− s)q2 + (v − c− s)(1− q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 − s
= (v − c)(1− q2) from (4.123). (4.136)
Step ii: Now, we show that if primary 1 selects N , then, it will attain a maximum
expected payoff of (v−c)(1−q2) and it is attained when it selects a price from the interval
[p˜1, v]. Towards this end, we first show that when primary 1 selects a price in the interval
[p˜1, v], then its expected payoff is (v− c)(1− q2) (Step ii.a.). Subsequently, we show that
when primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then its expected payoff is at
most (v − c)(1− q2) (Step ii.b.). Finally, we show that if primary 1 selects a price in the
interval [L, p˜2], then its expected payoff is less than (v− c)(1− q2) (Step ii.c.). Note that
a price which is strictly less than L will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff
at L, hence, this will show that under N the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v−c)(1−q2)
and it is attained when at prices in the interval [p˜1, v].
Step ii.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v]. Primary 2 selects a price
less than or equal to x if the channel of primary 2 is available and either primary 2 selects
Y or it selects N and then selects a price less than or equal to x. Thus, the probability
that primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x is p2q2 + (1 − p2)q2ψ2,N (x). Thus,
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by the continuity of ψ2,N (·), the expected payoff at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)q2ψ2,N (x)− p2q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) from (4.119). (4.137)
Step ii. b.: Similarly, at price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 1
is
(x− c)(1− p2q2 − (1− p2)q2ψ2,N (x)) = (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 (4.138)
The above is maximized at p˜1. From (4.123) L− c = s/q2, thus, the maximum value is
(p˜1 − c)(1− q2) + s = (v − c)(1− q2) from (4.126) (4.139)
Step ii.c.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Primary 2 does not
select a price in this interval if it selects N . Hence, at x, the expected payoff of primary
1 is
(x− c)(1− p2q2ψ2,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 from (4.117)
< (p˜1 − c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 as p˜1 > p˜2
= (v − c)(1− q2) from (4.126) and (4.123). (4.140)
Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain under N is (v−c)(1−q2)
and this is attained at every price in the interval [p˜1, v].
Step iii: The maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is (v − c)(1 − q2)
either under Y or N . Hence, any randomization between Y and N will also yield the same
expected payoff. The maximum expected payoff is attained by primary 1 when it follows
the strategy profile. Hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Case II: We,now, show that primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral
deviation. Toward this end, we first show that when primary 2 selects Y and the channel
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of primary 1 is available, then the maximum expected payoff that it can get is L− c− s
(Step i). When primary 2 selects Y and the channel of the primary 1 is unavailable,
then the payoff of primary 2 is (v − c − s). Subsequently, we show that under Y , the
maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (Step
ii). Subsequently, we show that when primary 2 selects N then, the maximum expected
payoff that primary 2 can get is also (v − c)(1 − q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (Step iii). Finally,
we show that primary 2 can attain the maximum expected payoff when it follows the
strategy profile (Step iii).
Step i: Suppose primary 2 selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
Primary 1 does not select a price from the interval [L, p˜2] when it selects N . Thus, at
price x in the interval [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s = L− c− s from (4.116) (4.141)
At price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s =
(x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s cf (4.116)&(4.120). (4.142)
Since the co-efficient of x is negative, the above is maximized at x = p˜2. From (4.123)
note that (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1). Thus, the expected payoff
of primary 2 is upper bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)/q1 − s = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2)− s
= L− c− s from (4.125) (4.143)
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Now, suppose that primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v). At x, the expected payoff of
primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1 − (1− p1)ψ1,N (x))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s cf. (4.118)&(4.120)
< (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s since p˜2 < p˜1. (4.144)
Note from (4.123) that (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1− q2)/q2 = (p˜2− c)(1−p2q1), thus, the above
can be written as
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)/q1 − s = L− c− s from (4.143). (4.145)
Since ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly lower compared
to a price close to v. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at v is strictly less than
L−c−s. Similarly, a price which is strictly less than L fetches a payoff of at most L−c−s
under Y .
Hence, when the channel of primary 1 is available, then, under Y the maximum
expected payoff that primary 2 can attain is L− c− s. It is attained at any price in the
interval [L, p˜2].
Step ii: When the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff that primary 2
attains is (v − c− s). Hence, the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is
q1(L− c− s) + (1− q1)(v − c− s) = (v − c)(1− q1) + (L− c)q1 − s
= (v − c)(1− q1) + q1s/q2 − s = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 since L− c = s/q2.
Step iii: Now, we show that if primary 2 selects N , then the maximum expected payoff
attained by primary 2 is (v−c)(1−q1)+s(q1−q2)/q2. Toward this end, we first show that
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the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 at any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]
and [p˜1, v] is (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1− q2)/q2 and the maximum expected payoff is attained
at any price in the interval [p˜2, v) (Step iii.a. and Step iii.b. resp.). Subsequently, we
show that if primary 2 selects any price less than p˜2, then the maximum expected payoff
is at most (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (Step iii.c.).
Step iii.a: Suppose that primary 2 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 1
selects a price less than or equal to x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] if the channel of primary 1 is available, it
selects Y and a price which is less than or equal to x. Thus, primary 1 selects a price less
than or equal to x w.p. p1q1ψ1,Y (x). Since ψ1,Y (·) is continuous in [p˜2, p˜1], the expected
payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 from (4.116)&(4.120).
(4.146)
Step iii.b: Now suppose primary 1 selects a price x from the interval [p˜1, v). Primary 1
selects a price less than or equal to x w.p. p1q1 + (1− p1)q1ψ1,N (x). Thus, the expected
payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1 − (1− p1)q1ψ1,N (x)) = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 cf. (4.118)
(4.147)
to primary 2. The expected payoff at v is strictly less than the expected payoff at a price
just below v since ψ1,N (·) has a jump at v. Thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly less
than (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2.
Step iii.c: Now suppose that primary 2 selects a price x from the interval [L, p˜2].
Primary 1 selects a price in the interval only when it selects Y . Thus, the expected payoff
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of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψ1,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q1) + (L− c)q1 from (4.116) (4.148)
Since the co-efficient of x is positive, the above is maximized at x = p˜2. By (4.125)
L− c = (1− p2)(p˜2 − c). Hence, the maximum value is
(p˜2 − c)(1− q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2)q1 = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)
= (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 from (4.123). (4.149)
On the other hand a price which is strictly less than L fetches a payoff which is strictly less
than the payoff at L as L is the lowest end-point of the support of primary 1. Thus, under
N , the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
and it is attained at any price in the interval [p˜2, v).
Step iv: Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v−c)(1−q1)+
s(q1 − q2)/q2 and it is attained if primary 2 follows the strategy profile. Thus, primary 2
also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. Hence, the result follows.
4.5.6 Numerical Results
Fig. 4.11 shows the variation of pi, the probability with which primary i selects Y . As
S increases, pis decrease. Additionally, p1 > p2 when 0 < s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2), when
s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2) both the primaries select N w.p. 1 and thus, pi = 0. When s = 0,
then pi = 1. When s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q1)/(1 − q1 + q2) p2 is also 0 but p1 is positive.
p1 decreases at a slower rate compared to the p2. The difference between p1 and p2 is
maximum at s = q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2). When s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2),
p1 decreases at a faster rate.
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Figure 4.11: Variation of pi,
i = 1, 2 with S for an example
setting: v = 25, c = 0, q1 =
0.7, q2 = 0.4.
Figure 4.12: Variation of the
expected payoffs of primaries
with s in the same example
setting considered in Fig. 4.11.
Figure 4.13: Variation of p1
and p2 with q1 and q2. In
the left hand figure we use
q1 = 0.6, c = 0, v = 50, s =
4 and for the right hand fig-
ure we use q2 = 0.4, v =
50, c = 0, s = 4.
Fig. 4.12 shows the variation of the expected payoffs of the primaries with s, the cost
of acquiring the CSI. The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. However,
the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s when s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2). Thus, as s
decreases the payoff of primary 2 decreases which contradicts the conventional wisdom
which suggests that the payoff of a primary should increase as s decreases.
Fig. 4.13 shows the variations of pi, i = 1, 2 with qi, i = 1, 2. Note from the left hand
figure of Fig. 4.13 that when q2 is low, both the primaries select N w.p. 1, thus, pi = 0.
When q2 > 0.25, p1 becomes positive, but p2 is 0. Due to high q1, primary 1 selects Y
with a higher probability and gains more compared to primary 2. When q2 > 0.4, p2
becomes positive and the difference between p1 and p2 decreases. As q2 becomes close to
q1, primary 2 also selects Y with a higher probability. Eventually, when q2 → q1, p2 → p1.
Note from the right hand figure of Fig. 4.13 that when q1 = q2, p1 = p2. As q1
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increases p2 decreases and eventually it becomes 0. Note that p1 initially increases with
q1. In this regime p2 decreases, however, q1 is not so high, thus, primary 1 can gain more
by selecting Y , hence, p1 increases. However, eventually p2 becomes 0 and q1 is high,
thus, p1 decreases.
4.6 Future Work
In this chapter, we consider the scenario where there are only two primaries. In future,
we consider the scenario where there are more than two primaries. When there are more
than two primaries, each primary can acquire the CSIs of any number of primaries it
wants. A primary needs to select a price based on how many CSIs of the competitors it
has acquired and how many channels are available among the acquired CSIs. The price
of the primary will not only based on the information it has but also on the information
that its competitors have. However, the primary itself is not aware of the decision of the
competitors. The competitors may have acquired CSIs of different primaries and thus,
may have different information compared to the primary. The primary, thus, itself is
not aware of the information that its competitors have even they acquire the CSIs. This
makes the characterization of an NE strategy a computationally challenging task.
We also consider that the available channels are statistically identical. The character-
ization of the NE when the available channel may belong to different states is also work
for the future. In future, we also consider the setting where the market operates over
multiple locations.
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4.A Uniqueness of Results in the Basic Model
Here, we show that there can not be any other NE strategy profile apart from those
described in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 in the basic model. Note that when s ≥ q(v−c)(1−q),
then the NE strategy profile is the one described in Theorem 4.3 and when s < q(v −
c)(1− q), the NE strategy profile is the one described in Theorem 4.4.
Structure of the Pricing strategies
We first investigate the key structure of the NE pricing strategies (if it exists).
Note that under Y , if a primary knows that its competitor’s channel is not available
then it will choose v w.p. 1. We thus, investigate the structure of F1(·) and F (·) in an
NE strategy. Recall that F1(·) is the pricing distribution that a primary chooses when
it selects Y and knows that the channel of its competitor is available, while F (·) is the
pricing distribution that a primary chooses when it selects N .
Theorem 4.13. In an NE strategy profile, neither F (·) nor F1(·) can have a jump at any
price which is less than v. Additionally, F1(·) can not have a jump at v.
Proof. First, we show that neither F (·) nor F1(·) can have a jump at any price which is
less than v. Subsequently, we show that F1(·) can not have a jump at v.
Note that a primary can only have a jump at a price if it is a best response. First,
note that F (·) can not have a jump at a price less than or equal to c. This is because at
a price less than or equal to c will fetch a negative profit, however, if the primary selects
v, then it will get an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q).
Similarly, if F1(·) has a jump at a price less than or equal to c, then its payoff under
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F1(·) is at most (c − c) − s = −s. Note that when the channel of the competitor is
unavailable, then the primary will attain the payoff of (v − c) − s. Hence, the expected
payoff under Y is thus, (v− c−s)(1− q)−sq = (v− c)(1− q)−s. However, if the primary
selects N and the price v which will fetch an expected profit of (v − c)(1− q).
Now if either F1(·) or F (·) has a jump at c < x < v, then the other primary can select
a price x−  and still can gain higher payoff compared to x. Thus, the other primary will
not select any price in the interval (x − , x + ) as it will get a strictly higher payoff at
x −  compared to any price in the interval. Hence, the primary itself can gain strictly
higher payoff by selecting a price at y ∈ (x, x+ ) compared to x. It contradicts the fact
that either F1(·) or F (·) will have a jump at x < v.
Next, we show that F1(·) can not have a jump at v. Suppose F1(·) has a jump at v,
then the other primary will never select v with positive probability when its channel is
available as it can get strictly higher payoff by selecting a price slightly less than v. Thus,
at v, the primary is never going to sell its channel when the channel of other primary is
available. Thus, the expected payoff that the primary will get under F1(·) is −s. Thus,
under Y , the expected payoff that the primary will attain is (v − c)(1 − q) − s. Again,
the primary will have an incentive to deviate to select N and select the price v which will
fetch a payoff of at least (v − c)(1− q).
The above theorem shows that if the channel of a primary is available then it can not
have a jump at any price other than v.
Now, we show an important property of F1(·) and F (·) when a primary randomizes
between Y and N in an NE strategy.
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Theorem 4.14. Suppose that primary 1 selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1 − p in an NE.
Then, the upper end point of the support set of F1(·) must be lower than or equal to to
the lower end-point of the support set of F (·).
Proof. Note from Theorem 4.13 that F1(·) can not have a jump at v. Thus, the lower end
point of F1(·) can never be v. If the lower end-point of the support set of F (·) is v, then
the statement is trivially true. So, we consider the setting where the lower end-point of
the support set of F (·) is less than v. Suppose the statement is false. Thus, there must
exist a x < y < v such that x is in the support set of F (·) and y is in the support set
of F1(·). Now, suppose that the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 when it selects
F1(·) under Y is p¯1. Also let p¯2 be the maximum expected payoff primary 1 gets when it
selects F (·) under N .
Since x < v, thus, if the channel of competitor is available, it can not have any jump
at x. Hence, while choosing N , the probability of winning at x is (1− qφ2(x)) where φ2(·)
is the probability that the primary 2 will select a price less than or equal to x when its
channel is available. Since x < v and primary 2 does not have a jump at x, thus, x is a
best response to primary 1 under N . Thus,
(x− c)(1− qφ2(x)) = p¯2 (4.150)
Since p¯1 is the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 gets under F1(·), thus, if primary
1 selects x under F1(·), then its payoff would be
(x− c)(1− φ2(x)) ≤ p¯1
1− φ2(x)
1− qφ2(x) ≤
p¯1
p¯2
from (4.150) (4.151)
297
Similarly, since y < v, thus, primary 2 will not have a jump at y when its channel is
available. Thus, primary 1’s expected payoff under F1(·) at the price y is
(y − c)(1− φ2(y)) = p¯1 (4.152)
If primary 1 selects N and the price y, then its expected payoff is
(y − c)(1− qφ2(y)) = p¯1 1− qφ2(y)
1− φ2(y) from (4.152)
≥ (1− qφ2(y))(1− φ2(x))
(1− φ2(y))(1− qφ2(x)) p¯2from (4.151) (4.153)
Now, note that φ2(y) ≥ φ2(x) as y > x. If φ2(y) = φ2(x), then the expected payoff at y
must be greater than the expected payoff at x, hence, x can not be a best response at N
for primary 1. However, if φ2(y) > φ2(x), then the expected payoff at y at N is strictly
higher than p¯2 by (4.153). Thus, this leads to a contradiction since p¯2 is the maximum
expected payoff at N . Hence, the result follows.
Now, we show that both F (·) and F1(·) are contiguous. Additionally, if a primary
randomizes between Y and N , then there is no “gap” between F (·) and F1(·).
Theorem 4.15. (i) In a NE strategy if a primary selects Y w.p. 1, and it selects F1(·)
when it knows that the channel of other primary is available, then F1(·) must be contiguous
and the upper end-point of F1(·) must be v.
(ii) In a NE strategy if a primary selects N w.p. 1, and if it selects F (·) when it knows
that channel of other primary is available, then F (·) must be contiguous and the upper
end-point of F (·) must be v.
(iii) In a NE strategy if the primary randomizes between Y and N , both F1(·) and F (·)
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must be contiguous, there must not be any gap between the support sets of F1(·) and F (·).
Moreover, the upper-end point of F (·) must be v.
Proof. We only show the proof of part (i). The proof of the other parts will be similar.
Part (i): Suppose that primary 1 selects F1(·) such that F1(x) = F1(y) for some
v ≥ y > x such that both y, x are under the support set of F1(·). Since x < v thus,
primary 2 does not have a jump at x when its channel is available. Hence, x is a best
response for primary 1 under F1(·). By Theorem 4.14 if a primary randomizes between
Y and N , then the lower end-point of F (·) must be greater than or equal to the lower
end-point of F1(·). Thus, F (x) = F (y) = 0. Thus, primary 2 will attain a strictly higher
payoff at any value z ∈ (x, y) compared to at x. Thus, there is an  > 0 where primary 2
will never select any price in the interval [x, x + ], hence, x itself is not a best response
for primary 1. But the above contradicts the fact that x is in the support set of F1(·).
Hence, the result follows.
Special Property where primaries randomize between Y and N
Next theorem shows that in an NE if both the primaries randomize between Y and N .
Then both of them should put the same probability mass on Y (and N , resp.).
Theorem 4.16. Suppose primary 1 selects Y w.p. 1 > p1 > 0 and N w.p. 1 − p1.
Primary 2 selects Y w.p. 1 > p2 > 1 and N w.p. 1−p2. Then, p1 = p2 in an NE strategy
profile.
Proof. Suppose that at Y , primary 1 (2, resp.) selects a price using the distribution F1(·)
(F¯1(·), resp.) when it knows that the channel of primary 2 (1, resp.) is available for sale.
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At N , suppose that primary 1 (2, resp.) selects a price using the distribution F (·) (F¯ (·),
resp.).
Let L1 (L¯1, resp.) and U1 (U¯1, resp.) be respectively the lower and upper end-points
of the support of F1 (F¯1, resp.). Let L (L¯, resp.) and U (U¯ , resp.) be the lower and
upper end-point of the support of F (·) (F¯ , resp.) respectively. By Theorem 4.14 L1 < L
and L¯1 < L¯. Note also from Theorem 4.15 that U1 = L and U¯1 = L¯.
First, we show that L1 = L¯1. Suppose not. Without loss of generality assume that
L1 < L¯1. Thus, primary 2 does not select any price in the interval (L1, L¯1). Thus, the
primary 1 will get a strictly higher payoff at L¯1− for some  > 0 compared to L1. Hence,
primary 1 must select prices close to L1 with probability 0 which contradicts that L1 is
the lower end-point of F1. Thus, L1 = L¯1.
By Theorem 4.13 L1 can not be equal to v. Thus, L1 = L¯1 < v. Thus, both L1 and L¯1
are best responses to primary 1 and primary 2 respectively at Y . Since L1 = L¯1, thus, the
expected payoff at Y must be the same for both players. Also note that since primaries
randomize between Y and N , thus, the payoffs at Y and N must be the same. Hence,
the expected payoff of the primaries at N also must be the same. Thus, no primary can
have a jump at v under N . This is because if a primary has a jump at N , then the other
primary would get a strictly higher payoff at a price just below v which contradicts that
both the primaries must have the same payoff under N . Thus, L, L¯ < v.
Now, we show that L = L¯, towards this end, we introduce few more notations. Let
p¯1 − c be the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 (2, resp.) under F1(·) (F¯1(·), resp.)
and p¯2 − c be the expected payoff of primary 1 (2, resp.) under F (·) (F¯ (·), resp.).
Suppose L 6= L¯. Without loss of generality assume that L > L¯. Thus, L¯ < v. Since
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L¯ is the upper end-point of F¯1(·) and L¯ < v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at L¯
under F¯1(·) is p¯1 − c. Thus,
(L¯− c)(1− p1F1(L¯)) = p¯1 − c (4.154)
L¯ is also a best response of primary 2 at N , thus,
(L¯− c)(1− qp1F1(L¯)) = p¯2 − c (4.155)
Since v > L > L¯ and L is the upper end-point of F1(·), thus, L is also a best response of
primary 1 under Y .
(L− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)F¯ (L)) = p¯1 − c (4.156)
Since L is the lower end point of F (·), thus, under N , the expected payoff of primary 1
at L is
(L− c)(1− qp2 − q(1− p2)F¯ (L)) = p¯2 − c (4.157)
Also note that since L > L¯, thus, L is in the support of F¯ (·), thus, under N , the expected
payoff to primary 2 at L is
(L− c)(1− qp1) = p¯2 − c (4.158)
as F1(L) = 1 and F (L) = 0.
Thus, from (4.158) and (4.157) p1 = p2 + (1− p2)F¯ (L). Now, the expected payoff of
primary 2 at L when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available, is
(L− c)(1− p1) = (L− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)F¯ (L))
= p¯1 − c from(4.156) (4.159)
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Hence, from (4.154), (4.159), (4.155) and (4.158) that
1− p1F1(L¯)
1− p1 =
1− qp1F1(L¯)
1− qp1 (4.160)
which leads to a contradiction as neither q is not equal to 1 nor F1(L¯) = 1. Hence, we
must have L = L¯.
Now, at L, the expected payoff of primary 2 at Y is (L−c)(1−p1) = p¯1−c. Similarly,
at L¯, the expected payoff of primary 1 at Y is (L¯ − c)(1 − p2) = p¯1 − c. Since L = L¯,
thus, we must have p1 = p2. Hence, the result follows.
Next, we determine the probability with which the primaries must randomize between
Y and N in an NE strategy.
Observation 4.10. If both the primaries randomize between Y and N , they should do it
w.p. p where p =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s
q(v − c)(1− q)− sq .
Proof. Suppose that a primary selects its price from F1(·) under Y and when it knows
that the channel of other primary is available. Suppose that under F1(·) the expected
payoff is p˜1 − c. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 under Y is
(v − c)(1− q) + q(p˜1 − c)− s (4.161)
Suppose that the primary selects its price from F (·) under N . Since no primary has
any jump at v when both the primaries randomize between Y and N and v is the upper
end-point of F (·) by Theorem 4.15, thus, the expected payoff under N is (v − c)(1 − q).
Since the primary randomizes between Y and N , thus, the expected payoff under Y and
under N must be the same. Hence, we must have s = q(p˜1 − c).
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Suppose L be the upper end point of the support of F1(·) (and thus, also the lower
endpoint of F (·)). Hence, the expected payoff at L is
(L− c)(1− qp) = (v − c)(1− q) (4.162)
Thus, L = (v − c)(1− q)/(1− qp) + c. Also note that L is also a best response at F1(·).
Thus,
(L− c)(1− p) = s
q
(v − c)(1− q)(1− p)
1− qp =
s
q
(4.163)
Obtaining p from the above expression will give the desired result.
Does there exists an NE where one player selects Y w.p. 1?
Theorem 4.17. There is no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and the other primary
selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1− p.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that primary 1 selects Y w.p. 1 and the primary
2 selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1− p.
Now suppose that primary 1 selects a price using the distribution function F1(·) when
it knows that the channel of its competitor is available for sale. Let at Y , primary 2 selects
a price using distribution function F2(·) when it knows that the channel of its competitor
is available for sale, and at N , it selects a price using distribution function F¯2(·).
Let L1 be the lower end-point of the support of F1(·) and L2 (L¯2, resp.) be the lower
end-point of F2(·) (F¯2, resp.).
Note from Theorem 4.14 that L¯2 > L2. Now, we show that L1 = L2. Suppose
that L1 > L2, then, primary 2 can attain strictly higher payoff at any price close to L1
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compared to at L2 which shows that L2 can not be a lower end-point of F2. By symmetry,
it also follows that L1 can not be less than L2, hence L1 = L2. Thus, the expected payoff
at Y must be equal for both the primaries.
Now, note that F1(·) can not have a jump at v by Theorem 4.13. Note that the upper
end-point of F¯2(·) is v by Theorem 4.15. Since F1(·) does not have a jump at v, thus, v
is a best response of primary 2 under N . Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 under
N is (v − c)(1 − q). Since primary 2 randomizes between N and Y , thus, the expected
payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q) under Y . Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
also (v − c)(1− q).
At any x ∈ [L¯2, v) primary 2 does not have any jump, thus, x is a best response for
primary 1. Thus, at any x ∈ [L¯2, v) the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p− (1− p)F¯2(x)) = p˜1 − c
F¯2(x) =
1
1− p(1− p−
1
1− p
p˜1 − c
x− c ) (4.164)
Note that under Y , the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q) + q(p˜1 − c)− s.
Now, if primary 1 selects N and a price x ∈ [L¯2, v), then its expected payoff is
(x− c)(1− qp− q(1− p)F¯2(x))
= (x− c)(1− qp− q(1− p− p˜1 − c
x− c ))
= (x− c)(1− q) + (p˜1 − c)q (4.165)
Thus, for any small enough  > 0, we have (v − c − )(1 − q) + (p˜1 − c)q > (v − c)(1 −
q)(1 − q) + q(p˜1 − c) − s¿ Hence, primary 1 has profitable unilateral deviation. Hence,
such a strategy profile can never be an NE.
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Note that we have already ruled out the possibility of the NE strategy profile where
a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and the other selects either N or Y w.p. 1. Hence, there is
no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1.
Does there exist a NE where one player selects N w.p. 1?
Theorem 4.18. There is no NE where a primary selects N w.p. 1 and the other primary
randomizes between Y and N .
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that primary 1 selects N w.p. 1 and primary 2
randomizes between Y and N .
Suppose that primary 1 selects its price using F (·). Let L be the lower end-point of
the support of F (·). Let p˜1− c be the expected payoff of primary 1. Let primary 2 selects
F2(·) when it selects Y and it knows that the channel of primary 1 is available. Let L2 be
the lower end-point of F2(·). First, note that L1 must be equal to the L2. Since L2 < v
by Theorem 4.15 and L1 = L2, thus, L2 is a best response for both primary 1 and 2.
The expected payoff of primary 2 under Y when the channel of primary 1 is L2 − c − s.
Similarly, the expected payoff of primary 1 is L2 − c. Thus, p˜1 − c = L2 − c. Expected
payoff of primary 2 under Y is, q(L2 − c) + (v − c)(1− q)− s.
Also let L be the lower end point of F¯2 where F¯2 be the pricing strategy that primary
2 uses when it selects N . From Theorem 4.15 the upper end-point of the support of F2(·)
is also L. From Theorem4.15 also note that the upper end-point of F¯2(·) is v.
First, note that under N the expected payoff of primary 2 must be at least (v−c)(1−q)
as this is the payoff that primary 2 can at least get when it selects v. Now, we show that
under N , the expected payoff of primary 2 must be equal to (v − c)(1− q). Suppose not,
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i.e. primary 2 attains an expected payoff of larger than (v − c)(1 − q). Since the upper
end-point of F¯2 is v, thus, primary 1 must have a jump at v. Since primary 1 has a jump
at v, thus, v is a best response for primary 1. Thus, primary 1 attains an expected payoff
of (v − c)(1− q) under N . Thus, p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q). Since primary 2 is randomizing
between Y and N , thus, the primary 2’s expected payoff is also greater than (v−c)(1−q)
when it selects Y . Thus, if the primary 1 select Y and price L2 w.p. 1 when the channel
of primary 2 is available and v w.p. 1 otherwise; then it will also get an expected payoff
of q(L2 − c) + (v − c)(1− q)− s which is higher compared to (v − c)(1− q). Hence, this
is not possible.
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 must be equal to (v− c)(1− q). Since primary
1 gets an expected payoff of at least of (v− c)(1− q), thus, L2− c ≥ (v− c)(1− q). Since
L is the upper end-point of the support of F2(·) and L is also the lower end-point of the
support of F¯2, thus,
(L− c)(1− F1(L))− s ≥ (v − c)(1− q)− s
(L− c)(1− qF1(L)) = (v − c)(1− q) (4.166)
both can not be true simultaneously since q 6= 1. Hence, the result follows.
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Chapter 5
Co-existence of Multiple
Secondaries in the Primary’s
channel
We now consider the setting where the primary allows multiple secondaries to access the
spectrum at a location. In a secondary network a secondary-base station (secondary-BS)
transmits to a secondary-user terminal (secondary-UT) with certain power. Secondary-
BSs are constrained to allocate transmitting powers such that the total interference at
each primary-UT is below a given threshold. We formulate the power allocation problem
as a concave non cooperative game with secondary-BSs as players and multiple primary-
UTs enforcing the coupled constraints. The equilibrium selection is based on the concept
of normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE). When the interference at a secondary-UT from
adjacent secondary-BSs is negligible, the NNE is shown to be unique for any strictly
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concave utility. We propose a distributed algorithm which converges to the unique NNE.
When the interference at a secondary-UT from adjacent secondary-BSs is not negligible,
an NNE may not be unique and the computation of the NNE may be computationally
challenging. To avoid these drawbacks, we introduce the concept of a weakly normalized
Nash equilibrium (WNNE) which keeps most of the NNEs’ interesting properties but, in
contrast to the latter, the WNNE can be determined with low complexity.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.1 we describe the system model. In
Section 5.2 we formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with secondary-BSs as
the players; secondary-BSs need to select the power with which they will transmit subject
to the constraint that the interference must be limited at each primary user terminal. We
describe Normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) as a solution concept. In Section 5.3 we
characterize the utility functions which admit a unique NNE. In Section 5.4 we introduce
the concept of Weakly normalized Nash equilibrium (WNNE). In Section 5.5 we show
that the NNE is equivalent to an optimal solution of a convex optimization problem
in a concave potential game. Leveraging on that we propose a distributed algorithm
which converges to the NNE in the concave potential games. If the game is not concave
potential, then we show that we can use the WNNE as an equilibrium concept which can
be computed easily compared to the NNE in those games. We illustrate the significance of
WNNE in a specific example setting in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7 we numerically analyze
the properties of the NNE and WNNE for some widely used utility functions.
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Figure 5.1: Primary-BS, primary-UTs, secondary-BSs and secondary-UTs in a region. Circles
represent the range of base stations. Primary-BS has higher coverage compared to secondary-BS.
Each secondary-BS serves only one secondary-UT. Secondary-UT is placed close to its serving
secondary-BS. Secondary-BSs cause interference at a primary-UT as well as the secondary-UTs.
5.1 System Model
Notation. Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower case and bold capital letters,
respectively; ·T denotes the transpose operator; the notation x  0 stays for component-
wise inequality; IM denotes the M × M identity matrix and 1M and 0M are the M -
dimensional column vectors of ones and zeros, respectively. Given the real x, (x)+ =
max(x, 0). Additionally, HK is the sub-matrix of H containing only the rows and columns
in an index set K. This notation is immediately extended to vectors. The vector v−i
is obtained from vector v by suppressing the ith component. The matrix operator 
denotes the Hadamard or component wise product; D = diag(v) maps vector v onto a
diagonal matrix with diagonal component d`,` = v`. The set of nonnegative real numbers
in denoted by R+.
We consider a cognitive radio network consisting of F secondary-BSs and M primary-
UTs (Fig. 5.1) [3]. In each secondary network, a secondary-BS serves a single secondary-
UT. Thus, there are F secondary-UTs. We do not make any assumptions regarding the
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Figure 5.2: Primary-BS, primary-UTs, secondary-BSs and secondary-UTs in a region. Circles
represent the range of base stations. The range of secondary-BS is smaller compared to Figure
5.1. The number of secondary networks is lower. In this setting, secondary-BSs do not cause
interference at the adjacent secondary-UTs. However, they still cause interference at primary-
UTs.
distribution of secondary-BSs, secondary-UTs and secondary-UTs except the fact that
each secondary-UT is located close to its secondary-BS since secondary-BS has smaller
coverage area. We consider the secondary spectrum access model where secondary net-
works and a primary network use the same channel for downlink communications. Let hf
be the channel gain between the secondary-BS f and its served secondary-UT f and ĥfm
is the channel gain between secondary-BS f and primary-UT m. Finally, h˜fk is the chan-
nel gain between secondary-BS k and secondary-UT f, with f 6= k. The secondary-BS
f transmits with power pf ≥ 0. For future use, it is convenient to define the follow-
ing vectors p = (p1, p2, . . . , pF )
T , h = (h1, h2, . . . , hF )
T , ĥm = (ĥ
1
m, ĥ
2
m, . . . , ĥ
F
m)
T , with
m = 1, . . . ,M, ĥf = (ĥf1 , ĥ
f
2 , . . . , ĥ
f
M )
T , and h˜f = (h˜f1 , h˜
f
2 , . . . , h˜
f
f−1, h˜
f
f+1, . . . h˜
f
F )
T , with
f = 1, . . . , F.
The primary network operates in the time division duplexing (TDD) mode i.e. the
primary-UTs transmit and receive in the same frequency band. This feature implies that
secondary-BS f can estimate ĥfm by sensing a pilot signal sent by primary-UT m due to
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the channel reciprocity assumption [90] . Hence, the channel feedback by primary-UTs
to secondary-BSs is not required to estimate ĥfm. Also note that secondary-BS f can
acquire ĥfm without communicating with other secondary-BSs or secondary-UTs. The
interference from secondary-BSs at a primary-UT m is
Im = p
T ĥm m = 1, . . . ,M. (5.1)
The signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) at secondary-UT f is given by
γf =
pfhf
σ2 + pT−f h˜f
(5.2)
where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise that also accounts for
interference from primary-BSs. In general γf is a function of p. When it is convenient,
we explicitly point out this dependence by writing γf (p), otherwise we omit it and use
the short notation γf .
Until now, we have discussed a general model where interference at a secondary-UT
from other secondary-BSs is not negligible. We also consider the setting depicted in Fig.
5.2 where the interference at a secondary-UT from other secondary-BSs is negligible. The
above setting arises when the number of secondary networks is small and the secondary-
BS has small coverage area. In this setting, it is reasonable to assume that h˜f ∼= 0, and
thus, γf reduces to the signal to noise ratio (SNR) γ
′
f =
pfhf
σ2
. We show that in this case,
the NNE has favorable properties which may not remain valid in a more general setting
such as in Fig. 5.1.
Note that in both of these settings, primary-UTs are ubiquitous and in general are
distant from the base station due to the wide coverage area of the primary-BS (consider,
for example, a macro cell). Thus, primary-UTs are likely to be present relatively close
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to secondary-BSs. Additionally, since the distance from the primary-BS to primary-UT
is large, the received signal power is very low at a primary-UT compared to the signal
power received by the secondary-UTs. As a result, secondary-BSs can generate significant
performance degradation to primary-UTs even when the interference at each secondary-
UT caused by adjacent secondary-BSs is negligible. Thus, the performance degradation
at primary-UT due to the transmission of secondary-BSs can be severe in both the studied
settings. In order to keep the quality of the downlink communications in each primary-UT
acceptable, total interference from all secondary-BSs must be below an acceptable limit
in both of these settings. Specifically, we assume
pT ĥm ≤ IT m = 1, . . . ,M. (5.3)
In this article we are interested only in keeping the interference caused by secondary-base
stations to each primary-UT below a certain acceptable limit. In fact, in practice, the
interference from primary-BSs to primary-UTs is efficiently controlled by proper beam-
forming design and coordinated beamforming. We consider identical thresholds at differ-
ent primary-UTs in order to keep notations simple. The extension to the general case
with different thresholds is straightforward.
Additionally, the transmission powers are constrained to a maximum value PMAX such
that
p  PMAX1F . (5.4)
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5.2 Problem Formulation and Solution concept
5.2.1 Problem Formulation
Secondary-BS f selects its transmission power with the objective of maximizing the quality
of its communication in downlink. Its communication quality is characterized by Uf (γf ),
where Uf (·) is a concave nondecreasing function.
We formulate the power allocation at secondary-BSs as a non-cooperative game where
each secondary-BS aims to maximize its utility Uf (γf ) under constraints
1 (5.3).
More specifically, we define this non-cooperative game in a strategic form as
G = {F ,P, {uf (p)}f∈F} (5.5)
where the elements of the game are
• Player set: Set of the secondary-BSs F = {1, ..., F};
• Strategy set: P = {p|p ∈ RF+ and pT ĥm ≤ IT , m = 1, . . .M}, where RF+ is the
product space of F nonnegative real spaces R+.
• Utility set: the functions uf (p) are defined as uf (p) ≡ Uf (γf (p)) =
Uf
(
pfhf
σ2+pT−f h˜f
)
, Uf (·) is a concave nondecreasing function in R+.
We adopt a NE of the non-cooperative game G as a power allocation policy for the
secondary-BSs. More specifically, the power allocation vector p∗ is a Nash Equilibrium
1Throughout the rest of this chapter, to keep notation and equations compact, we do not consider
constraints (5.4). They are orthogonal and can be immediately embedded in the proposed game theoretical
framework. The extension of all the results presented here to the case including these additional constraints
is straightforward.
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(NE), i.e., for every f ∈ F and pf such that (p∗1, . . . p∗f−1, pf , p∗f+1, p∗F ) ∈ P
Uf
(
p∗fhf
σ2 + p∗T−f h˜f
)
≥ Uf
(
pfhf
σ2 + p∗T−f h˜f
)
. (5.6)
By observing that each Uf
(
pfhf
σ2+pT−f h˜f
)
is continuous in RF+ and concave for pf ∈ R+
and the set P is convex and closed, we conclude that G falls in the class of concave games
with coupled constraints studied in [67] and a NE exists [67].
5.2.2 Normalized Nash Equilibrium
The strategy set P is closed, convex, and bounded2. Under the further assumption that
the functions Uf , for all f = F , possess continuous first derivatives, we can use the
necessary and sufficient KKT conditions for constrained maxima [11] to obtain conditions
satisfied by a NE p∗. If p∗ is a NE in P, then, there exist F vectors λf = (λf1 , λf2 . . . , λfM )
with λf ≥ 0 such that p∗ satisfies the following system of equations
λfm(p
T ĥm − IT ) = 0, m = 1, . . .M
and f = 1, . . . F (5.7)
∂Uf (γf )
∂pf
−
M∑
m=1
λfm
∂
∂pf
(pT ĥm − IT ) = 0f = 1, . . . F (5.8)
We can write (5.8) as
U
′
f (γf )
∂γf
∂pf
− λf T ĥf = 0, f = 1, . . . F. (5.9)
2Boundedness can be immediately verified if each secondary-BS’s transmitted signal impinges on at
least one of the primary-UT, i.e. there exists no secondary-BS f such that ĥfm = 0 for all m = 1, . . . ,M .
If this will not be the case, it is not of a practical interest to include a secondary-BS that does not cause
interference on any primary-UT, as player in the game G.
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A NE in the coupled game G is not unique in general. The uniqueness of an NE in
a constrained game is guaranteed only for orthogonal constraints, i.e., when the strategy
of a player is independent of other players’ strategies [67]. Rosen in [67] has introduced
the concept of NNE that provides a useful equilibrium selection criterion for coupled
constrained games when the strategy of a player poses restrictions on the strategy of
other players as in our setting.
The strategy p∗ is a normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) if the KKT conditions in (5.7)
and (5.9) are satisfied with3 λm = (λ
1
m, . . . , λ
F
m) = λm1
T
F , i.e., the Lagrangian multipliers
are identical for all the players for each given constraint enforced by primary-UT m. The
concept of NNE has several advantages described in the following.
The Lagrangian multiplier λfm can be viewed as the price per unit of interference
caused by player f at primary-UT m. Thus, as first advantage, a primary-UT does not
have to select different prices for different players in an NNE. Additionally, as it will be
clear from the decentralized implementation proposed in Section 5.5.2, the above property
considerably reduces the cost and the complexity of the signaling among primary-UTs and
secondary-BSs. A second benefit appears in obtaining a distributed algorithm where each
primary-UT only needs to track the sum of the interferences in order to calculate the price
and does not need to track the interference from each user reducing the communication
and signaling costs further.
3In [67] an equilibrium is an NNE if the KKT conditions are satisfied for some vector r > 0 and λ >= 0,
λfm = λm/rf . The NNE that we consider is in accordance with the above definition when r = 1. In [67],
r is used to find an NNE for a weighted utility function, i.e., Uf is scaled by rfUF . In our setting, r = 1
since we do not consider any weighted utility function.
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Since NNEs have favorable properties to be implemented in a decentralized fashion,
we henceforth examine the computing and the uniqueness of the NNEs.
5.3 On the Uniqueness of an NNE
The uniqueness of an NNE for concave games with coupled constrained has been studied
in [67]. In the following proposition we summarize the results useful for further develop-
ments.
Proposition 5.1. [67] Let
G(p) =

∂2u1
∂p21
∂2u1
∂p2∂p1
. . .
∂2u1
∂pF∂p1
∂2u2
∂p1∂p2
∂2u2
∂p22
. . .
∂2u2
∂pF∂p2
...
...
...
∂2uF
∂p1∂pF
∂2uF
∂p2∂pF
. . .
∂2uF
∂p2F

. (5.10)
If the symmetric matrix G(p) + GT (p) is negative definite for all p ∈ P, then there
exists a unique vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λM ) and a unique NE p
∗ which satisfy all the KKT
conditions in (5.7)-(5.9) with λfm = λm for all f ∈ F and m = 1, . . . ,M , i.e., the NNE
is unique4.
In order to study the uniqueness of an NNE, throughout this article, we assume that
the utility set Uf (·) are twice differentiable and strictly concave. We analyze under which
4The condition defined in Proposition 5.1 is sufficient, but not necessary. In [67] a weaker sufficient
condition is provided for the uniqueness of NNE. We do not consider that conditona since it is very difficult
to verify in practice.
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conditions the game G defined for the cognitive network with secondary-BSs as players
admits a unique NNE.
Initially, we focus on the case when the interference from adjacent secondary-BSs is
negligible at all the secondary-UTs, i.e. uf (p) = Uf (γ
′
f ) = Uf
(
pfhf
σ2
)
. Then, G(p) is
diagonal and given by
G(p) = diag
(
h21
σ4
U ′′1
(
p1h1
σ2
)
,
h22
σ4
U ′′2
(
p2h2
σ2
)
, . . .
h2F
σ4
U ′′F
(
pFhF
σ2
))
. (5.11)
Thanks to the assumption of strict concavity of Uf (·), for f ∈ F and for every p ∈ P
, all the diagonal elements of the matrix G(p) are strictly negative and according to
Proposition 5.1, NNE is unique.
Then, we consider the case where the interference from adjacent secondary-BSs is not
negligible. In this case,
∂2Uf
∂p2f
= κfU
′′
f (γf )hf (5.12)
∂2Uf
∂p`∂pf
= −κf h˜f`
(
γfU
′′
f (γf ) + U
′
f (γf )
)
(5.13)
with κf =
hf
(σ2 + pT−f h˜f )2
. Then, the general expression of matrix G(p) is presented in
(5.14) and the properties of the matrix G(p) strictly depend on the selected functions
Uf (·), with f ∈ F , and on the realizations of the channels h and h˜f , f ∈ F . In general,
it is not clear if the matrix G(p) + GT (p) is negative definite for every p ∈ P and thus,
the uniqueness of the NNE is not guaranteed. Even for given functions Uf (·), f ∈ F ,
and channel h and h˜f , it is not clear if the condition of Proposition 5.1 is satisfied.
Nevertheless, in the next section we provide a class of utility functions which are of
practical interest and possess unique NNEs when the interference at a secondary-UT
from adjacent secondary-BSs is not negligible.
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5.4 Weakly normalized NE (WNNE)
First of all, we state a proposition whose proof is in Appendix.
Proposition 5.2. Let G ≡ {F ,P, {Uf (γf )}f∈F} and G′ ≡ {F ,P, {Vf (γf )}f∈F} be two
games of the kind defined in (5.5) with identical player and strategy sets and different
utility sets. Let the functions Vf and Uf , f ∈ F , be strictly increasing functions. Then,
if p∗ is a NE of game G′, then it is also a NE for game G.
By using the above proposition, we formally define the weakly normalized NE (WNNE)
of game G induced by the utility set V = {Vf (γf )}f∈F .
Definition 5.1. Let game G′ with utility set V ≡ {Vf (γf )|f ∈ F} and strictly increasing
Vf (·) have an NNE p. Then, p is also a NE of the game G with utility set U ≡ {Uf (γf )|f ∈
F} and strictly increasing Uf (·). This NE p is be denoted as the Weakly Normalized Nash
equilibrium of G induced by the utility set V.
Note that the WNNE depends on the set of utility functions V. If the game G′ with the
specified set of utility functions V admits a unique NNE, then there is a unique WNNE
of the game G induced by the utility set V.
For some game G the NNE may not be unique and the computation of an NNE can
be highly costly in terms of the computational complexity, while it can be possible to
identify a unique WNNE induced on game G by a different set of utility functions with
lower complexity. Thus, we can obtain a NE of the game that retains some of the appealing
properties of an NNE. We enlighten the benefit in detail in Sections 5.5.4 and 5.6.
In cognitive radio networks with non negligible inter-secondary-network interference,
the concept of WNNE can be illustrated by selecting the functions Vf (x) = log(x) and
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defining the utility set
V =
{
vf (p) = log(γ) = log
(
pfhf
σ2 + pT−f h˜f
)}
. (5.15)
Note that it is worthwhile to consider such a utility function thanks to the following
features:
• ∑f∈F log(γf ) is the utility function underlying a proportionally fair SINR allocation.
• When SINR  1, then the maximum achievable rate of each secondary-UT, shortly
referred as Shannon capacity, log(1 + SINR) can be approximated by log(SINR), i.e.
log(1 + SINR) ≈ log(SINR).
• For certain applications (e.g. voice transmission) the utility functions increase with
SINR in a logarithmic manner.
By observing that
x
d2 log(x)
dx2
+
d log(x)
dx
= 0
the matrix G(p) in (5.14) reduces to a diagonal matrix with strictly negative diagonal
elements for every p ∈ P when the utility set V is adopted. Thus, by Proposition 5.1, the
NNE p is unique for the above game. We can adopt p as a unique WNNE induced by the
set V to any game G of the kind defined in (5.5) with strictly increasing utility functions
Uf (·), f ∈ F . For example, we can consider the set V = {Vf (γf (p)) = log(1 + γf )} i.e.
the set of Shannon Capacity functions.
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5.5 Computing a Normalized Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we present the concept of coupled constrained potential games. Subse-
quently, we show that there are games of the type introduced in Section 5.2-where finding
an NNE is equivalent to solving a concave potential game. We propose a distributed
algorithm which converges to the unique NNE of a strictly concave potential game in Sec-
tion 5.5.2. Subsequently, we identify a class of utility functions for which the distributed
algorithm can be applied to attain the unique NNE in Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4. Finally,
in Section 5.5.4, we discuss the significance of obtaining an NNE as it induces a WNNE
in a broad class of games.
5.5.1 Constrained Concave Potential Games
Constrained potential games have been discussed in [92] and [71]. They found application
to rate and power allocation in multiple access channels (MAC). To the best of our
knowledge our work is the first one to provide a relationship between potential games and
NNE in a cognitive network. In contrast to [92] and [71], we consider here an interference
channel which presents more challenging issues than a MAC. For example, the Shannon
capacity in a MAC setting admits a potential function and this property has been widely
exploited in literature. However, the same utility does not admit a potential function
when there is interference at a secondary-UT from other secondary-BSs in the interference
channel. Additionally, in contrast to previous works, we also identify a broad class of
utility functions which admit concave potential games. Finally, we propose a distributed
algorithm by leveraging on the concave potential game. This distributed algorithm enables
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us to implement NNE or WNNE in a distributed fashion in cognitive radio networks which
were not considered in [92] and [71].
We first introduce the following definitions which we use throughout.
Definition 5.2. [92] A non-cooperative game G with utility set {uf (p)|f ∈ F} is an exact
potential game5 if there exists a function Φ(p) such that for all f ∈ F and (pf ,p−f ),
(p′f ,p−f ) ∈ P:
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f ,p−f ) = uf (pf ,p−f )− uf (p′f ,p−f ).
Definition 5.3. [92] A potential game is called a concave potential game if the potential
function Φ(p) is concave in p ∈ P. If Φ(p) is strictly concave, it is called strictly concave
potential game.
Remark 5.1. [61] For a differentiable utility function uf (·), Φ(·) is a potential function of
the game if and only if (iff)
∂uf
∂pf
=
∂Φ
∂pf
∀f ∈ F . (5.16)
The utility of introducing the concave potential game is shown in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5.3. Suppose there exists a potential function Φ(p) of the game G defined in
(5.5) as G = {F ,P, {uf (p)|f ∈ F}}. The solution of the following optimization problem,
referred to as CCPG, is an NNE.
CCPG maximizep Φ(p)
subject to p ∈ P
5Hitherto, we refer to an exact potential game as a potential game.
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If the potential function Φ(p) is concave, then the optimal solution of the convex
optimization problem CCPG is an NNE. Note that if an NNE is unique then the solution
of CCPG is the unique NNE. If a coupled constraint concave game G admits a potential
function, in general, not every NNE can be expressed as a solution of CCPG. However, if
the potential function is concave, then, each NNE is a solution of the CCPG optimization
problem since the KKT conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality
for concave potential games.
5.5.2 A Distributed Algorithm to Determine an NNE
In Section 5.5.1, we showed that, when a coupled constrained concave game G has a unique
NNE and admits a potential function, we can solve the potential game in order to achieve
the unique NNE. When the potential function Φ(·) is strictly concave and ∂Uf
∂pf
only
depends on the local information measurable at secondary-BS f, i.e., pf , hf , σ
2 ∀f ∈ F ,
then, there exists a distributed algorithm which converges to the unique optimal solution
p∗ and the dual optimal solution λ∗. The distributed algorithm is described in the
following.
Algorithm DIST
Initially primary-UT m selects λ0 ∈ RM+ \ {0} randomly6.
At iteration k + 1 = 1, 2, . . . , the following tasks are performed:
1. Each secondary-BS f sets
pk+1f = argmaxpf≥0Φ− pfλk T hˆf (5.17)
6λ0 is initialized arbitrarily.
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Then, all the secondary-BSs transmit with updated power level
pk+1 = (pk+11 , p
k+1
2 , . . . p
k+1
F ).
2. Primary-UT m sets
λk+1m = (λ
k
m + δ(ĥ
T
mp
k+1
f − IT ))+ (5.18)
where δ > 0 is a sufficiently small constant. Primary-UT m reports the updated
cost λk+1m to all the secondary-BSs.
Since computing an NNE is equivalent to solving the convex optimization problem CCPG
by Proposition 5.3, thus, the convergence of Algorithm DIST follows immediately from
known results in [9] and it is stated in the following:
Proposition 5.4. Algorithm DIST converges to the unique optimal primal solution p∗
and dual solution λ∗ when Φ(·) is strictly concave in p.
In algorithm DIST Secondary-BS f needs to find the optimal pf . In order to find the
optimal pf , secondary-BS f needs to evaluate
∂Φ
∂pf
. Since in a potential game,
∂Φ
∂pf
=
∂Uf
∂pf
,
thus, a secondary-BS f does not need to know the utility functions of other secondary-BSs.
Equivalently we can write step 1 as
pk+1f = argmaxpf≥0Uf (γf (p))− pfλk T hˆf
In step 1, secondary-BS f needs to know ĥf . Note that ĥf consists of the values of
channel gains between secondary-BS f and all primary-UTs. As discussed in Section 5.1,
Secondary-BS f can obtain those values locally through sensing of pilot signal sent from
the primary-UTs assuming the channel reciprocity since the primary network operates
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in TDD mode. Thus, when
∂Uf
∂pf
only depends on pf , hf , σ
2, then secondary-BS f can
update its power in step 1 without any costly feedback exchange with other secondary-BSs
and secondary-UTs in algorithm DIST. Thus, even though the solution of potential game
CCPG requires to know all the channel gains, a secondary-BS needs not know channel
gains regarding other secondary-BSs and UTs in Algorithm DIST. Hence, a secondary-
BS does not need to communicate with other secondary-BSs and UTs. In the following
Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4, we show that for a wide class of utility functions concave potential
games exist and
∂Uf
∂pf
only depends on pf , hf and σ
2, i.e., for a wide class of utility
functions, algorithm DIST can be applied to obtain the unique NNE.
Note that primary-UTs need to broadcast the prices λ. Thus, a cooperation from
primary-UTs is required. However, we need very limited cooperation from primary-UTs.
The costly channel feedback from primary-UTs to secondary-BSs is not required since
secondary-BS f can acquire the vector ĥf locally as discussed in Section 5.1. Each
primary-UT only needs to track the total interference7. This tracking can be performed
by using a known test signal sent by the primary-BS periodically. The primary-UT
does not need to track interference from each secondary-BS. Hence, it does not need to
communicate with each secondary-BS. Thus, a primary-UT is oblivious of the number
of secondary-UTs, their utilities, the channel parameters and the transmitted power p.
Hence, the signaling and communication cost is greatly reduced. Primary-UT m is also
compensated by the price λm for per unit of interference caused by the secondary-BSs.
Thus, an incentive is also provided to primary-UTs for the minimal amount of cooperation
7It is reasonable to assume that the interference from secondary-BSs situated at far-off locations from
a primary-BS is negligible in order to avoid communication overhead.
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required in Algorithm DIST. Thus, the distributed algorithm DIST is readily scalable and
implementable in practice.
5.5.3 Negligible Inter-Secondary Network Interference
In this section, we show that when the interference from other secondary-BSs at each
secondary-UT is negligible , then the game is a strictly concave potential game.
In this setting, SINR reduces to the SNR γ′f (p) =
pfhf
σ2
, ∀f ∈ F . Next lemma shows
that in this scenario every game G defined in (5.5) is a strictly concave potential game.
Lemma 5.1. Let Φ(p) =
∑
f Uf (γ
′
f (p)). Then, Φ(p) is a potential function for game G
defined in (5.5) with utility set {Uf (γ′f )|f ∈ F}. Moreover, if Uf (·) is strictly concave,
then so Φ(·) is.
If we focus on strictly concave functions Uf (·), the NNE is unique as we have shown
in Section 5.3. We can evaluate the unique NNE by solving the potential game CCPG by
Proposition 5.3. Moreover, we can apply Algorithm DIST, which will converge to optimal
p∗ and dual variable λ∗ since γ′f is only a function of pf , hf and σ
2 and Uf (·) is a function
of γ′f in this setting. It is worth noting that the NNE in this setting also maximizes the
sum of the utility functions of players under the set of constraints P since Φ = ∑Ff=1 Uf .
5.5.4 Presence of Inter-Secondary Network Interference
When the interference from adjacent secondary-BSs is not negligible at all the secondary-
UTs, then we have already seen that an NNE may be not unique. However, in Section
5.4 we have identified a utility set V defining a game G, whose NNE is unique and can be
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used to define a unique WNNE for games with different utility sets. In this section, we
show that the game with utility set V defined in (5.15) admits a potential function.
Let us consider again the utility set V defined in (5.15). Then, Vf (p) is a strictly
increasing concave function in pf . The following lemma shows that the game G with the
utility set V defined in (5.15) is a potential game.
Lemma 5.2. Let Φ(p) =
∑
f log(pf ). Φ(p) is a potential function for the game G defined
in (5.5) and the utility set (5.15). Moreover, the potential game is strictly concave.
Hence, the solution of CCPG will provide the unique NNE to game G defined in (5.5)
with the utility set (5.15). Note that though Uf depends on p−f and h˜f ,
∂Φ
∂pf
or
∂Uf
∂pf
only
depends on pf , hf and σ
2, thus, we can use Algorithm DIST described in Section 5.5.2
to obtain the unique NNE for a game G with utility set (5.15). Note that the NNE may
not maximize the sum of the utility functions of players unlike the NNEs of the games
discussed in Section 5.5.3.
Now, we show that, in general, a potential game does not exist in this setting by using
the following result.
Proposition 5.5. [61] For twice continuously differentiable utility functions uf , u`, f, ` ∈
F , there exists a potential function iff ∂
2uf
∂p`∂pf
(p) =
∂2u`
∂pf∂p`
(p), ∀p ∈ P.
It is easy to verify from (5.13) that in general the utilities Uf (γf ) do not satisfy the
conditions stated in Proposition 5.5. Thus, in general a potential function does not exist.
There exist large classes of function Uf (γf (p)) which are strictly concave functions of pf
but still they do not admit a potential function. One such examples is Uf (γf ) = log(1+γf ).
For all these cases when the functions Uf (·) are strictly increasing, it is convenient to
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invoke to Proposition 5.2 and resort to the concept of WNNE with respect to the utility
set V in (5.15). We have already shown in Lemma 5.2 that the game G with utility set
V in (5.15) is a strictly concave potential game and we can attain the unique NNE using
Algorithm DIST proposed in Section 5.5.2. Hence, we can easily obtain the WNNE for
any game G including the one where Uf (γf ) = log(1 + γf ) even though this latter game
is not a potential game.
5.6 A Relevant Case
In this section we focus on the Shannon capacity as utility, i.e. Uf (γf ) = B log(1 + γf ),
B being the channel frequency bandwidth. First, we determine conditions which are
sufficient to conclude about uniqueness of an NNE. In Section 5.5.4 we saw that there is
no potential function for this game. Thus, we cannot utilize the results regarding potential
games in order to obtain the NNE. Nevertheless, we provide an algorithm which returns
the unique NNE for a system with a single primary-UT when the uniqueness condition is
satisfied and under some technical conditions detailed throughout this section.
Let us start introducing a first assumption that guarantees the uniqueness of the NNE.
Assumption 5.1. The following matrix is row wise and column wise diagonally dominant
H¯ =

k1h1 k1h˜
1
2 . . . k1h˜
1
F
. . . . . . . . . . . .
kF h˜
F
1 kF h˜
F
2 . . . kFhF

for every kf , f ∈F such that Bhf
(p¯fhf + p¯
T
−f h˜f + σ2)2
≤ kf ≤ Bhf
σ4
where p¯f = minm
IT
hˆfm
, f ∈
F .
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Remark 5.2. Note that the following conditions are sufficient to conclude that the matrix
H¯ is row wise and column wise diagonally dominant:
hf >1
T
F−1h˜
f (5.19)
Bh2f
(p¯fhf + p¯
T
−f h˜f + σ2)2
>
∑
`6=f
Bh`h˜
`
f
σ4
. (5.20)
Though the above conditions are technical but the above conditions are satisfied for
sufficiently small h˜`f and h˜
f
` , ` 6= f compared to hf .
The following lemma shows that if Assumption 5.1 holds, then the NNE is unique.
Lemma 5.3. If Assumption 5.1 holds, then there exists a unique NNE .
Henceforth, we assume that Assumption 5.1 is satisfied and we examine how to com-
pute the unique NNE. Since there is a unique NNE p∗ = (p1, . . . , pF ) ∈ P, thus there is
a unique λ ≥ 0 satisfying the system of equations (5.9) and the complementary slackness
equations
λm(p
∗T ĥm − IT ) = 0 ∀m = 1, . . . ,M. (5.21)
By simple algebraic calculation we obtain the optimal p∗f for a given λ:
p∗f =
1
hf
(
Bhf
λT ĥf
− σ2 − pT−f h˜f
)+
. (5.22)
The optimal strategy of a secondary-BS depends on the strategies adopted by the other
secondary-BSs and λ. It is not known a priori which p∗f is zero and which constraints
are active, i.e. which components of λ are strictly positive. The solution requires us to
consider all the possible combinations. Thus, it is computationally demanding to compute
the unique NNE. The complexity of the problem reduces to some extent when we focus on
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the scenario with one single primary-UT, i.e., M = 1. Thus, we consider such a scenario.
Since there is only one constraint with a slight abuse of notation we shortly denote hˆf1 as
hˆf ∀f ∈ F and ĥ1 as ĥ.
The following observation shows that the single constraint must be active at the NNE
in this setting.
Observation 5.1. At NNE p, we must have pT ĥ = IT .
Since there is a single constraint, thus (5.22) reduces to
p∗f =
1
hf
(
Bhf
λhˆf
− p∗T−f h˜f − σ2
)+
(5.23)
From Observation 5.1 we also must have
pT ĥ = IT . (5.24)
Then, the NNE p∗ and the corresponding λ have to satisfy (5.23) and (5.24).
In the following, we provide an algorithm yielding p∗ for a given λ. Let
H =

h1 h˜
1
2 . . . h˜
1
F
· · . . . ·
h˜F1 h˜
F
2 . . . hF

and
h =
(
Bh1
hˆ1
· · · BhF
hˆF
)T
We assume that
Assumption 5.2. The matrix H is row wise and column wise strictly diagonally domi-
nant.
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Remark 5.3. Since H is row wise and column wise strictly diagonally dominant, thus the
square matrix HK is invertible for any index subset K of F .
Under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, we can state the following algorithm.
Algorithm OPTI:
Given λ > 0, we execute the following steps:
1. Initialize K0 to the empty set, i.e. set K0 = ∅. For each index i ∈ F , if Bhi
λhˆi
≤ σ2
set p∗i = 0 otherwise assign K
0 ← K0⋃{i}.
2. If K0 is empty exit; otherwise go to the next step.
3. Let I = 0.
4. Solve the system of equations8
HKIpKI =
1
λ
h¯KI − σ21|KI | (5.25)
and assign the solution to p0
KI
.
5. If p0
KI
 0, then set p∗
KI
= p0
KI
and exit. Otherwise go to the next step.
6. Assign I ← I + 1 and set KI = ∅. For each index i ∈ KI−1, if p0i < 0 set p∗i = 0
otherwise assign KI ← KI ⋃{i} and go to step 4.
First note that if K0 is empty, then p∗i = 0F is the only possible solution. Additionally,
the algorithm stops at most after F iterations. Thus, the algorithm scales linearly with
the number of secondary-BSs. Finally, if i /∈ KI at some iteration I, then p∗i = 0.
Algorithm OPTI converges to the desired p∗ under the following assumptions and this
property is stated in Proposition 5.6.
8Since HK0 is invertible, the solution is linear and the solution unique.
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Assumption 5.3. Fix any index k. For any i = 1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , F , we have
∑
j 6=k,i
h˜kj h˜
j
i
hj
≤ h˜ki
and ∑
j 6=k
h˜kj h˜
j
k
hkhj
≤ 1
Proposition 5.6. For a given λ > 0, Algorithm OPTI converges to p∗, the solution to
the system of equations (5.23) for every f ∈ F .
Now, we present Algorithm DIST-INT to update λ in a suitable way to attain the
NNE p and the corresponding λ. In the following, we denote by p∗(λ) the result of
Algorithm OPTI for a given λ.
Algorithm DIST-INT:
1. Set the accuracy  to a desired positive value. Initialize λ0 to positive value9 and
set J = 0.
2. Apply Algorithm OPTI to determine p∗(λJ).
3. Assign J → J + 1 and set
λJ =
(
λ(J−1) + δJ(ĥTp∗(λJ−1)− IT )
)+
where δJ = 1/(J + 1) is the stepsize.
4. If |ĥTp∗(λJ−1)− IT | ≤ , then exit, otherwise go to step 2.
9In the case it is necessary to avoid that the constraints on the communications are violated in during
the transient of the algorithm, then λ0 has to be initialized to a sufficiently high value.
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The primary-UT only needs to track the total interference like in Algorithm DIST. The
primary-UT does not need to track individual interference from a secondary-BS. Hence,
computation and signaling costs between primary-UTs and secondary-BSs are greatly
reduced. Also note that primary-UT is compensated by λ which gives the primary-UTs
incentives to cooperate during the convergence of Algorithm DIST-INT.
Note that p∗i is a continuous decreasing function of λ if the interference from other
players is small. From (5.23) it is clear that for a sufficiently small λ, at least one p∗i
will be sufficiently large such that p∗i hˆ
i > IT . On the other hand, for sufficiently large
λ, for all i ∈ F p∗i = 0 and thus ĥTp∗(λ) < IT . Thus, by the intermediate theorem of
continuity, there exists surely a λ > 0 such that ĥTp∗(λ) = IT . Hence, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 5.7. If Assumption 5.1 holds, Algorithm DIST-INT converges to an optimal
λ, which in turn yields an NNE p by Algorithm OPTI.
Discussion: Algorithm DIST-INT converges to the unique NNE with a single primary-
UT and when Assumptions 5.1-5.3 are satisfied. Hence, if Assumptions 1-3 are not satis-
fied, we have to leverage on the concept of WNNE as explained in Section 5.4.
Additionally, Algorithm OPTI can be implemented if one of the following occurs
–i) each secondary-BS knows the channel parameters H, h, and h˜f , ii) a central con-
troller has the above information and coordinates among secondary-BSs, iii) using Gauss-
Siedel method10 Algorithm OPTI can be implemented in a distributed manner at each
10In the Gauss Siedel algorithm, secodnary-BS f basically solves the equation for each f in the linear
equation (5.25) assuming that p−f is fixed. Then, secondary-BS f transmits with pf , and other secondary-
BSs then update the power vector p−f . Secondary-BS f then again updates pf until no more update is
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secondary-BS. However, in all these approaches signalling and communication costs are
greatly increased as secondary-BSs need to communicate with each other. On the other
hand, WNNE can be implemented using Algorithm DIST where secondary-BSs do not
need to exchange information among themselves. In contrast to the Gauss-Siedel method,
secondary-BSs do not need to repeatedly update their powers to solve the linear equation
(5.25), in Algorithm DIST. Hence, the convergence of the Algorithm DIST is also fast.
Hence, we can leverage on WNNE if we want to reduce the signaling and communication
cost or the time for finding an equilibrium solution and when Assumptions 5.1-5.3 are not
satisfied.
5.7 Numerical Results
We numerically evaluate the characteristics of an NNE strategy profile for several utility
functions. We consider two scenarios: i) The interference at each secondary-UT from
adjacent secondary-BSs is negligible (γi ≈ SNRi), ii) The interference is not negligible
(γi = SINRi).
To generate hˆim, h˜
i
f , we first randomly place secondary-BSs and primary-UTs in a
disc of radius r1. Then, we randomly place a secondary-UT in a disc of radius r2 around
each secondary-BS as in Fig. 5.1. We take r1 > r2 because in practice, a secondary-
UT is in a close vicinity of its secondary-BS compared to the range of primary-BS as a
secondary-BS has smaller coverage area compared to a primary-BS. Since we consider that
possible. The above algorithm converges to a solution of the linear equation (5.25). However, it needs a
longer time to converge and a secondary-BS needs to transmit its power to other secondary-BSs during
the convergence process of the algorithm OPTI.
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primary-UTs and secondary-BSs are placed randomly, our numerical analysis also includes
the possible setting where secondary-BSs and primary-UTs may be close to each other.
We compute the channel gain between two nodes according to the formula: Kd−β where
K is a parameter which depends on the frequency, the antenna gains of the transmitter
and the receiver d is the distance between two entities and β is the path loss exponent.
Similar simulation setup has been considered in several papers including [86, 78, 52]. For
all simulations we take r1 = 20, K = 1, β = 2 and σ
2 = 1. We consider r2 = 2 for
all simulations except for simulation in Fig. 5.9. Throughout this section, we use the
following notations:
UOPT = max
p∈P
∑
f∈F
Uf (γf (p)) (5.26)
UNNE =
∑
f∈F
Uf (γf (pNNE)) (5.27)
where pNNE is the NNE strategy profile.
5.7.1 Negligible Interference at secondary-UT from adjacent secondary-
BSs
In this setting γi = γ
′
i =
pihi
σ2
.
We consider the following utility functions
1. Shannon Capacity : Here Uf (γ
′
f ) = B log(1 + γ
′
f ).
2. Bit Error Rate: From[17] we can approximate bit error rate (BER) for K-QAM
modulation at secondary-BS f as follows:
BER = 0.2 exp
(
− 3γ
′
f
2(K − 1)
)
. (5.28)
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Since each secondary-BS wants to minimize the BER, we define the utility function
as
Uf (γ
′
f ) = −0.2 exp
(
− 3γ
′
f
2(K − 1)
)
. (5.29)
The above utility function is strictly concave in γ′f and thus, the NNE is unique.
We set IT = 5dB, B = 1MHz and assume a 4-QAM modulation for all simulations in this
subsection. Recall from Section 5.5.3 that pNNE is also the optimal solution for UOPT
i.e. UOPT = UNNE .
First, we study the variation of maximum achievable total utility UOPT with the
number of primary-UTs when the Shanon capacity is the utility function. Fig. 5.3 shows
that, as the number of primary-UTs increases, UOPT and the individual utilities decrease.
Intuitively, when the number of primary-UTs increases the strategy set P reduces. The
decrement of UOPT becomes small as the number of primary-UTs increases. Thus, an
increase in the number of primary-UTs does not affect the utility significantly when it
exceeds a certain threshold.
In Fig. 5.4 we adopt as utility function the BER in (5.28). Fig. 5.4 reveals that
the mean BER and each secondary-BS’s BER increase as the number of primary-UTs
increases since each secondary-BS transmits with lower power as the number of primary-
UTs increases. The rate of its increment slows down as the number of primary-UTs
increases. Intuitively, as the number of primary-UTs increases, the strategy set P remains
almost identical. Thus, the power remains almost the same even when the number of
primary-UTs increases.
Fig.5.5 shows the convergence of Algorithm DIST for systems with different number
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of secondary-BSs, F = 3, 5, and 8. Numerical computations reveal that the convergence
rate is higher for smaller number of secondary-BSs. Fig. 5.6 shows the convergence of
Algorithm DIST for systems with different number of primary-UTs. Numerical analysis
reveals that the convergence rate increases as the number of primary-UTs increase since
it decreases the strategy space P.
5.7.2 Non-Negligible Interference at Secondary-UTs from Adjacent
Secondary-BSs
When we adopt the following utility Uf (γf ) = log(γf ), f ∈ F , then it is easy to verify
that the maximization of
∑
i Ui(γi) for p ∈ P is a geometric programming [10]. Hence,
we can employ standard optimization tools to compute UOPT.
Fig.5.7 reveals that as the number of secondary-BSs increases the difference between
UOPT and UNNE increases. Intuitively, when the number of secondary-BSs is small, then
the interference at a secondary-UT is not significant and UNNE closely matches UOPT.
However, as the number of secondary-BSs increases, UNNE decreases and the difference
between UNNE and UOPT increases. Note that UOPT also decreases with the number of
secondary-BSs. Intuitively, as Uf (γf ) = log(γf ), it must be pf > 0 for any f ∈ F11. Thus,
as the number of secondary-BSs increases the interference at a secondary-UT becomes
significant as each additional secondary-BS transmits with nonzero power. Thus, UOPT
decreases with the number of secondary-BSs as the interference at a secondary-UT from
other secondary-BSs becomes significant.
Shannon capacity : We also numerically evaluate the characteristics of the NNE strat-
11Otherwise, UOPT would be negative infinity.
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egy profile when secondary-BS f ’s utility is Uf (γf ) = B log(1 + γf ).
We obtain the NNE using the algorithms OPTI and DIST-INT. We consider B = 1,
δ = 0.01, λ0 = 5 and  = 5 × 10−4. Assumptions 5.1-5.3 are satisfied for most of the
randomly generated instances of the system for F ≤ 8. Let UWNNE denote the total
utility at a WNNE pWNNE , i.e., pWNNE is the NNE for a game with utility function
Uf (γf ) = log(γf ). Fig.5.8 reveals that UWNNE closely matches UNNE when the number of
secondary-BSs is very small. But as the number of secondary-BSs increases the difference
between UNNE and UWNNE increases since the interference at a secondary-UT from other
secondary-BSs increases. Fig.5.8 also shows that the fluctuation of the utilities across
players is higher for power allocations based on the NNE. Intuitively,
∑
f log(γf ) induces
a proportional fair SINR allocation, thus the utilities at the WNNE vary on a smaller
range compared to the utilities corresponding to the power allocation based on an NNE.
Large r2 and large F : Finally, Fig. 5.9 shows the UWNNE as the number of secondary-
BSs increase. We still consider the Shannon capacity function as the utility function. We
consider r2 = 8, hence, it models the setting where the coverage area of secondary-BS
is large. We consider the number of primary-UTs (M) as 10. Note that, the NNE may
not be unique in this setting since Assumption 5.1 may not be satisfied. Additionally,
we cannot use Algorithm DIST-INT since M > 1. Instead, we can obtain WNNEs using
Algorithm DIST. Fig. 5.9 reveals that the sum of the utilities (UWNNE) increases initially
with the number of secondary-BSs, but it decreases after it reaches a certain threshold.
Intuitively, the characteristic of UWNNE is similar to the characteristic observed in Fig. 5.7
since pWNNE is an NNE when the utility function is log(γf ).
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5.8 Conclusion
We investigated the power allocation problem in cognitive radio networks using a game
theoretic setting. Each secondary-BS selects a transmission power subject to the global
constraint that the total interference should be below a given threshold at each primary-
UT. This game falls into the category of the coupled constrained concave games. We
adopted the NNE as an equilibrium concept since it caters to distributed settings. We
showed that the NNE is unique when the interference at a secondary-UT from adjacent
secondary-BSs is negligible. But an NNE may not be unique when the interference at
a secondary-UT from adjacent secondary-BSs is not negligible. We identified a class of
utility functions for which the NNE is unique in the latter setting. We also proposed a
distributed algorithm which converges to the unique NNE for those utility functions. In
the distributed algorithm, secondary-BSs do not exchange information among themselves
and each primary-UT only needs to track the total interference. When it is computation-
ally difficult to obtain an NNE or its uniqueness cannot be guaranteed, we leveraged on
the concept of WNNE as an equilibrium concept which retains most of the properties of
the NNE but it can be obtained with lower complexity compared to NNE. We showed the
importance of WNNE when the utility function is Shannon Capacity function and there
is inter secondary network interference.
WNNE is easy to compute, however, the performance of the WNNE can be poor
compared to the NNE. The characterization of the difference between the WNNE and
NNE, and the impact of the interference on the difference is a work for the future.
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Assume that p∗ is a NE for G′ but not for G. Then, there exists a pf such that (pf ,p∗−f ) ∈ P
and
Uf (γf (pf ,p
∗
−f )) > Uf (γf (p
∗)).
Since Uf is increasing then γf (pf ,p
∗
−f ) > γf (p
∗). But also Vf is an increasing function in
γf and
Vf (γf (pf ,p
∗
−f )) > Vf (γf (p
∗)).
This contradicts the assumption that p∗ is a NE for G′. Thus, p∗ is a NE for both G and
G′. 
5.A.2 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Let p∗ be an optimal solution to CCPG. First, note that p∗ is an NE. If it was not, then
there would exist a p′f such that (p
′
f ,p−f ) ∈ P, f ∈ F such that
uf (p
∗
f ,p
∗
−f ) < uf (p
′
f ,p
∗
−f ). (5.30)
Since Φ(·) is a potential function, (5.30) implies that Φ(p∗f ,p∗−f ) < Φ(p′f ,p∗−f ). This
contradicts the fact that p∗ is an optimal solution.
Since p∗ is an optimal solution, thus, according to the KKT conditions there exists a
ν = (ν1, . . . , νM )
T  0M such that
∂Φ
∂pf
− νĥf = 0 ∀f ∈ F (5.31)
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at p = p∗, with
νm(p
T ĥm − IT ) = 0 ∀m. (5.32)
Identifying λ in (5.7)–(5.9) with ν we can easily discern that p∗ is indeed an NNE. Hence,
the result follows.
5.A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Since Uf (γ
′
f ) does not depend on p−f , for any f ∈ F
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f ,p−f ) =
Uf (γ
′
f (pf ,p−f ))− Uf (γ′f (p′f ,p−f ))
for any (pf ,p−f ), (p′f ,p−f ) ∈ P. This proves that Φ(·) is a potential function.
By the definition of Φ(·) and γ′f , it is clear that if Uf (·) is strictly concave ∀f ∈ F ,
then so Φ(·) is.
5.A.4 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Note that
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f , p−f ) = log(pf )− log(p′f ). (5.33)
But,
log(γf (pf ,p−f ))− log(γf (p′f , p−f )) =
log
(
pfhf
pT−f h˜f + σ2
)
− log
(
p′fhf
pT−f h˜f + σ2
)
=
log(pf )− log(p′f ). (5.34)
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Thus, comparing (5.33) and (5.34) we conclude that Φ(p) is a potential function. It is
easy to verify that Φ(p) is a strictly concave function in p.
5.A.5 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Note that
∂2Uf
∂p2f
= − Bh
2
f
(pfhf + p
T
−f h˜f + σ2)2
∂2Uf
∂pf∂p`
= − Bhf h˜
`
f
(pfhf + p
T
−f h˜f + σ2)2
.
Additionally, the maximum of the denominator of
∂2Uf
∂p2f
is obtained when pf , f ∈ F
attains its maximum value in P. Note that for all feasible pf , f ∈ F we must have
pf ≤ min
m
IT
ĥfm
= p¯f .
On the other hand, the minimum value12 of the denominator of
∂2Uf
∂pf∂p`
and
∂2Uf
∂2pf
is σ4.
Since Assumption 5.1 is satisfied, thus, by identifying kf with
Bhf
(pfhf + p
T
−f h˜f + σ2)2
we
conclude that the matrix −G(p) defined in (5.10) is row-wise and column wise diagonally
dominant for all p ∈ P. Hence, −(G(p) + GT (p)) is positive definite ∀p ∈ P. Hence, the
result follows from Proposition 5.1.
5.A.6 Proof of Observation 5.1
Let us assume we have an NNE p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯F ) such that p¯
T ĥ < IT . Now, consider
the following unilateral deviation of player f : It increases its power p¯f to p˜f such that∑
` 6=f p¯`hˆ
` + p˜f hˆ
f = IT , which is a feasible solution. Since Uf (γf ) is a strictly increasing
12The minimum value is obtained when p = 0F .
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in pf thus, secondary-BS f gets strictly higher utility at p˜f compared to p¯f . Thus, player
f has an incentive to deviate unilaterally which, indeed, entails that p¯ cannot be an NE.
Hence, the result follows.
5.A.7 Proof of Proposition 5.6
We use the following result to prove proposition 5.6. Note that if i /∈ KI for some I,then
pi = 0, thus from (5.25) we obtain for any index k ∈ KI
pkhk + p
T
−kh˜
k =
Bhk
λhˆk
− σ2 (5.35)
Now we are ready to prove the proposition.
If K0 is empty, the optimal solution is p∗ = 0. Hence, the proposition is trivially true.
Thus, we consider the case when K0 is not empty.
Let L + 1 be the last iteration and thus pL+1 ≥ 0. Note that for pk, k /∈ KL+1 = 0.
Thus, in order to conclude the optimality we have to check whether pk, k /∈ KL+1 satisfies
(5.22)i.e. pk, k /∈ KL+1 must satisfy the following
∑
j 6=k
pL+1j h˜
k
j ≥
Bhk
λhˆk
− σ2
∑
j 6=k
pL+1j
h˜kj
hk
≥ B
λhˆk
− σ
2
hk
(5.36)
First we show that for k ∈ KL, /∈ KL+1, the above inequality holds. Later we show the
above for ks which do not belong to KL.
Note that since k ∈ KL and pLi = 0, i /∈ KL, thus we can write from (5.35)
pLkhk + p
T
−kh˜
k =
Bhk
λhˆk
− σ2 (5.37)
Since k ∈ KL and k /∈ KL+1 thus pLk < 0, pL+1k = 0.
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Let j ∈ KL+1. Thus, from (5.35)
pL+1j +
∑
i 6=j
pL+1i
h˜ji
hj
=
B
λhˆj
− σ
2
hj
(5.38)
Since j ∈ KL+1, thus j ∈ KL. Thus, from (5.35)
pLj +
∑
i 6=j
pLi
h˜ji
hj
=
B
λhˆj
− σ
2
hj
(5.39)
Thus, subtracting (5.39) from (5.38) we obtain
pL+1j +
∑
i 6=j
pL+1i
h˜ji
hj
− pLj −
∑
i 6=j
pLi
h˜ji
hj
= 0 (5.40)
Note that the above expression is true for any j ∈ KL+1. Let P1 = {i : pL+1i ≥ pLi } and
P2 = P
C
1 . Since p
L+1
k > p
L
k (as p
L+1
k = 0, p
L
k < 0), thus P1 is not empty. From (5.40) we
obtain
pL+1j − pLj ≥
∑
i∈P1,6=j
(pLi − pL+1i )
h˜ji
hj
(5.41)
If i /∈ KL+1, then pL+1i = 0 and pLi ≤ 0, thus by the definition of P2, all indices j ∈ P2
must belong to KL+1. Thus, (5.41) is valid for any j ∈ P2. Thus,
∑
j∈P2
(pL+1j − pLj )
h˜kj
hk
+
∑
i∈P1/{k}
(pL+1i − pLi )
h˜ki
hk
+ pL+1k − pLk
≥
∑
j∈P2
(
∑
i∈P1
(pLi − pL+1i )
h˜ji h˜
k
j
hkhj
)
+
∑
i∈P1/{k}
(pL+1i − pLi )
h˜ki
hk
+ pL+1k − pLk (from (5.41))
= (pL+1k − pLk )(1−
∑
j∈P2
h˜jkh˜
k
j
hkhj
)
+
∑
i∈P1/{k}
(pL+1i − pLi )(−
∑
j∈P2
h˜kj h˜
j
i
hkhj
+
h˜ki
hk
) (5.42)
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Since pL+1i − pLi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ P1, thus, from assumption 5.3 and (5.42) we have
∑
j∈P2
pL+1j
h˜kj
hk
+
∑
j∈P1/{k}
pL+1j
h˜kj
hk
+ pL+1k
≥ pLk +
∑
j 6=k
pLj
h˜kj
hk
=
B
λhˆk
− σ
2
hk
(from (5.37)) (5.43)
Since pL+1k = 0,hence from (5.43) we obtain (5.36) is valid for all k ∈ KL but not in
KL+1.
Now, suppose that k ∈ KL−1 but k /∈ KL. Thus, pLk = pL+1k = 0. Since k ∈ KL−1,
thus from (5.35)
pL−1k hk +
∑
j 6=k
pL−1j h˜
k
j =
Bhk
λhˆk
− σ2 (5.44)
Suppose j ∈ KL+1. Then, from (5.35)
pL+1j hj +
∑
i 6=j
pL+1i h˜
j
i =
Bhj
λhˆj
− σ2 (5.45)
Since j ∈ KL+1, thus j ∈ KL−1. Hence,
pL−1j hj +
∑
i 6=j
pL−1i h˜
j
i =
Bhj
λhˆj
− σ2 (5.46)
Thus, from (5.45) and (5.46) we obtain
pL+1j − pL−1j +
∑
i 6=j
(pL+1i − pL−1i )
h˜ji
hj
= 0
pL+1j − pL−1j ≥
∑
i∈K1,6=j
(pL−1i − pL+1i )
h˜ji
hj
(5.47)
where K1 = {i : pL+1i ≥ pL−1i }; let K2 = KC1 . Since k ∈ KL−1 but k /∈ KL, thus
pL−1k < 0 = p
L+1
k . Thus, K1 is not empty. Now, suppose that i ∈ KL, but i /∈ KL+1, we
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have already shown that (5.36) is valid for those indices, thus from (5.36) we have
pL+1i +
∑
l 6=i
pL+1l
h˜il
hi
≥ B
λhˆi
− σ
2
hi
(5.48)
where pL+1i = 0.
Again since i ∈ KL, thus, i ∈ KL−1. Thus from (5.35), we obtain
pL−1i hi +
∑
l 6=i
pL−1l h˜
i
l =
Bhi
λhˆi
− σ2
pL+1i − pL−1i +
∑
l 6=i
(pL+1l − pL−1l )
h˜il
hi
≥ 0 (from (5.48))
pL+1i − pL−1i ≥
∑
l∈K1, 6=i
(pL−1l − pL+1l )
h˜il
hi
(5.49)
Note that if a /∈ KL, then a /∈ KL+1. Thus, pL+1a = 0 and pL−1a ≤ 0. Thus, an index
i ∈ K2 only if i ∈ KL or i ∈ KL+1. Thus, (5.49) is valid for any index i ∈ K2. Hence
∑
j∈K2
(pL+1j − pL−1j )
h˜kj
hk
+
∑
j∈K1, 6=k
(pL+1j − pL−1j )
h˜kj
hk
+ pL+1k − pL−1k
≥
∑
j∈K2
(
∑
i∈K1
(pL−1i − pL+1i )
h˜ji h˜
k
j
hjhk
)
+
∑
i∈K1,i 6=k
(pL+1i − pL−1i )
h˜ki
hk
+ pL+1k − pL−1k (by (5.47)&(5.49))
=
∑
i∈K1/{k}
(pL+1i − pL−1i )(
h˜ki
hk
−
∑
j∈K2
h˜ji h˜
k
j
hjhk
)
+ (pL+1k − pL−1k )(1−
∑
j∈K2
h˜ji h˜
k
j
hjhk
) (5.50)
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Since pL+1i − pL−1i ≥ 0 for i ∈ K1, thus, from assumption 5.3 and (5.50) we have
∑
j∈K2
pL+1j
h˜kj
hk
+
∑
j∈K1/{k}
pL+1j
h˜kj
hk
+ pL+1k
≥ pL−1k +
∑
j∈K2
pL−1j
h˜kj
hk
+
∑
j∈K1/{k}
pL−1j
h˜kj
hk
=
B
λhˆk
− σ2 (from (5.44)) (5.51)
Since pL+1k = 0, thus, (5.51) implies that (5.36) is valid for k ∈ KL−1, but /∈ KL+1,KL.
Note that we have only used the fact that (5.36) is valid for any i ∈ KL but i /∈ KL+1
in order to show that (5.36) is valid for a k ∈ KL−1 but k /∈ KL,KL+1. Hence, using
the same argument we can show that (5.36) is valid for k ∈ KI but k /∈ KI+1 for any
I < L− 1. Hence, the result follows.
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G(p) =

κ1h1 −κ1h˜12 . . . −κ1h˜1F
−κ2h˜21 κ2h2 . . . −κ2h˜2F
...
...
. . .
...
−κF h˜F1 −κF h˜F2 . . . −κFhF

⊙

U ′′1 (γ1) γ1U
′′
1 (γ1) + U
′
1(γ1) . . . γ1U
′′
1 (γ1) + U
′
1(γ1)
γ2U
′′
2 (γ2) + U
′
2(γ2) U
′′
2 (γ2) . . . γ2U
′′
2 (γ2) + U
′
2(γ2)
...
...
. . .
...
γFU
′′
F (γF ) + U
′
F (γF ) γFU
′′
F (γF ) + U
′
F (γF ) . . . U
′′
F (γF )

. (5.14)
Figure 5.3: UOPT and Uf , f = 1, 2, 3 versus number of primary-UTs for Shannon capacity and
F = 3.
Figure 5.4: log(BER) versus number of primary-UTs for F = 3.
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Figure 5.5: Convergence analysis of Algorithm
DIST for F = 3, 5 and 8 secondary-BSs with
M = 5.
Figure 5.6: Convergence analysis of Algorithm
DIST versus the number of primary-UTs for
F = 3.
Figure 5.7: UOPT and UNNE
versus number of secondary-
BSs with M = 5.
Figure 5.8: UWNNE , UNNE
and individual utilities versus
the number of secondary-BSs
for IT = 10dB.
Figure 5.9: The sum of the
utilities of Secondary-BSs at
WNNE with M = 10 & IT =
10dB.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, we have addressed several technical issues which have inhibited the deploy-
ment of the real time secondary spectrum market. Specifically, in the first part of the
thesis (Chapters 2 to 4), we investigated a readily implementable secondary spectrum
market where a primary announces its price for its available channel in a database. The
price of the primary depends on several factors such as– the channel states, the infor-
mation that the primaries have, the various stages of the deployment and the cost of
acquiring additional information. We characterize the NE pricing strategies of the pri-
maries which will enable them to select prices by considering each such factor. We also
characterize the payoffs of the primaries and the possible social implications of the NE
strategies.
In the last part of the thesis (Chapter 5), we consider the setting where multiple
self-interested secondaries can use the spectrum of a primary. In such a scenario, the
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interference must be limited at each primary-UT in order to avoid the ‘‘tragedy of com-
mons”. However, since the secondaries are self-interested entities, the cooperation among
the secondaries can not be expected which make the interference mitigation a challenging
task. We provide a computationally efficient equilibrium which can redress the challenge.
In the following, we briefly state the setting that we considered and key results of each of
the chapter.
In Chapter 2 we consider the setting a primary is aware of its own channel state, but is
unaware of the channel states of other primaries while selecting its price. The secondaries
buy among the channels depending on the prices and the channel qualities. A primary
allows at most one secondary to use the channel. We already discussed the complications
arise in analyzing this setting in detail in Section 1.2. We show that the NE is unique
in this setting and also compute the same. We show that the primaries select prices
such that they will render the higher quality channels more preferable to the secondaries.
Thus, though we consider that each primary only maximizes its own payoff, it gives rise
a socially efficient allocation for a large class of penalty functions i.e. prices are selected
in such a way that the secondaries always buy higher quality channels compared to the
low quality ones (Please see Section 2.6 for complete discussion on results).
In Chapter 3 we analyze the setting where a primary owns a channel over multiple
locations. A primary needs to select a set of non interfering locations apart from the
price. We model the interference relationship as a conflict graph. Each primary selects
a price and an independent set (which represents the set of non interfering locations in
the conflict graph) where it will sell its channel. We already discussed the complications
arise in analyzing the setting in Section 1.6.4. We consider two scenarios-i) the number
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of locations is small, ii) the number of locations is large. Since the spectrum leasing is
in short term basis, thus, a computationally efficient strategy is also required. We show
that when the number of locations is small, there exists a computationally efficient NE
strategy where a primary selects an independent set whose cardinality is above a certain
threshold. The threshold increases with the quality of the channel. The symmetric NE
strategy is also unique in the linear conflict graph. When the number of locations is
large, a primary only selects among the maximum independent sets. The symmetric NE
strategy is also not unique in the linear conflict graph (Sections 1.6.4 and 3.7).
In Chapter 4 we consider a setting where a primary can acquire the CSI of the competi-
tor by incurring a cost. We formulate the problem with two primaries as a non cooperative
game. Each primary has to decide whether to acquire the CSI of the competitors or not,
and then a price depending on the information it has. However, a primary is unaware of
the decision of the other primaries. Thus, a primary is not aware whether its channel state
is known to the competitors whereas in the setting considered in Chapter 2 a primary
knows that its channel state is not known to the other primaries. Error also occurs while
estimating the CSI, which also complicates the analysis. In Section 1.4 we discuss in de-
tail all the complications arise in this setting. We characterize the NE strategies and the
impact of estimation errors, different costs of acquiring the CSI, and different availability
probabilities on the NE strategies. We have also obtained some counter intuitive results
( Section 1.6.3 and the introduction of Chapter 4).
In Chapter 5 we consider the setting where multiple secondaries use the spectrum of
a primary at a given location. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with
the secondary-BSs as the players. Each secondary-BS selects a power to maximize its own
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utility subject to the constraint that the interference must be limited at each primary-UT.
We use the normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) as an equilibrium concept. We show that
for a large class of utility functions, there exists a distributed algorithm which converges
to the unique NNE. In the distributed algorithm a secondary-BS needs not to know the
channel parameters of other secondary-BSs. We also introduce the concept of the weakly
normalized Nash equilibrium (WNNE) which proved to be invaluable when the NNE is
not unique or difficult to compute as WNNE retains most of the favorable properties of
the NNE.
6.2 Future Work
We first state some generic directions in which our work can be extended. Subsequently,
we state some specific directions in which the setting studied in each chapter can be
extended.
Throughout this thesis, we mainly consider the scenario where the primaries interact
only once. When the spectrum will be leased in a short term basis, the primaries may
interact multiple times. Consideration of the above will give rise several future research
directions. For example, the channel states of a primary may be correlated at different
times, the characterization of the NE in such a setting is a work for the future. When
the primaries interact multiple times, a primary may update the belief of the occurrence
of the channel states of the other primaries based on their actions. A primary has to
characterize the pricing strategy based on its own belief function. On the other hand, the
primary will also know that its competitors will learn about its channel state based on
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its action. The primary may deliberately mislead its competitors for potential gain. The
characterization of an NE in such a setting will require the tools from both the learning
theory, and the game theory and it has been deferred to the future. We also consider that
the secondaries are statistically identical in Chapters 2 to 4; the characterization of the
NE strategies when the secondaries are heterogeneous is also a work for the future.
We now describe the specific directions in which the setting studied in each chapter
can be extended. In Chapter 3 we consider that the available channels are statistically
identical when the number of locations is large. The characterization of an NE where
the available channel may belong to multiple states in the scenario where the number of
locations is large remains open. We also assume that the demand at different locations
are independent. The characterization of an NE when the demand at different locations
are correlated is a work for the future.
In Chapter 4 we consider the scenario where there are only two primaries. When there
are more than two primaries the complexity to characterize a NE strategy significantly
increases (Section 4.6). The characterization of the NE strategy profile in the scenario
where there are more than two primaries is deferred to the future. The characterization
of an NE strategy profile in the setting where the primary owns a channel over multiple
locations is a work for the future.
In Chapter 5, we consider the scenario where there is a constraint that the interference
must be limited at each primary-UT. The characterization of the equilibrium strategies
in the setting where primaries can relax the above constraint (by paying a penalty to the
primary-UTs for the violation of the interference constraint) by quoting additional prices
remains open.
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